Horizontal collaboration between logistics service providers (LSP) in Australia: examining the structure opportunities and impediments

This research investigated horizontal collaboration among logistics service providers (LSPs) in Australia. The study examined the extent to which this exists and is being adopted, and the forms of any horizontal collaboration among LSPs in Australia. Using a qualitative methodology from an interpretivist-constructivist perspective, the research process used semi-structured interviews to collect responses from a broad range of individuals from Australian logistics providers, logistics authorities and associations. The study found that horizontal collaboration is not being adopted by LSPs as the primary type of relationship to interact with each other in Australia. Their focus is the use of both vertical and lateral collaboration models, with vertical collaboration as the dominant type. The data also show that the extent of direct involvement in developing horizontal collaboration activities in the Australian logistics context seems to be to remain largely at arm's length and enter operational relationships. The participants, however, anticipated that the level of horizontal collaboration would grow in the future. The data revealed that LSPs consider horizontal collaboration to be a promising concept. There is clear enthusiasm and interest in the thinking of the logistics industry about horizontal collaboration, its possibilities, potential structures and the areas where this type of collaboration could be implemented and employed. Potential opportunities and drivers of horizontal collaboration among LSPs were identified in the research. These were for LSPs seeking to reduce costs; improve productivity and market positioning; provide better customer service; and create better capability and capacity. The research found that the adoption of horizontal collaboration is impeded in the Australian logistics industry by difficulties with partner selection; problems with the partnership process and how economic benefits are determined and divided; and uncertainty about how to overcome difficulties with both business coordination and with information and communication technology. The research also identified that collaboration adoption is significantly negatively affected by the nature and structure of the Australian logistics industry, the attitude of large LSPs, fear of mergers and acquisitions in the industry and the role of government authorities and regulations in the Australian commercial context. The most significant effect of impediments to collaboration is that LSPs are reluctant or unable to build long-term successful horizontal collaborations with others in the Australian logistics industry. This thesis uses the results of the data analysis and the existing research frameworks on collaboration in logistics to develop a theoretical model for understanding the development and effective application of horizontal collaboration. It proposes a comprehensive horizontal logistics collaboration model and evaluates its applicability in the Australian logistics context

Generalized additive games

A transferable utility (TU) game with n players specifies a vector of (Formula presented.) real numbers, i.e. a number for each non-empty coalition, and this can be difficult to handle for large n. Therefore, several models from the literature focus on interaction situations which are characterized by a compact representation of a TU-game, and such that the worth of each coalition can be easily computed. Sometimes, the worth of each coalition is computed from the values of single players by means of a mechanism describing how the individual abilities interact within groups of players. In this paper we introduce the class of Generalized additive games (GAGs), where the worth of a coalition (Formula presented.) is evaluated by means of an interaction filter, that is a map (Formula presented.) which returns the valuable players involved in the cooperation among players in S. Moreover, we investigate the subclass of basic GAGs, where the filter (Formula presented.) selects, for each coalition S, those players that have friends but not enemies in S. We show that well-known classes of TU-games can be represented in terms of such basic GAGs, and we investigate the problem of computing the core and the semivalues for specific families of GAGs

Some new results on generalized additive games

A Generalized Additive Game (GAG) (Cesari et al. in Int J Game Theory 46(4):919-939, 2017) is a Transferable Utility (TU) game (N, v), where each player in N is provided with an individual value, and the worth v(S) of a coalition S subset of N is obtained as the sum of the individual values of players in another subset M(S) subset of N. Based on conditions on the map M (which associates to each coalition S a set of beneficial players M(S) not necessarily included in S), in this paper we characterize classes of GAGs that satisfy properties like monotonicity, superadditivity, (total) balancedness, PMAS-admissibility and supermodularity, for all nonnegative vectors of individual values. We also illustrate the application of such conditions on M over particular GAGs studied in the literature (e.g., glove games (Shapley and Shubik in Int Econ Rev 10:337-362, 1969), generalized airport games (Norde et al. in Eur J Oper Res 136(3):635-654, 2002), fixed tree games (Bjorndal et al. in Math Methods Oper Res 59(2):249-270, 2004), link-connection games (Moretti in Multi-agent systems and agreement technologies, vol 10767. Springer, Cham, 2008; Nagamochi et al. in Math Oper Res 22(1):146-164, 1997), simple minimum cost spanning tree games (Norde et al. in Eur J Oper Res 154(1):84-97, 2004; Tijs et al. in EurJ Oper Res 175(1):121-134, 2006) and graph coloring games (Deng et al. in Math Program 87(3):441-452, 2000; Hamers et al. in Math Program 145(1-2):509-529, 2014))

Some new results on generalized additive games

A Generalized Additive Game (GAG) (Cesari et al. in Int J Game Theory 46(4):919-939, 2017) is a Transferable Utility (TU) game (N, v), where each player in N is provided with an individual value, and the worth v(S) of a coalition S subset of N is obtained as the sum of the individual values of players in another subset M(S) subset of N. Based on conditions on the map M (which associates to each coalition S a set of beneficial players M(S) not necessarily included in S), in this paper we characterize classes of GAGs that satisfy properties like monotonicity, superadditivity, (total) balancedness, PMAS-admissibility and supermodularity, for all nonnegative vectors of individual values. We also illustrate the application of such conditions on M over particular GAGs studied in the literature (e.g., glove games (Shapley and Shubik in Int Econ Rev 10:337-362, 1969), generalized airport games (Norde et al. in Eur J Oper Res 136(3):635-654, 2002), fixed tree games (Bjorndal et al. in Math Methods Oper Res 59(2):249-270, 2004), link-connection games (Moretti in Multi-agent systems and agreement technologies, vol 10767. Springer, Cham, 2008; Nagamochi et al. in Math Oper Res 22(1):146-164, 1997), simple minimum cost spanning tree games (Norde et al. in Eur J Oper Res 154(1):84-97, 2004; Tijs et al. in EurJ Oper Res 175(1):121-134, 2006) and graph coloring games (Deng et al. in Math Program 87(3):441-452, 2000; Hamers et al. in Math Program 145(1-2):509-529, 2014))

Game theoretic Models of network Formation

Cette thèse traite de l’analyse théorique et l’application d’une nouvelle famille de jeux coopératifs, où la valeur de chaque coalition peut être calculée à partir des contributions des joueurs par un opérateur additif qui décrit comme les capacités individuelles interagissent au sein de groupes. Précisément, on introduit une grande classe de jeux, les Generalized Additive Games, qui embrasse plusieurs classes de jeux coopératifs dans la littérature, et en particulier de graph games, où un réseau décrit les restrictions des possibilités d’interaction entre les joueurs. Des propriétés et solutions pour cette classe de jeux sont étudiées, avec l’objectif de fournir des outils pour l’analyse de classes de jeux connues, ainsi que pour la construction de nouvelles classes de jeux avec des propriétés intéressantes d’un point de vue théorique. De plus, on introduit une classe de solutions pour les communication situations, où la formation d’un réseau est décrite par un mécanisme additif, et dans la dernière partie de cette thèse on présente des approches avec notre modèle à des problèmes réels modélisés par des graph games, dans les domaines de la théorie de l’argumentation et de la biomédecine.This thesis deals with the theoretical analysis and the application of a new family of cooperative games, where the worth of each coalition can be computed from the contributions of single players via an additive operator describing how the individual abilities interact within groups. Specifically, we introduce a large class of games, namely the Generalized Additive Games, which encompasses several classes of cooperative games from the literature, and in particular of graph games, where a network describes the restriction of the interaction possibilities among players. Some properties and solutions of such class of games are studied, with the objective of providing useful tools for the analysis of known classes of games, as well as for the construction of new classes of games with interesting properties from a theoretic point of view. Moreover, we introduce a class of solution concepts for communication situations, where the formation of a network is described by means of an additive pattern, and in the last part of the thesis we present two approaches using our model to real-world problems described by graph games, in the fields of Argumentation Theory and Biomedicine

Modèles de théorie des jeux pour la formation de réseaux

This thesis deals with the theoretical analysis and the application of a new family of cooperative games, where the worth of each coalition can be computed from the contributions of single players via an additive operator describing how the individual abilities interact within groups. Specifically, we introduce a large class of games, namely the Generalized Additive Games, which encompasses several classes of cooperative games from the literature, and in particular of graph games, where a network describes the restriction of the interaction possibilities among players. Some properties and solutions of such class of games are studied, with the objective of providing useful tools for the analysis of known classes of games, as well as for the construction of new classes of games with interesting properties from a theoretic point of view. Moreover, we introduce a class of solution concepts for communication situations, where the formation of a network is described by means of an additive pattern, and in the last part of the thesis we present two approaches using our model to real-world problems described by graph games, in the fields of Argumentation Theory and Biomedicine.Cette thèse traite de l’analyse théorique et l’application d’une nouvelle famille de jeux coopératifs, où la valeur de chaque coalition peut être calculée à partir des contributions des joueurs par un opérateur additif qui décrit comme les capacités individuelles interagissent au sein de groupes. Précisément, on introduit une grande classe de jeux, les Generalized Additive Games, qui embrasse plusieurs classes de jeux coopératifs dans la littérature, et en particulier de graph games, où un réseau décrit les restrictions des possibilités d’interaction entre les joueurs. Des propriétés et solutions pour cette classe de jeux sont étudiées, avec l’objectif de fournir des outils pour l’analyse de classes de jeux connues, ainsi que pour la construction de nouvelles classes de jeux avec des propriétés intéressantes d’un point de vue théorique. De plus, on introduit une classe de solutions pour les communication situations, où la formation d’un réseau est décrite par un mécanisme additif, et dans la dernière partie de cette thèse on présente des approches avec notre modèle à des problèmes réels modélisés par des graph games, dans les domaines de la théorie de l’argumentation et de la biomédecine