4,848 research outputs found

    How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games

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    This paper uses a Bayesian mechanism design approach to investigate the effects of communication in a threshold public goods game. Individuals have private information about contribution costs. Individuals can each make a discrete contribution. If the number of contributors is at least equal to the threshold, a public benefit accrues to all members of the group. We experimentally implement three different communication structures prior to the decision move: (a) simultaneous exchange of binary messages, (b) larger finite numerical message space and (c) unrestricted text chat. We obtain theoretical bounds on the efficiency gains that are obtainable under these different communication structures. In an experiment with three person groups and a threshold of two, we observe significant efficiency gains only with the richest of these communication structures, where participants engage in unrestricted text chatting. In that case, the efficiency bounds implied by mechanism design theory are achieved

    An experimental inquiry into the nature of relational goods

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    Our experiment aims at studying the impact of two types of relational goods on the voluntary contributions to the production of a public good, i.e. acquaintance among the contributors and having performed a common work before the experiment. We implement two treatments with 128 participants from two different groups. In the first treatment the subjects are left talking in a room before the experiment (cheap talk treatment); they are not suggested any particular topic to talk about, nor are they requested to perform any activity in particular. The second treatment involves the performance of a common work (namely, the computation of some indices of economic performance of three companies, based on their balance sheets). The two groups of subjects are composed either by people with or without previous acquaintance. An equal number of subjects from each of these groups is then allocated to either treatment. After that the subjects played a standard 10-rounds public goods game in groups of 4. The groups were gender-homogeneous. This allows us also to inquire for the possible presence of a gender effect in our experiment. Our results show that: 1) both common work and previous acquaintance increase the average contribution to the public good, 2) there is a relevant gender effect with women contributing more or less than men, depending on the treatment. Therefore, we conclude that relational goods are important to enhance cooperation, that acquaintance and working together are rather complements than substitutes, and that different relational goods produce different effects on cooperation. Also, we find further evidence for women's behaviour to be more context-specific than men's.relational goods; public goods experiments; gender effect

    How Cheap Talk Enhances Efficiency in Public Goods Games

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    This paper uses a Bayesian mechanism design approach to investigate the effects of communication in a threshold public goods game. Individuals have private information about contribution costs. If at least some fraction of the group make a discrete contribution, a public benefit accrues to all members of the group. We experimentally implement three different communication structures prior to the decision move: (a) simultaneous exchange of binary messages, (b) larger finite numerical message space and (c) unrestricted text chat. We obtain theoretical bounds on the efficiency gains that are obtainable under these different communication structures. In an experiment with three person groups and a threshold of two, we observe significant efficiency gains only with the richest of these communication structures, where participants engage in unrestricted text chatting. In that case, the efficiency bounds implied by mechanism design theory are achieved

    The impact of smiling cues on social cooperation

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    This is the final version. Available on open access from Wiley via the DOI in this recordWhile there is a plethora of experimental studies on the effects of preplay communication on economic behavior, little is known about the impact of simple cues, such as smiling, on pro-sociality. This article presents a comprehensive analysis exploring how the presence of a smiling opportunity affects pro-social behavior as measured by a one-shot linear public goods game. Our design varies (i) whether smiling is costly or costless and (ii) whether one or both members in a group are given the opportunity to smile. To test for the robustness of our results, we consider two versions of smiling cues: (i) a smiling label and (ii) a smiling face (emoji). Our findings indicate that introducing a cost for smiling has detrimental behavioral consequences regardless of the cue. Specifically, when smiling is costly, only a small minority of subjects are willing to smile as opposed to when smiling is costless. As a result, subjects contribute significantly less. These results remain the same regardless of the type of smiling cue that subjects can send. Overall, our findings provide new evidence that simple cues such as smiles embody information that influences pro-social behavior in social interactions.University of BirminghamUniversity of Exete

    The Power of Words: Why Communication fosters Cooperation and Efficiency

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    We present a game-theoretical model that accounts for abundant experimental evidence from games with non-binding communication (‘cheap talk’). It is based on two key ideas: People are conditionally averse to break norms of honesty and fairness (i.e., the emotional cost of breaking a norm is low if few people comply), and heterogeneous with regard to their concern for norms. The model explains (a) why cooperation in social dilemmas rises if players can previously announce their intended play, (b) why details of the communication protocol like the number of message senders and the order in which players communicate affect cooperation, (c) why players in sender-receiver games tend to transmit more information than a standard analysis would predict, and (d) why senders of false messages are often sanctioned if punishment is available.Communication; Cooperation; Fairness; Heterogeneity; Honesty; Reciprocity; Social Norms

    Full Agreement and the Provision of Threshold Public Goods

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    The experimental evidence suggests that groups are inefficient at providing threshold public goods. This inefficiency appears to reflect an inability to coordinate over how to distribute the cost of providing the good. So, why do groups not just split the cost equally? We offer an answer to this question by demonstrating that in a standard threshold public good game there is no collectively rational recommendation. We also demonstrate that if full agreement is required in order to provide the public good then there is a collectively rational recommendation, namely, to split the cost equally. Requiring full agreement may, therefore, increase efficiency in providing threshold public goods. We test this hypothesis experimentally and find support for it

    Communication, Feedbacks and Repeated Moral Hazard with Short-lived Buyers

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    We show that experience good sellers facing myopic buyers can solve the inherent moral hazard problem by communicating their observation of quality before trade, provided that communication is part of their public track record. Such cheap-talk communication, if trusted, allows market prices to re ect the actual value created, thus providing an immediate reward for the seller's eort which complements the conventional, reputational incentives. Pre-trade communication achieves maximal eciency when truthful and the full eciency as the noise in the seller's observation vanishes. We fully characterize the conditions for communication to improve eciency and the extent to which it does so

    The power of words: why communication fosters cooperation and efficiency

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    We present a game-theoretical model that accounts for abundant experimental evidence from games with non-binding communication (‘cheap talk’). It is based on two key ideas: People are conditionally averse to break norms of honesty and fairness (i.e., the emotional cost of breaking a norm is low if few people comply), and heterogeneous with regard to their concern for norms. The model explains (a) why cooperation in social dilemmas rises if players can previously announce their intended play, (b) why details of the communication protocol like the number of message senders and the order in which players communicate affect cooperation, (c) why players in sender-receiver games tend to transmit more information than a standard analysis would predict, and (d) why senders of false messages are often sanctioned if punishment is available

    Essays on Social Dilemmas in Networks

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    The focus of the research is to study mechanisms that can raise the total social welfare in social dilemmas in exogenous networks. The two chapters apply experimental and empirical designs based on an underlying theoretical model which studies the effect of network structure on the group and individual behavior in laboratory settings. The first chapter studies the efficacy of two cost sharing rules in raising efficiency in a best shot public goods game. The two cost sharing rules align individual incentive with group efficiency. The first is a local cost sharing rule, where individuals who invest receive a transfer from each of their neighbors who do not invest. The second is a global cost sharing rule, where the total cost of investment is equally divided among members who benefit from the public good. The second chapter studies the effectiveness of two communication architectures in resolving inefficiencies in the provision of local public goods. Communication can help with coordination by lowering strategic uncertainty. The two communication structures I study are the following: (i) global, where everyone in the group can talk, (ii) local, where only neighbors can communicate with each other
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