4 research outputs found
Euclidean Preferences, Option Sets and Strategy Proofness
In this note, we use the technique of option sets to sort out the implications of coalitional strategyproofness in the spatial setting. We also discuss related issues and open problems
Euclidean Preferences, Option Sets and Strategy Proofness
In this note, we use the technique of option sets to sort out the implications of coalitional strategyproofness in the spatial setting. We also discuss related issues and open problems
La Moderna teoria de l'elecci贸 social: de la impossibilitat a la possibilitat
Es presenten els dos teoremes d'impossibilitat m茅s importants de la moderna teoria de l'elecci贸 social: el teorema d'Arrow per a funcions de benestar social no dictatorials que satisfan el principi de Pareto i la propietat de la independ猫ncia d'alternatives irrellevants, i el teorema de Gibbard-Satterthwaite per a funcions d'elecci贸
social no trivials i no manipulables. Es descriuen set exemples de problemes concrets d'elecci贸 social en qu猫 l'estructura particular del conjunt d'alternatives socials permet restringir el domini de prefer猫ncies individuals i dissenyar, per a cada un d'aquests, funcions d'elecci贸 social no manipulables en els corresponents dominis de prefer猫ncies restringits.We present the two most important impossibility theorems of the modern social choice theory: Arrow聮s theorem for social welfare functions satisfying the Pareto principle and the independence of irrelevant alternatives property, and
Gibbard-Satterthwaite聮s theorem for non-trivial and strategy-proof social choice functions. We describe seven examples of specific social choice problems where the particular structure of the set of social alternatives allows to restrict the domain of individual preferences and to design for each of them strategy-proof social choice functions on the corresponding restricted preference domains