9 research outputs found
Group Activity Selection with Few Agent Types
The Group Activity Selection Problem (GASP) models situations where a group of agents needs to be distributed to a set of activities while taking into account preferences of the agents w.r.t. individual activities and activity sizes. The problem, along with its well-known variants sGASP and gGASP, has previously been studied in the parameterized complexity setting with various parameterizations, such as number of agents, number of activities and solution size. However, the complexity of the problem parameterized by the number of types of agents, a natural parameter proposed already in the first paper that introduced GASP, has so far remained unexplored. In this paper we establish the complexity map for GASP, sGASP and gGASP when the number of types of agents is the parameter. Our positive results, consisting of one fixed-parameter algorithm and one XP algorithm, rely on a combination of novel Subset Sum machinery (which may be of general interest) and identifying certain compression steps which allow us to focus on solutions which are "acyclic". These algorithms are complemented by matching lower bounds, which among others close a gap to a recently obtained tractability result of Gupta, Roy, Saurabh and Zehavi (2017). In this direction, the techniques used to establish W[1]-hardness of sGASP are of particular interest: as an intermediate step, we use Sidon sequences to show the W[1]-hardness of a highly restricted variant of multi-dimensional Subset Sum, which may find applications in other settings as well
Hedonic Games and Treewidth Revisited
We revisit the complexity of the well-studied notion of Additively Separable Hedonic Games (ASHGs). Such games model a basic clustering or coalition formation scenario in which selfish agents are represented by the vertices of an edge-weighted digraph G = (V,E), and the weight of an arc uv denotes the utility u gains by being in the same coalition as v. We focus on (arguably) the most basic stability question about such a game: given a graph, does a Nash stable solution exist and can we find it efficiently?
We study the (parameterized) complexity of ASHG stability when the underlying graph has treewidth t and maximum degree ?. The current best FPT algorithm for this case was claimed by Peters [AAAI 2016], with time complexity roughly 2^{O(??t)}. We present an algorithm with parameter dependence (? t)^{O(? t)}, significantly improving upon the parameter dependence on ? given by Peters, albeit with a slightly worse dependence on t. Our main result is that this slight performance deterioration with respect to t is actually completely justified: we observe that the previously claimed algorithm is incorrect, and that in fact no algorithm can achieve dependence t^{o(t)} for bounded-degree graphs, unless the ETH fails. This, together with corresponding bounds we provide on the dependence on ? and the joint parameter establishes that our algorithm is essentially optimal for both parameters, under the ETH.
We then revisit the parameterization by treewidth alone and resolve a question also posed by Peters by showing that Nash Stability remains strongly NP-hard on stars under additive preferences. Nevertheless, we also discover an island of mild tractability: we show that Connected Nash Stability is solvable in pseudo-polynomial time for constant t, though with an XP dependence on t which, as we establish, cannot be avoided
Core Stability in Additively Separable Hedonic Games of Low Treewidth
Additively Separable Hedonic Game (ASHG) are coalition-formation games where
we are given a graph whose vertices represent selfish agents and the weight
of each edge denotes how much agent gains (or loses) when she is
placed in the same coalition as agent . We revisit the computational
complexity of the well-known notion of core stability of ASHGs, where the goal
is to construct a partition of the agents into coalitions such that no group of
agents would prefer to diverge from the given partition and form a new
(blocking) coalition. Since both finding a core stable partition and verifying
that a given partition is core stable are intractable problems
(-complete and coNP-complete respectively) we study their
complexity from the point of view of structural parameterized complexity, using
standard graph-theoretic parameters, such as treewidth
LIPIcs, Volume 244, ESA 2022, Complete Volume
LIPIcs, Volume 244, ESA 2022, Complete Volum
Group activity selection problem with approval preferences
We consider a setting where one has to organize one or several group activities for a set of agents. Each agent will participate in at most one activity, and her preferences over activities depend on the number of participants in the activity. The goal is to assign agents to activities based on their preferences in a way that is socially optimal and/or stable. We put forward a general model for this setting, which is a natural generalization of anonymous hedonic games. We then focus on a special case of our model where agents’ preferences are binary, i.e., each agent classifies all pairs of the form ‘(activity, group size)’ into ones that are acceptable and ones that are not. We formulate several solution concepts for this scenario, and study them from the computational point of view, providing hardness results for the general case as well as efficient algorithms for settings where agents’ preferences satisfy certain natural constraints
Group activity selection problem with approval preferences
International audienceWe consider a setting where one has to organize one or several group activities for a set of agents. Each agent will participate in at most one activity, and her preferences over activities depend on the number of participants in the activity. The goal is to assign agents to activities based on their preferences in a way that is socially optimal and/or stable. We put forward a general model for this setting, which is a natural generalization of anonymous hedonic games. We then focus on a special case of our model where agents’ preferences are binary, i.e., each agent classifies all pairs of the form ‘(activity, group size)’ into ones that are acceptable and ones that are not. We formulate several solution concepts for this scenario, and study them from the computational point of view, providing hardness results for the general case as well as efficient algorithms for settings where agents’ preferences satisfy certain natural constraints
Group activity selection problem with approval preferences
We consider a setting where one has to organize one or several group activities for a set of agents. Each agent will participate in at most one activity, and her preferences over activities depend on the number of participants in the activity. The goal is to assign agents to activities based on their preferences in a way that is socially optimal and/or stable. We put forward a general model for this setting, which is a natural generalization of anonymous hedonic games. We then focus on a special case of our model where agents’ preferences are binary, i.e., each agent classifies all pairs of the form ‘(activity, group size)’ into ones that are acceptable and ones that are not. We formulate several solution concepts for this scenario, and study them from the computational point of view, providing hardness results for the general case as well as efficient algorithms for settings where agents’ preferences satisfy certain natural constraints
Group activity selection problem with approval preferences
We consider a setting where one has to organize one or several group activities for a set of agents. Each agent will participate in at most one activity, and her preferences over activities depend on the number of participants in the activity. The goal is to assign agents to activities based on their preferences in a way that is socially optimal and/or stable. We put forward a general model for this setting, which is a natural generalization of anonymous hedonic games. We then focus on a special case of our model where agents’ preferences are binary, i.e., each agent classifies all pairs of the form ‘(activity, group size)’ into ones that are acceptable and ones that are not. We formulate several solution concepts for this scenario, and study them from the computational point of view, providing hardness results for the general case as well as efficient algorithms for settings where agents’ preferences satisfy certain natural constraints