Multiwinner Voting with Fairness Constraints

Multiwinner voting rules are used to select a small representative subset of candidates or items from a larger set given the preferences of voters. However, if candidates have sensitive attributes such as gender or ethnicity (when selecting a committee), or specified types such as political leaning (when selecting a subset of news items), an algorithm that chooses a subset by optimizing a multiwinner voting rule may be unbalanced in its selection -- it may under or over represent a particular gender or political orientation in the examples above. We introduce an algorithmic framework for multiwinner voting problems when there is an additional requirement that the selected subset should be "fair" with respect to a given set of attributes. Our framework provides the flexibility to (1) specify fairness with respect to multiple, non-disjoint attributes (e.g., ethnicity and gender) and (2) specify a score function. We study the computational complexity of this constrained multiwinner voting problem for monotone and submodular score functions and present several approximation algorithms and matching hardness of approximation results for various attribute group structure and types of score functions. We also present simulations that suggest that adding fairness constraints may not affect the scores significantly when compared to the unconstrained case.Comment: The conference version of this paper appears in IJCAI-ECAI 201

Online Algorithms for Matchings with Proportional Fairness Constraints and Diversity Constraints

Matching problems with group-fairness constraints and diversity constraints have numerous applications such as in allocation problems, committee selection, school choice, etc. Moreover, online matching problems have lots of applications in ad allocations and other e-commerce problems like product recommendation in digital marketing. We study two problems involving assigning {\em items} to {\em platforms}, where items belong to various {\em groups} depending on their attributes; the set of items are available offline and the platforms arrive online. In the first problem, we study online matchings with {\em proportional fairness constraints}. Here, each platform on arrival should either be assigned a set of items in which the fraction of items from each group is within specified bounds or be assigned no items; the goal is to assign items to platforms in order to maximize the number of items assigned to platforms. In the second problem, we study online matchings with {\em diversity constraints}, i.e. for each platform, absolute lower bounds are specified for each group. Each platform on arrival should either be assigned a set of items that satisfy these bounds or be assigned no items; the goal is to maximize the set of platforms that get matched. We study approximation algorithms and hardness results for these problems. The technical core of our proofs is a new connection between these problems and the problem of matchings in hypergraphs. Our experimental evaluation shows the performance of our algorithms on real-world and synthetic datasets exceeds our theoretical guarantees.Comment: 16 pages, Full version of a paper accepted in ECAI 202

Persistence of power: Repeated multilateral bargaining with endogenous agenda setting authority

We extend a simple repeated, multilateral bargaining model to allow successful agenda setters to hold on to power as long as they maintain the support of a majority of other committee members. Theoretically and experimentally, we compare this Endogenous Power environment with a standard Random Power environment in which agenda setters are appointed randomly each period. Although the theoretical analysis predicts that the two environments are outcome equivalent, the experimental analysis shows substantial differences in behavior and outcomes across the games. The Endogenous Power environment results in the formation of more stable coalitions, less-equitable budget allocations, the persistence of power across periods, and higher long-run inequality than the Random Power environment. We present evidence that the stationary equilibrium refinements traditionally used in the literature fail to predict behavior in either game

reconciling party autonomy and the international rule of law

This paper focuses on one particular issue which has arisen in the course of the ongoing debate on the reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), namely that of the appointment of arbitrators. Taking as its starting point that there now exists tentative consensus that the present system for the appointment of arbitrators either causes or exacerbates certain problematic aspects of the current ISDS system, the paper explores one option for reform, namely the introduction of an independent panel for the selection of investment arbitrators. In doing so, it is argued that a shift in the normative basis of the rules governing appointments is required in order to accommodate the principles of party autonomy and the international rule of law. Such reform, while not completely removing the initiative that parties presently enjoy, is the most efficient way to introduce rule of law considerations such as a measure of judicial independence into the current appointments system. This, it is argued, would in turn help to address some of the problematic features of the appointment of arbitrators in ISDS

Congress, the FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee

The features of constitutional politics involving independent agencies are discussed through an examination of FCC efforts to repudiate regulatory initiatives designed to facilitate diversity in broadcasting

Spartan Daily, April 17, 1951

Volume 39, Issue 121https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/11542/thumbnail.jp