Hotelling tax competition

This paper shows how competition among governments for mobile firms can bring about excessive differentiation in levels of taxation and public good provision. Hotelling’s Principle of Minimum Differentiation is applied in the context of tax competition and shown to be invalid. Instead, when an equilibrium exists, differentiation of public good provision is maximized. Non-existence of equilibrium, which can occur, is a metaphor for intense tax competition. The paper also shows that, to some extent, perfect tax discrimination presents a solution to the existence problem created by Hotelling tax competition, but that the efficiency problem of Hotelling tax competition is exacerbated

Hotelling Tax Competition

This paper shows how competition among governments for mobile firms can bring about excessive differentiation in levels of taxation and public good provision. Hotelling’s Principle of Minimum Differentiation is applied in the context of tax competition and shown to be invalid. Instead, when an equilibrium exists, differentiation of public good provision is maximized. Non-existence of equilibrium, which is possible, is a metaphor for intense tax competition. The paper also shows that, to some extent, perfect tax discrimination presents a solution to the existence problem created by Hotelling tax competition, but that the efficiency problem of Hotelling tax competition is exacerbated.hotelling, limit tax, perfect tax discrimination, tax competion

HOTELLING TAX COMPETITION

This paper shows how competition among governments for mobile firms can bring about excessive differentiation in levels of taxation and public good provision. Hotelling’s Principle of Minimum Differentiation is applied in the context of tax competition and shown to be invalid. Instead, when an equilibrium exists, differentiation of public good provision is maximized. Non-existence of equilibrium, which can occur, is a metaphor for intense tax competition. The paper also shows that, to some extent, perfect tax discrimination presents a solution to the existence problem created by Hotelling tax competition, but that the efficiency problem of Hotelling tax competition is exacerbated.amenity competition ; Hotelling ; limit tax ; perfect tax discrimination ; single peaked profit function ; tax competition.

Depletion and Development: Natural Resource Supply with Endogenous Field Opening

This paper develops a model in which supply of a non-renewable resource can adjust through two margins: the rate of depletion and the rate of field opening. Faster depletion of existing fields means that less of the resource can ultimately be extracted, and optimal depletion of open fields follows a (modified) Hotelling rule. Opening a new field involves sinking a capital cost, and the timing of field opening is chosen to maximize the present value of the field. Output dynamics depend on both depletion and field opening, and supply responses to price changes are studied. In contrast to Hotelling, the long run equilibrium rate of growth of prices is independent of the rate of interest, depending instead on characteristics of demand and geologically determined supply.non-renewable resource, depletion, exhaustible, Hotelling, fossil fuel, carbon tax

Sustainable growth: The extraction-saving relationship

The paper presents two new results for the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz model with an essential nonrenewable resource: (1) the pattern of resource extraction can be more important for sustainable growth than the pattern of saving when the Hotelling Rule modifier is not small enough; (2) the qualitative behavior of the long-run per capita consumption can be examined along any smooth enough path of extraction using the "sustainability functional" introduced in the paper.sustainable growth; modified Hotelling Rule; sustainability number; Hubbert curve consumption

Multivariate Control Chart based on Neutrosophic Hotelling T2 Statistics and Its Application

Under classical statistics Hotelling 〖 T〗^2 control chart is applied when the observations of quality characteristics are precise, exact, or crips data. However, in reality, under uncertain conditions, the observations are not necessarily precise, exact, or indeterminacy. As a consequence, the classical Hotelling〖 T〗^2control chart is not appropriate to monitor the process for this condition. To tackle this situation, we proposed new Hotelling 〖 T〗^2 monitoring scheme based on a fuzzy neutrosophic concept. Neutrosophic is the generalization of fuzzy. It is used to handle uncertainty using indeterminacy. The combination of statistics based on neutrosophic Hotelling 〖 T〗^2 and classical Hotelling 〖 T〗^2 control chart will be proposed to tackle indeterminacy observations. The proposed Hotelling 〖 T〗^2 statistics, its call neutrosophic Hotelling 〖 T〗^2 (T_N^2 ) control chart. This chart involves the indeterminacy of observations, its call neutrosophic data and will be expressed in the indeterminacy interval. T_N^2 control charts consist T_N^2 lower chart and T_N^2 upper chart. In this paper, the neutrosophic Hotelling T^2will be applied to individual observations of glass production and will be compared by using classical Hotelling T^2 control chart. Based on T_N^2 control charts of glass production, nine points fall outside of 〖UCL〗_N of lower control chart and 24 points outside from 〖UCL〗_N  of upper control chart. Whereas using classical Hotelling T^2 control chart, just one point outside frim UCL. From the comparison, it concluded that the neutrosophic Hotelling T^2 control chart is more suitable for the indeterminacy of observations

On Coase and Hotelling

It has been long recognized that an exhaustible-resource monopsonist faces a commitment problem similar to that of a durable-good monopolist. Indeed, Hörner and Kamien (2004) demonstrate that the two problems are formally equivalent under full commitment. We show that there is no such equivalence in the absence of commitment. The existence of a choke price at which the monopsonist adopts the substitute (backstop) supply divides the surplus between the buyer and the sellers in a way that is unique to the resource model. Resource sellers receive a surplus share independently of their cost heterogeneity; a result in sharp contrast with the durable-good monopoly logic. The resource buyer can distort the equilibrium through delayed purchases, but the Coase conjecture arises under extreme patience (zero discount rate).Durable goods, exhaustible resources, coase conjecture