Characterizing the principle of minimum cross-entropy within a conditional-logical framework

AbstractThe principle of minimum cross-entropy (ME-principle) is often used as an elegant and powerful tool to build up complete probability distributions when only partial knowledge is available. The inputs it may be applied to are a prior distribution P and some new information R, and it yields as a result the one distribution P∗ that satisfies R and is closest to P in an information-theoretic sense. More generally, it provides a “best” solution to the problem “How to adjust P to R?”In this paper, we show how probabilistic conditionals allow a new and constructive approach to this important principle. Though popular and widely used for knowledge representation, conditionals quantified by probabilities are not easily dealt with. We develop four principles that describe their handling in a reasonable and consistent way, taking into consideration the conditional-logical as well as the numerical and probabilistic aspects. Finally, the ME-principle turns out to be the only method for adjusting a prior distribution to new conditional information that obeys all these principles.Thus a characterization of the ME-principle within a conditional-logical framework is achieved, and its implicit logical mechanisms are revealed clearly

Probabilistic inferences from conjoined to iterated conditionals

There is wide support in logic, philosophy, and psychology for the hypothesis that the probability of the indicative conditional of natural language, $P(\textit{if } A \textit{ then } B)$, is the conditional probability of $B$ given $A$, $P(B|A)$. We identify a conditional which is such that $P(\textit{if } A \textit{ then } B)= P(B|A)$ with de Finetti's conditional event, $B|A$. An objection to making this identification in the past was that it appeared unclear how to form compounds and iterations of conditional events. In this paper, we illustrate how to overcome this objection with a probabilistic analysis, based on coherence, of these compounds and iterations. We interpret the compounds and iterations as conditional random quantities which, given some logical dependencies, may reduce to conditional events. We show how the inference to $B|A$ from $A$ and $B$ can be extended to compounds and iterations of both conditional events and biconditional events. Moreover, we determine the respective uncertainty propagation rules. Finally, we make some comments on extending our analysis to counterfactuals

Making Ranking Theory Useful for Psychology of Reasoning

An organizing theme of the dissertation is the issue of how to make philosophical theories useful for scientific purposes. An argument for the contention is presented that it doesn’t suffice merely to theoretically motivate one’s theories, and make them compatible with existing data, but that philosophers having this aim should ideally contribute to identifying unique and hard to vary predictions of their theories. This methodological recommendation is applied to the ranking-theoretic approach to conditionals, which emphasizes the epistemic relevance and the expression of reason relations as part of the semantics of the natural language conditional. As a first step, this approach is theoretically motivated in a comparative discussion of other alternatives in psychology of reasoning, like the suppositional theory of conditionals, and novel approaches to the problems of compositionality and accounting for the objective purport of indicative conditionals are presented. In a second step, a formal model is formulated, which allows us to derive quantitative predictions from the ranking-theoretic approach, and it is investigated which novel avenues of empirical research that this model opens up for. Finally, a treatment is given of the problem of logical omniscience as it concerns the issue of whether ranking theory (and other similar approaches) makes too idealized assumptions about rationality to allow for interesting applications in psychology of reasoning. Building on the work of Robert Brandom, a novel solution to this problem is presented, which both opens up for new perspectives in psychology of reasoning and appears to be capable of satisfying a range of constraints on bridge principles between logic and norms of reasoning, which would otherwise stand in a tension