PORTFOLIO OPTIMIZATION IN ELECTRICITY TRADING WITH LIMITED LIQUIDITY

In principle, portfolio optimization in electricity markets can make use of the standard mean-variance model going back to Markowitz. Yet a key restriction in most electricity markets is the limited liquidity. Therefore the standard model has to be adapted to cope with limited liquidity. An application of this model shows that the optimal hedging strategy for generation portfolios is strongly dependent on the size of the portfolio considered as well as on the variance-covariancematrix used and the liquidity function assumed.optimization; electricity, liquidity; electricity trading; mean-variance-model

Dynamic Pricing, Advanced Metering, and Demand Response in Electricity Markets

Presents an overview and analysis of the possible approaches to bringing an active demand side into electricity markets. Part of a series of research reports that examines energy issues facing California

Formulating hedging strategies for financial risk mitigation in competitive U.S. electricity markets

The challenges currently facing participants in the competitive electricity markets are unique and staggering: unprecedented price volatility, fluctuations in the demand, a lack of historical market data on which to test the new modeling approaches, increased competition and continuously changing regulatory structure...Electricity plant owners and purchasers of electricity may benefit from various techniques to manage price volatility. For electricity, however, no futures market is actively traded. The electricity forward market in NYMEX is in its nascent stage and is low in liquidity. Producers and purchasers of electricity may find cross-hedging electricity with natural gas futures contracts to be effective in reducing exposure to price volatility. The objective of this study is to estimate the cross-hedge relationship and strategies between spot electricity price and the NYMEX natural gas futures market for the cross-hedging horizon of one month --Introduction, page 10-11

Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets

Deregulation of the electricity sector has resulted in conflict between the economic aims of creating competitive wholesale and retail markets, and an engineering focus on reliability of supply. The paper starts by deriving the optimal prices and investment program when there are price-insensitive retail consumers, and their load serving entities can choose any level of rationing they prefer contingent on real time prices. It then examines the assumptions required for a competitive wholesale and retail market to achieve this optimal price and investment program. The paper analyses the implications of relaxing several of these assumptions. First, it analyses the interrelationships between regulator-imposed price caps, capacity obligations, and system operator procurement, dispatch and compensation arrangements. It goes on to explore the implications of potential network collapses, the concomitant need for operating reserve requirements and whether market prices will provide incentives for investments consistent with these reserve requirements

Financial risk management and market performance in restructured electric power markets: Theoretical and agent-based test bed studies

Electric power systems have traditionally been operated as natural monopolies. Restructuring has entailed un-bundling of hitherto vertically integrated organizations into independently managed generation, transmission and distribution systems. As a result, electric power markets can be divided into wholesale and retail layers. The wholesale power market design proposed by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in an April 2003 white paper FERC (2003) encompasses the following core features: central oversight by an independent system operator (ISO); a two-settlement system consisting of a day-ahead market supported by a parallel real-time market to ensure continual balancing of electric power supply and demand. In this new environment electricity is traded like other commodities in ISO organized power pools. However, power systems must be in instantaneous power balance, i.e. demand must equal supply at all times. Moreover, at present, electric power cannot be stored economically in substantial amounts. The power flows on transmission systems are governed by physical laws of power flow such as the Kirchoff\u27s law, and are constrained by the overall capacity of transmission lines. During the peak hours of electric power demand, the above mentioned constraints become binding affecting outcomes throughout the grid. Transmission constraints in particular create congestion, which can impede the generation and/or injection of electric power into the grid in merit-order , i.e., from least-cost generator to high-cost generators. Electric power prices can be very volatile and hence, new forms of risk have arisen due to the restructuring. As part of restructuring, congestion on electricity transmission grids is now handled in many energy regions by means of locational marginal pricing (LMP), i.e., the pricing of electric energy in accordance with the location of its injection or withdrawal from the grid. The LMP so calculated at a node k measures the least cost to supply an additional unit of load at that location from the resources of the system. The difference in LMPs at any two buses is known as congestion rent, which is collected by the ISO. In the case of grid congestion, LMPs can vary widely across the grid, which creates price risk for all market participants. Using existing market design features, this thesis investigates the risk management issues of market participants and overall efficiency of the wholesale power markets. Additionally, I also study the market rules dealing with renewable energy sources

Dynamic pricing for demand response considering market price uncertainty

Retail energy providers (REPs) can employ different strategies such as offering demand response (DR) programs, participating in bilateral contracts, and employing self-generation distributed generation (DG) units to avoid financial losses in the volatile electricity markets. In this paper, the problem of setting dynamic retail sales price by a REP is addressed with a robust optimization technique. In the proposed model, the REP offers price-based DR programs while it faces uncertainties in the wholesale market price. The main contribution of this paper is using a robust optimization approach for setting the short-term dynamic retail rates for an asset-light REP.With this approach, the REP can decide how to participate in forward contracts and call options. They can also determine the optimal operation of the self-generation DG units. Several case studies have been carried out for a REP with 10,679 residential consumers. The deterministic approach and its robust counterpart are used to solve the problem. The results show that, with a slight decrease in the expected payoff, the REP can effectively protect itself against price variations. Offering time-variable retail rates also can increase the expected profit of the REPs.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio