Message from the general chair

Journal ArticleI am very pleased to welcome all attendees to the 2012 IEEE International Symposium on Performance Analysis of Systems and Software (ISPASS) in New Brunswick, New Jersey on April 1-3, 2012. The conference represents the hard work of several organizing committee members and contributing authors. We all hope that the conference will be highly productive for every attendee. ISPASS has emerged as a premier forum for research on tools and performance analysis. This year's program continues that tradition. Dr. Viji Srinivasan of IBM T.J. Watson did an excellent job as program chair. She assembled a world-class program committee, and efficiently organized the reviewing and PC meeting. She was meticulous in her review assignments, which contributed greatly to a fair review process. I am very thankful to a dedicated program committee and external reviewers that spent many hours providing feedback to several authors. I'd also like to thank Dr. Mazda Marvasti (VMware) and Prof. Margaret Martonosi (Princeton) for agreeing to deliver keynote presentations. The conference is being kicked off with an excellent serving of workshops and tutorials on Sunday April 1st. I appreciate the efforts of Vijay Reddi (UT Austin) who served as the Workshop/Tutorial Chair. I also thank the organizers of the workshops and tutorials for the time they are putting into augmenting the ISPASS program

Welcome message from General Chair Dr. Robert V. Duncan

The welcome message from the ICCF18 general chair, Dr. Robert V. Duncan

Message from the general chair

[No abstract available

Department of Marketing News, Spring 2015

Articles in this issue include: AMA Recognized as Top 30 Club Message from the chair Faculty spotlight: Debra Kellerman Student of the Term: Karen Herron General Business Major Returns to Marketing Remembering Professor Tom Zupan

Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information

We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. We show that it is not possible for all legislators to communicate informatively. In particular, the legislator who is ideologically more distant from the proposer cannot communicate informatively, but the closer legislator may communicate whether he would \compromise "or flight" on ideology. Surprisingly, the proposer may be worse off when bargaining with two legislators (under majority rule) than with one (who has veto power), because competition between the legislators may result in less information conveyed in equilibrium. Despite separable preferences, the proposer is always better off making proposals for the two dimensions together