26,856 research outputs found
PASCAL: Timing SCA Resistant Design and Verification Flow
A large number of crypto accelerators are being deployed with the widespread
adoption of IoT. It is vitally important that these accelerators and other
security hardware IPs are provably secure. Security is an extra functional
requirement and hence many security verification tools are not mature. We
propose an approach/flow-PASCAL-that works on RTL designs and discovers
potential Timing Side-Channel Attack(SCA) vulnerabilities in them. Based on
information flow analysis, this is able to identify Timing Disparate Security
Paths that could lead to information leakage. This flow also (automatically)
eliminates the information leakage caused by the timing channel. The insertion
of a lightweight Compensator Block as balancing or compliance FSM removes the
timing channel with minimum modifications to the design with no impact on the
clock cycle time or combinational delay of the critical path in the circuit.Comment: Total page number: 4 pages; Figures: 5 figures; conference: 25th IEEE
International Symposium on On-Line Testing and Robust System Design 201
The Political Economy Of Sanitation: How Can We Increase Investment and Improve Service For The Poor?
This report presents the results of a Global Economic and Sector Work (ESW) Study on the Political Economy of Sanitation in Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Senegal that was conducted by the Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) and the World Bank. Its purpose is to help WSP and the World Bank -- through a better understanding of the political economy of sanitation -- in their efforts to support partner countries and development practitioners in the design, implementation, and effectiveness of operations that aim to provide pro-poor sanitation investments and services to improve health and hygiene outcomes
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Precise Enforcement of Progress-Sensitive Security
Program progress (or termination) is a covert channel that may leak sensitive information. To control information leakage on this channel, semantic definitions of security should be progress sensitive and enforcement mechanisms should restrict the channel's capacity. However, most state-of-the-art language-based information-flow mechanisms are progress insensitive---allowing arbitrary information leakage through this channel---and current progress-sensitive enforcement techniques are overly restrictive.
We propose a type system and instrumented semantics that together enforce progress-sensitive security more precisely than existing approaches. Our system is permissive in that it is able to accept programs in which the termination behavior depends only on low-security (e.g., public or trusted) information. Our system is parameterized on a termination oracle, and controls the progress channel precisely, modulo the ability of the oracle to determine the termination behavior of a program based on low-security information. We have instantiated the oracle for a simple imperative language with a logical abstract interpretation that uses an SMT solver to synthesize linear rank functions.
In addition, we extend the system to permit controlled leakage through the progress channel, with the leakage bound by an explicit budget. We empirically analyze progress channels in existing Jif code. Our evaluation suggests that security-critical programs appear to satisfy progress-sensitive security.Engineering and Applied Science
Online Personal Data Processing and EU Data Protection Reform. CEPS Task Force Report, April 2013
This report sheds light on the fundamental questions and underlying tensions between current policy objectives, compliance strategies and global trends in online personal data processing, assessing the existing and future framework in terms of effective regulation and public policy. Based on the discussions among the members of the CEPS Digital Forum and independent research carried out by the rapporteurs, policy conclusions are derived with the aim of making EU data protection policy more fit for purpose in todayâs online technological context. This report constructively engages with the EU data protection framework, but does not provide a textual analysis of the EU data protection reform proposal as such
A language for automatically enforcing privacy policies
It is becoming increasingly important for applications to protect sensitive data. With current techniques, the programmer bears the burden of ensuring that the application's behavior adheres to policies about where sensitive values may flow. Unfortunately, privacy policies are difficult to manage because their global nature requires coordinated reasoning and enforcement. To address this problem, we describe a programming model that makes the system responsible for ensuring adherence to privacy policies. The programming model has two components: 1) core programs describing functionality independent of privacy concerns and 2) declarative, decentralized policies controlling how sensitive values are disclosed. Each sensitive value encapsulates multiple views; policies describe which views are allowed based on the output context. The system is responsible for automatically ensuring that outputs are consistent with the policies. We have implemented this programming model in a new functional constraint language named Jeeves. In Jeeves, sensitive values are introduced as symbolic variables and policies correspond to constraints that are resolved at output channels. We have implemented Jeeves as a Scala library using an SMT solver as a model finder. In this paper we describe the dynamic and static semantics of Jeeves and the properties about policy enforcement that the semantics guarantees. We also describe our experience implementing a conference management system and a social network
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