The Epistemology of Anger in Argumentation

While anger can derail argumentation, it can also help arguers and audiences to reason together in argumentation. Anger can provide information about premises, biases, goals, discussants, and depth of disagreement that people might otherwise fail to recognize or prematurely dismiss. Anger can also enhance the salience of certain premises and underscore the importance of related inferences. For these reasons, we claim that anger can serve as an epistemic resource in argumentation

Defeasible Logic Programming: An Argumentative Approach

The work reported here introduces Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP), a formalism that combines results of Logic Programming and Defeasible Argumentation. DeLP provides the possibility of representing information in the form of weak rules in a declarative manner, and a defeasible argumentation inference mechanism for warranting the entailed conclusions. In DeLP an argumentation formalism will be used for deciding between contradictory goals. Queries will be supported by arguments that could be defeated by other arguments. A query q will succeed when there is an argument A for q that is warranted, ie, the argument A that supports q is found undefeated by a warrant procedure that implements a dialectical analysis. The defeasible argumentation basis of DeLP allows to build applications that deal with incomplete and contradictory information in dynamic domains. Thus, the resulting approach is suitable for representing agent's knowledge and for providing an argumentation based reasoning mechanism to agents.Comment: 43 pages, to appear in the journal "Theory and Practice of Logic Programming

Argumentation in school science : Breaking the tradition of authoritative exposition through a pedagogy that promotes discussion and reasoning

The value of argumentation in science education has become internationally recognised and has been the subject of many research studies in recent years. Successful introduction of argumentation activities in learning contexts involves extending teaching goals beyond the understanding of facts and concepts, to include an emphasis on cognitive and metacognitive processes, epistemic criteria and reasoning. The authors focus on the difficulties inherent in shifting a tradition of teaching from one dominated by authoritative exposition to one that is more dialogic, involving small-group discussion based on tasks that stimulate argumentation. The paper builds on previous research on enhancing the quality of argument in school science, to focus on how argumentation activities have been designed, with appropriate strategies, resources and modelling, for pedagogical purposes. The paper analyses design frameworks, their contexts and lesson plans, to evaluate their potential for enhancing reasoning through foregrounding the processes of argumentation. Examples of classroom dialogue where teachers adopt the frameworks/plans are analysed to show how argumentation processes are scaffolded. The analysis shows that several layers of interpretation are needed and these layers need to be aligned for successful implementation. The analysis serves to highlight the potential and limitations of the design frameworks

Argumentation-based design rationale - the sharpest tools in the box

In this paper the three main argumentation-based design rationale methodologies - IBIS, QOC and DRL – will be discussed with illustrations of particular points drawn from a working example. The areas of scope, expressiveness in terms of design space and argumentation representation and the resulting usability by human and computer will be examined. Particular attention is paid to how the development of the artifact is being controlled by the evaluation of intentions and objectives that allow consistent goals throughout the design to be formulated, evaluated and modified. Furthermore, decision making within an argumentative context is highlighted

Reflective Argumentation

Theories of argumentation usually focus on arguments as means of persuasion, finding consensus, or justifying knowledge claims. However, the construction and visualization of arguments can also be used to clarify one's own thinking and to stimulate change of this thinking if gaps, unjustified assumptions, contradictions, or open questions can be identified. This is what I call "reflective argumentation." The objective of this paper is, first, to clarify the conditions of reflective argumentation and, second, to discuss the possibilities of argument visualization methods in supporting reflection and cognitive change. After a discussion of the cognitive problems we are facing in conflicts--obviously the area where cognitive change is hardest--the second part will, based on this, determine a set of requirements argument visualization tools should fulfill if their main purpose is stimulating reflection and cognitive change. In the third part, I will evaluate available argument visualization methods with regard to these requirements and talk about their limitations. The fourth part, then, introduces a new method of argument visualization which I call Logical Argument Mapping (LAM). LAM has specifically been designed to support reflective argumentation. Since it uses primarily deductively valid argument schemes, this design decision has to be justified with regard to goals of reflective argumentation. The fifth part, finally, provides an example of how Logical Argument Mapping could be used as a method of reflective argumentation in a political controversy

Assessing relevance

This paper advances an approach to relevance grounded on patterns of material inference called argumentation schemes, which can account for the reconstruction and the evaluation of relevance relations. In order to account for relevance in different types of dialogical contexts, pursuing also non-cognitive goals, and measuring the scalar strength of relevance, communicative acts are conceived as dialogue moves, whose coherence with the previous ones or the context is represented as the conclusion of steps of material inferences. Such inferences are described using argumentation schemes and are evaluated by considering 1) their defeasibility, and 2) the acceptability of the implicit premises on which they are based. The assessment of both the relevance of an utterance and the strength thereof depends on the evaluation of three interrelated factors: 1) number of inferential steps required; 2) the types of argumentation schemes involved; and 3) the implicit premises required

Eudaimonistic Argumentation

Virtue theories have lately enjoyed a modest vogue in the study of argumentation, echoing the success of more far-reaching programmes in ethics and epistemology. Virtue theories of argumentation (VTA) comprise several conceptually distinct projects, including the provision of normative foundations for argument evaluation and a renewed focus on the character of good arguers. Perhaps the boldest of these is the pursuit of the fully satisfying argument, the argument that contributes to human flourishing. This project has an independently developed epistemic analogue: eudaimonistic virtue epistemology. Both projects stress the importance of widening the range of cognitive goals beyond, respectively, cogency and knowledge; both projects emphasize social factors, the right sort of community being indispensable for the cultivation of the intellectual virtues necessary to each project. This paper proposes a unification of the two projects by arguing that the intellectual good life sought by eudaimonistic virtue epistemologists is best realized through the articulation of an account of argumentation that contributes to human flourishing

Analytic frameworks for assessing dialogic argumentation in online learning environments

Over the last decade, researchers have developed sophisticated online learning environments to support students engaging in argumentation. This review first considers the range of functionalities incorporated within these online environments. The review then presents five categories of analytic frameworks focusing on (1) formal argumentation structure, (2) normative quality, (3) nature and function of contributions within the dialog, (4) epistemic nature of reasoning, and (5) patterns and trajectories of participant interaction. Example analytic frameworks from each category are presented in detail rich enough to illustrate their nature and structure. This rich detail is intended to facilitate researchers’ identification of possible frameworks to draw upon in developing or adopting analytic methods for their own work. Each framework is applied to a shared segment of student dialog to facilitate this illustration and comparison process. Synthetic discussions of each category consider the frameworks in light of the underlying theoretical perspectives on argumentation, pedagogical goals, and online environmental structures. Ultimately the review underscores the diversity of perspectives represented in this research, the importance of clearly specifying theoretical and environmental commitments throughout the process of developing or adopting an analytic framework, and the role of analytic frameworks in the future development of online learning environments for argumentation

The Pragma-Dialectical Reconstruction of Teleological-Evaluative Argumentation in Complex Structures of Legal Justification

I give a pragma-dialectical reconstruction of the role of teleological-evaluative argumentation referring to goals and values in the justification of judicial decisions. I establish the role and place of this form of argumentation in complex forms of justification in which the argumentation interacts with other forms of legal argumentation. I will do this by integrating the insights from legal theory and legal philosophy into a pragma-dialectical framework for the analysis and evaluation of argumentation

What should a normative theory of argumentation look like?

Within the epistemological approach to Argumentation Theory, there are two opposing views on what a theory of argumentation should look like. On the one hand, there are those interested in providing epistemological criteria for good argumentation. For these theorists, the main question is should we accept this claim on the basis of those reasons? . On the other hand, there are those interested in “characterizing” what is good argumentation. For them, the main question is: does this piece of argumentation count as good argumentation, taking into account the conception of good argumentation that underlies the practice of arguing? . Both accounts assimilate the goals of a normative theory of argumentation to the goals of a theory of justification, but the former focuses on the conditions for considering that a target-claim is justified, whereas the latter tries to characterize the very concept of justification from the point of view of the practice of arguing. In this paper, I analyze the rewards and shortcomings of both epistemological conceptions of Argumentation Theory and their corresponding criteriological and transcendental accounts of the sort of objectivity that good argumentation is able to provide