Anti-Radiation Missiles vs. Radars

In this article the author makes an attempt to characterize the factors which are to be taken into consideration while designing the ground radar component of Air Defense systems, in order to enable them to operate on the modern battlefield. He presents the latest theoretical views on the relationship between the usage of anti-radar weapons and the organizational and technical defense mechanisms which can be deployed against such weapons. In particular the author emphasizes the protection of radars against anti-radiation missiles (ARMs) which present the biggest threat for effective Air Defense systems. He also stresses the need to combine radars into one system which enables the streamlining of their work parameters and thus ensuring their complex usage. The gaining of those capabilities will guarantee that the parameters of the air surveillance radar zone can be defined effectively

Army Global Missile Defense Operations

Army Global Missile Defense Operations, United States Army Field Manual FM 3-2

U.S Naval Strategy in the 1990\u27s

The decade of the 1990s represents a distinctive period in American naval strategic thinking. Bounded on one side by the end of the Cold War in 1989-91 and on the other by the beginning of the era of the global war on terrorism after 11 September 2001, these were years in which the U.S. Navy of the 1990s found itself faced with a dramatically altered strategic situation. For the first time in at least four decades, the U.S. Navy had neither a peer nor a superior naval adversary; further, no credible naval adversary could be discerned in the foreseeable future.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-newport-papers/1026/thumbnail.jp

Impacts of Anti-Access/Area Denial Measures on Space Systems: Issues and Implications for Army and Joint Forces

The 2018 National Defense Strategy and National Space Strategy both reaffirm the vital interests that the United States has in the domain of space. However, space remains an inherently hostile environment that has become congested, contested, and competitive among the nations. What are ways for the U.S. Army to assure the success of its space-dependent warfighting functions in an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environment where space systems are degraded for significant periods of time?https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1395/thumbnail.jp

2035 AND U.S. NAVY INTELLIGENCE: COMMUNITY MANNING FOR SUCCESS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

This thesis seeks to understand the best method for employing the Naval intelligence community in 2035 and beyond. Naval intelligence manning has remained largely unchanged since the end of the Cold War. As the United States adapts to a new geopolitical paradigm involving peer military forces and the rapid technological advances, the Naval intelligence community must adapt to ensure U.S. success in all phases of conflict. This thesis sets the stage for a future geopolitical scenario defined by multipolarity, confrontation with China, and the rise of artificial intelligence and remote technologies. This thesis examines the problem of strategic warning to enable deterrence, effective team building to optimize information flow, and the effectiveness of tactical intelligence in the modern and future naval battlefield. Ultimately, this thesis argues the Naval intelligence community should expand its support to tactical warfighting units to ensure sustained U.S. naval dominance.Lieutenant, United States NavyApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited

THE IRANIAN MARITIME CHALLENGE

Iran is the leading challenge to the United States and its partners and allies in the Middle East. Nowhere is this challenge more pronounced than in the maritime domain, where Iran’s naval power continues to dwarf that of its neighbors in the Persian Gulf. This thesis explores the threat Iran poses by examining the extensive maritime capabilities of its two navies, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy (IRGCN) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN), and how those forces have employed their capabilities in past aggressive behavior. The thesis highlights three primary cases to that end: Iran’s attacks on commercial shipping during the Tanker War, the brief hostage-taking of U.S. Sailors near Farsi Island, and the repeated use of harassment tactics and sabotage operations. Through those cases studies, a broader assessment is made regarding the degree of Iran’s ability to use its capabilities to close the Strait of Hormuz for an extended period and its ability to effectively employ kinetic swarm attacks against the U.S. Navy. This study concludes with some recommendations for the U.S. Navy on ways to better plan for, and counter, Iran’s likely tactical pathways of aggression at sea.Lieutenant, United States NavyApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited

UAV swarm attack: protection system alternatives for Destroyers

Systems Engineering Project ReportThe Navy needs to protect Destroyers (DDGs) from Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) attacks. The team, focusing on improving the DDG’s defenses against small radar cross section UAVs making suicide attacks, established a DRM, identified current capability gaps, established a functional flow, created requirements, modeled the DDG’s current sensing and engagement capabilities in Microsoft Excel, and used Monte Carlo analysis of 500 simulation runs to determine that four out of eight incoming IED UAVs are likely to hit the ship. Sensitivity analysis showed that improving weapon systems is more effec-tive than improving sensor systems, inspiring the generation of alternatives for improving UAV defense. For the eight feasible alternatives the team estimated cost, assessed risk in accordance with the requirements, simulated performance against the eight incoming UAVs, and performed cost benefit analysis. Adding CIWS mounts is the most cost effec-tive alternative, reducing the average number of UAV hits from a baseline of 3.82 to 2.50, costing $816M to equip the 62-DDG fleet for a 12-year life cycle. Combining that with upgraded EW capabilities to jam remote-controlled UAVs reduces the hits to 1.56 for$1844M, and combining those with decoy launchers to defeat the radar-seeking Har-py UAVs reduces the hits to 1.12 for $2862M.http://archive.org/details/uavswarmttackpro1094528669Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Rule of Law in the Age of the Drone: Requiring Transparency and Disqualifying Clandestine Actors—the CIA and the Joint Special Operations Command

Since shortly after 9/11, weaponized drones have be-come part of the fabric of United States policy and practice in countering Islamic terrorist organizations and personnel. Although many diplomats, UN officials, and scholars have criticized the widespread use of this weapon system for “targeted killing,” drones are here to stay. But how much investigation and oversight must a democratic country carry out over such a program, and more critically, how can a country do so effectively when the Executive has handed primary responsibility for drone targeted killing attacks to its clandestine forces, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Special Operations Command? In a confrontation with extremely violent terrorist organizations, the balance between secrecy and transparency is not easily struck. But compiling, in essence, a hit list and telling our secret agents to employ from the safety of a control room a weaponized drone to target individuals on the list demands greater openness. In addition, the line between lawful killing of combatants and extrajudicial taking of life grows increasingly thin, particularly when the state carries out such killings outside of armed conflict zones. A democratic nation and a superpower needs to do more than claim it is in the right and that it complies with international law—that nation must show that it is doing so. Since they keep their operations and the effects of all their operations secret, the CIA and JSOC cloud the explosive tactic of targeted killing. Consequently, they literally keep the American public and the world community in the dark about deliberate, institutional taking of life. Such a pro-gram of secrecy, with little known accountability, leads to speculation about who and why selected persons were killed and to what extent, if any, civilians were included in their number. Furthermore, such secrecy deprives the United States of the opportunity to show it is complying with applicable international humanitarian law and human rights law. Because terrorist organizations, to a great extent, operate underground in many countries and because they employ guerilla tactics and can inspire lone wolves anywhere on the globe, little chance exists that the U.S. military alone can eliminate the threat of terrorism. The United States and its Western allies need the help of Muslim countries, Muslim governments, and Muslim communities around the world to stop those extremists who would do us harm. Using our secret forces to engage in such killing may, however, under-mine the moral authority of the United States, especially in the eyes of Muslims. Such secrecy suggests we have some-thing to hide. Using the CIA and JSOC, on top of the perceived Muslim immigration bans, can only add to distrust of the United States in the Muslim community, whose cooperation is crucial to eliminating the extremists’ threat. Thus, the United States must take away from the CIA and JSOC the responsibility to conduct drone targeted killing at-tacks and give that authority to more transparent armed service commands