6 research outputs found

    How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games

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    This paper uses a Bayesian mechanism design approach to investigate the effects of communication in a threshold public goods game. Individuals have private information about contribution costs. Individuals can each make a discrete contribution. If the number of contributors is at least equal to the threshold, a public benefit accrues to all members of the group. We experimentally implement three different communication structures prior to the decision move: (a) simultaneous exchange of binary messages, (b) larger finite numerical message space and (c) unrestricted text chat. We obtain theoretical bounds on the efficiency gains that are obtainable under these different communication structures. In an experiment with three person groups and a threshold of two, we observe significant efficiency gains only with the richest of these communication structures, where participants engage in unrestricted text chatting. In that case, the efficiency bounds implied by mechanism design theory are achieved

    Analysing Group Contract Design Using a Lab and a Lab-in-the-Field Threshold Public Good Experiment

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    This paper presents the results of a threshold public goods game experiment with heterogeneous players. The experiment is designed in close collaboration with the Dutch association of agri-environmental farmer collectives. Subjects are recruited at a university (“the lab”) and a farm management training centre (“lab-in-the-field”). The treatments have two different distribution rules which are varied in a within-subjects manner. After subjects have experienced both, they can vote for one of the two rules: either a differentiated bonus that results in equal payoff for all, or an undifferentiated, equal share of the group bonus. In a between-subjects manner, subjects can vote for a (minimum or average) threshold or are faced with an exogenous threshold. The results indicate that exogenous thresholds perform better, possibly because the focal point they provide facilitates coordination. With regard to the two distribution rules, the results are mixed: average contributions and payoffs are higher in the lab under the ‘equal-payoff’ rule, but there is no significant difference between the two in the lab-in-the-field, possibly because contributions in the lab-in-the-field are much less efficient. Overall, our results suggest that environmental payment schemes should not only consider farmer heterogeneity in the design of group contracts, but pay explicit attention to coordination problems as well

    Full Agreement and the Provision of Threshold Public Goods

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    The experimental evidence suggests that groups are inefficient at providing threshold public goods. This inefficiency appears to reflect an inability to coordinate over how to distribute the cost of providing the good. So, why do groups not just split the cost equally? We offer an answer to this question by demonstrating that in a standard threshold public good game there is no collectively rational recommendation. We also demonstrate that if full agreement is required in order to provide the public good then there is a collectively rational recommendation, namely, to split the cost equally. Requiring full agreement may, therefore, increase efficiency in providing threshold public goods. We test this hypothesis experimentally and find support for it

    Enhancing coordination in water management through communication tools: results from experimental games in Coastal Bangladesh

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    Canal siltation is a pervasive problem in coastal Bangladesh causing water-logging and losses in crop yield. Although timely maintenance of canals through regular contributions from the community can solve this problem; it often breaks down because of the free riding issue, a common feature in the provision of public goods. Previous literature on experimental games has shown how different communication strategies can help to achieve coordination. We conducted experimental games with the aims to: (i) determine the effectiveness of these communication institutions in the specific problem of maintenance of canal; and (ii) compare the relative effectiveness of different communication mechanisms. Playing these games was also a part of a participatory action research approach with the idea that community members would have a clearer understanding of the incentives and constraints of contribution for canal maintenance. The basic insight from our study is that any institution that enables more information sharing about both the intended contribution and setting the group norm translates into better coordination among the users to increase the group income towards Pareto Optimum outcomes. The lessons from these games could potentially open up a forum of discussion and help the villagers in their future communications as a tool for understanding and testing different alternatives for community management of natural resources. The results are also of interest for development practitioners supporting community organizations for sustaining local public goods

    Action revision, information and collusion in an experimental duopoly market

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    We report on an experiment designed to study a dynamic model of quantity competition where firms continuously revise their production targets prior to the play of the "one-shot" game. We investigate how the observability of rival firm's plans and the technology for implementation of revised actions affect market competitiveness. Under a real-time revision game where payoffs are determined only by the quantities prepared at the end, play converges to the Cournot-Nash output when rival's plans are unobservable. If plans cannot be hidden from competitors, choices are even more competitive than the static Nash equilibrium, thereby showing a negative value of information with lower profits. With stochastic revision, where opportunities to revise arrive according to a Poisson process and the quantities selected at the last opportunity are implemented, collusion is much frequent. This shows, more generally, that cooperation can be observed even when individuals interact only once
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