Secure Vehicular Communication Systems: Implementation, Performance, and Research Challenges

Vehicular Communication (VC) systems are on the verge of practical deployment. Nonetheless, their security and privacy protection is one of the problems that have been addressed only recently. In order to show the feasibility of secure VC, certain implementations are required. In [1] we discuss the design of a VC security system that has emerged as a result of the European SeVeCom project. In this second paper, we discuss various issues related to the implementation and deployment aspects of secure VC systems. Moreover, we provide an outlook on open security research issues that will arise as VC systems develop from today's simple prototypes to full-fledged systems

Settlement in modern network-based payment infrastructures – description and prototype of the E-Settlement model

Payment systems are undergoing rapid and fundamental changes stimulated largely by technological progress especially distributed network technology and real-time processing. Internet and e-commerce will have a major impact on payment systems in the future. User demands and competition will speed up developments. Payment systems will move from conventions that were originally paper-based to truly network-based solutions. This paper presents a solution – E-Settlement – for improving interbank settlement systems. It is based on a decentralised approach to be fully integrated with the banks’ payment systems. The basic idea is that central bank money, the settlement cover, is transferred as an encrypted digital stamp as part of the interbank payment message. The future payment systems would in this model operate close to the Internet/e-mail concept by sending payment messages directly from the sending bank’s account/payment server to the system of the receiving bank with immediate final interbank settlement without intervening centralised processing. Payment systems would become more efficient and faster and the overall structure would be come straightforward. The E-Settlement and network-based system concept could be applied with major benefits for correspondent banking, ACH and RTGS processing environments. In order to assess this novel idea the Bank of Finland built a prototype of the E-Settlement model. It consist of a group of emulated banks sending payments to each other via a TCP/IP network under the control of a central bank as the liquidity provider and an administration site monitoring the system security. This paper contains an introduction to network-based payment systems and E-Settlement, the specifications of the E-Settlement model and the description, results and experiences of the actual E-Settlement prototype.network-based payment systems; settlement systems; interbank settlement; payment system integration

Post-Quantum Secure Architectures for Automotive Hardware Secure Modules

The rapid development of information technology in the automotive industry has driven increasing requirements on incorporating security functionalities in the in-vehicle architecture, which is usually realized by adding a Hardware Secure Module (HSM) in the Electronic Central Unit (ECU). Therefore, secure communications can be enforced by carrying out secret cryptographic computations within the HSM by use of the embedded hardware accelerators. However, there is no common standard for designing the architecture for an automotive HSM. A future design of a common automotive HSM is desired by the automotive industry which not only fits to the increasing performance demand, but also further defends against future attacks by attackers exploiting large-scale quantum computers. The arrival of future quantum computers motivates the investigation into post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which will retain the security of an HSM in the future. We analyzed the candidates in NIST\u27s PQC standardization process, and proposed new sets of hardware accelerators for the future generation of the automotive HSMs. Our evaluation results show that building a post-quantum secure automotive HSM is feasible and can meet the hard requirements imposed by a modern vehicle ECU

RSA Signatures Under Hardware Restrictions

We would like to compute RSA signatures with the help of a Hardware Security Module (HSM). But what can we do when we want to use a certain public exponent that the HSM does not allow or support? Surprisingly, this scenario comes up in real-world settings such as code-signing of Intel SGX enclaves. Intel SGX enclaves have to be signed in order to execute in release mode, using 3072-bit RSA signature scheme with a particular public exponent. However, we encountered commercial hardware security modules that do not support storing RSA keys corresponding to this exponent. We ask whether it is possible to overcome such a limitation of an HSM and answer it in the affirmative (under stated assumptions). We show how to convert RSA signatures corresponding to one public exponent, to valid RSA signatures corresponding to another exponent. We define security and show that it is not compromised by the additional public knowledge available to an adversary in this setting

Deduction with XOR Constraints in Security API Modelling

We introduce XOR constraints, and show how they enable a theorem prover to reason effectively about security critical subsystems which employ bitwise XOR. Our primary case study is the API of the IBM 4758 hardware security module. We also show how our technique can be applied to standard security protocols

A Formal Theory of Key Conjuring

Key conjuring is the process by which an attacker obtains an unknown, encrypted key by repeatedly calling a cryptographic API function with random values in place of keys. We propose a formalism for detecting computationally feasible key conjuring operations, incorporated into a Dolev-Yao style model of the security API. We show that security in the presence of key conjuring operations is decidable for a particular class of APIs, which includes the key management API of IBM’s Common Cryptographic Architecture (CCA)