Detection and prediction of urban archetypes at the pedestrian scale: computational toolsets, morphological metrics, and machine learning methods

Granular, dense, and mixed-use urban morphologies are hallmarks of walkable and vibrant streets. However, urban systems are notoriously complex and planned urban development, which grapples with varied interdependent and oft conflicting criteria, may — despite best intentions — yield aberrant morphologies fundamentally at odds with the needs of pedestrians and the resiliency of neighbourhoods. This work addresses the measurement, detection, and prediction of pedestrian-friendly urban archetypes by developing techniques for high-resolution urban analytics at the pedestrian scale. A spatial-analytic computational toolset, the cityseer-api Python package, is created to assess localised centrality, land-use, and statistical metrics using contextually sensitive workflows applied directly over the street network. cityseer-api subsequently facilitates a review of mixed-use and street network centrality methods to improve their utility concerning granular urban analysis. Unsupervised machine learning methods are applied to recover ‘signatures’ — urban archetypes — using Principal Component Analysis, Variational Autoencoders, and clustering methods from a high-resolution multi-variable and multi-scalar dataset consisting of centralities, land-uses, and population densities for Greater London. Supervised deep-learning methods applied to a similar dataset developed for 931 towns and cities in Great Britain demonstrate how, with the aid of domain knowledge, machine-learning classifiers can learn to discriminate between ‘artificial’ and ‘historical’ urban archetypes. These methods use complex systems thinking as a departure point and illustrate how high-resolution spatial-analytic quantitative methods can be combined with machine learning to extrapolate benchmarks in keeping with more qualitatively framed urban morphological conceptions. Such tools may aid urban design professionals in better anticipating the outcomes of varied design scenarios as part of iterative and scalable workflows. These techniques may likewise provide robust and demonstrable feedback as part of planning review and approvals processes

After Orwell: Totalitarian Fears and the English Political Novel, 1950-2010

After Orwell: Totalitarian Fears and the English Political Novel, 1950-2010 gives a coherent account of the English political novel after World War II, a critical narrative absent from current scholarship. I contend that George Orwell\u27s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), a touchstone for political fiction, is underwritten by Orwell\u27s conflicted attitude toward politics: despite embracing politics as the necessary means to genuinely improve people\u27s lives, he also remained suspicious of politics\u27 apparently inherent potential to diminish or even eliminate autonomy. Orwell\u27s simultaneous attraction and vigorous resistance to politics, I argue, is tied to broader contemporaneous anxieties over political and cultural totalization. Such fears reverberate throughout postwar English political fiction. To substantiate this claim, my project reads an assortment of political novels against the political convulsions and reorientations following the Second World War. Orwellian apprehensions over totalizing systems and theories serve as a common thread for otherwise wide-ranging novelistic engagements with politics in the postmodern, multicultural, and globalized contexts of postwar England

Experience representation in information systems

This thesis looks into the ways subjective dimension of experience could be represented in artificial, non-biological systems, in particular information systems. The pivotal assumption is that experience as opposed to mainstream thinking in information science is not equal to knowledge, so that experience is a broader term which encapsulates both knowledge and subjective, affective component of experience, which so far has not been properly embraced by knowledge representation theories. This is the consequence of dominance of behaviourism and later cognitivism in the XXth-century science, which tended to reduce mind and experience respectively to behavioural expressions and discrete states relating mindful creature to external world, meanwhile the processes of knowing to manipulations with symbols. We support the view that traditional knowledge representation approaches will not suffice to embrace the entirety of mental phenomena. We propose that in order to understand, represent and model the thinking and behavioural processes of mindful entities in information systems we need to look into the phenomenon of experience beyond the boundaries of knowledge. At the same time we propose to look at experience in a more structured way and try to capture it in formal terms, making it amenable to symbolic representation, being aware at the same time of innate limitations of symbolic representations compared to the natural representations in biological bodies. Under the paradigm of mind intentionality, which assumes that minds have this special intrinsic feature that they can relate to external word and thus are about external world, it can be asserted that experience is one in all intentional mind state composed of knowledge that is the intentional contents of this state, the world-to-mind relation, meanwhile its inseparable subjective component is composed of subjective feelings of the mindful individual corresponding to this intentional mind states. If so, we propose that experience can be defined as two-dimensional mental phenomena consisting of mental states that have both knowledge and affective component. Consequently we suggest that experience can be represented as pairs of elements of sets K, and A, where K represents knowledge, hence contents of remembered intentional states of mind (i.e. intentional contents of experience), whereas A represents affect, i.e. the subjective qualitative component of experience. iii Importantly, it does not particularly matter if we define experience as a set of mind states or a mind state process for assessing if the overall relation between knowledge and subjective experience that we have outlined above is valid. Whether there is knowing rather then knowledge or experiencing rather than experience which seems increasingly a contemporary principle, remains a fascinating philosophical, ontological to be more specific, question, however it falls beyond the scope of the thesis and therefore we shall not concentrate on it herewith. Furthermore we propose that the subjective component of experience is also intrinsically intentionalistic, but meanwhile the intentionality in case of knowing is directed outward, to the external world, in case of feeling it is directed inwards to the within of the experiencing mindbody. We tap into the contemporary thinking in the philosophy of mind that the primordial, intrinsic intentionalistic capacity of mind is non-linguistic, as there must be other more primordial, non-linguistic form of intentionality that allows human children, as well as other language-capable animals, to learn language in first place. Contemporary cognitive neuroscience suggest that this capacity is tightly related to affect. We also embrace the theories of consciousness and self coming from brain scientists such as Damasio and Panksepp who believe that there is a primordial component of self, a so called protoself composed of the raw feelings coming from within the body, which are representations of bodily states in the mind, and have strictly subjective character. Therefore we can look at this compound of primordial feelings as a mirror in which external world reflects via the interface of the senses. This results in experience that has this conceptually dual, yet united within the conscious mindbody, composition of intentional contents that is knowledge and subjective component that is built up by feelings coming from within the experiencing mindbody. For it is problematic to state sharply either that this composition is dual or united we can refer to these two separately considered aspects of experience either as components or dimensions. In this thesis we pay particular attention to the role the affective component of experience plays in the behaviour of organisms, and we use the concept of rational agency to discuss the relations between agent experience and behaviour. This role is primarily about motivation and experience vividness, i.e. how easily experiential states can be retrieved from memory. The affective dimension of experience determines the drivers for agent action and influences the remembering and forgetting (memory) processes that experience is prone to. We reflect on how the above presented framework could enhance one of the most popular rational agency models: the Believes Desires Intentions model (BDI) based on Bratmann’s account of practical reason that has dominated information science and artificial intelligence literature. Inspired by Davidson, who opposing Hume’s account that the passions (desires) drive action while reason (belief) merely directs its force, concluded that iv “(...) belief and desire seem equally to be causal conditions of action. But (...) desire is more basic in that if we know enough about a person’s desires, we can work out what he believes, while the reverse does not hold.” (Davidson, 2004) we conclude that in so far as BDI model approaches them, desires are sort of beliefs. Indeed a desire in the above sense is a verbalised desire, i.e. in order for a proposition to be included in the deliberation an agent must have internally verbalize it and accept it by which he converts it into a belief. As a result an agent acquires a belief about its desire. Apart from desires made thus explicit and becoming beliefs there are implicit experiential states that directly influence behaviour, these are not embraced by the Desires set in the BDI and other instrumentalist rationality models as these currently do not have adequate forms of representation. If this is so, the BDI models looses its D creating a gap which must be filled in, which we try to do with the subjective dimension of experience. Under such an account each belief, either the proper one or about the desire, represented formally with a proposition should have an extra component added which would stand for the subjective affective state to this belief. Some preliminary suggestions how this could be implemented are proposed and discussed. The central proposition of this thesis states that experience, broadly understood as the entirety of contents and quality of a conscious mind state, can be satisfactorily represented in information systems, and any information system which objective is to emulate natural agent behaviour with satisfactory faithfulness cannot do without a sound experience representation framework. To achieve this it is necessary to realize and accept, based on convincing evidence from neuroscience, that the missing subjective component of experience is affect that forms and integral part of natural agent’s experience, and determines, or at least impacts profoundly the behaviour of natural agents. Relating affect to knowledge would result in a satisfactory approximation of experience. It is to realize as well that the subjective dimension of experience, classified as affect, is not entirely private, subjective epiphenomenal entity but rather can be studied in objective terms as neurological correlates in the brain following account of emotion and affect as fostered by contemporary neuroscience. By identifying affective correlates of intentional contents of states of mind, which build up knowledge, we can exploit a broader concept experience for the purpose of more accurate emulation of natural agents’ thinking process and behaviour in information systems. This thesis presents and discusses a bulk of evidence coming mainly from three fields: information science, philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience that led us to the above stated conclusions, as well as establishes a framework for experience representation in information systems

Unmet goals of tracking: within-track heterogeneity of students' expectations for

Educational systems are often characterized by some form(s) of ability grouping, like tracking. Although substantial variation in the implementation of these practices exists, it is always the aim to improve teaching efficiency by creating homogeneous groups of students in terms of capabilities and performances as well as expected pathways. If students’ expected pathways (university, graduate school, or working) are in line with the goals of tracking, one might presume that these expectations are rather homogeneous within tracks and heterogeneous between tracks. In Flanders (the northern region of Belgium), the educational system consists of four tracks. Many students start out in the most prestigious, academic track. If they fail to gain the necessary credentials, they move to the less esteemed technical and vocational tracks. Therefore, the educational system has been called a 'cascade system'. We presume that this cascade system creates homogeneous expectations in the academic track, though heterogeneous expectations in the technical and vocational tracks. We use data from the International Study of City Youth (ISCY), gathered during the 2013-2014 school year from 2354 pupils of the tenth grade across 30 secondary schools in the city of Ghent, Flanders. Preliminary results suggest that the technical and vocational tracks show more heterogeneity in student’s expectations than the academic track. If tracking does not fulfill the desired goals in some tracks, tracking practices should be questioned as tracking occurs along social and ethnic lines, causing social inequality

The Strange Play of Traumatic Reality: Enchantment in Jewish American Literature

This project analyzes the play of narrative worlds in the work of Bernard Malamud (The Magic Barrel), Michael Chabon (The Yiddish Policemen’s Union), Nicole Krauss (Great House), Jonathan Safran Foer (Everything Is Illuminated), Nathan Englander (“The Tumblers”), and the Coen brothers (A Serious Man). These texts self-consciously dramatize the question: How do we know what we think we know about Holocaust history? The serious play of fantasy registers a historical shift in Jewish American literature towards metafictional approaches to mediating Holocaust history, exposing the unconsidered intersections between speculative fiction and historiography. This work flouts interpretive conventions of narrative ontologies to problematize meaning-making in Holocaust studies, subverting assumptions that this history is either knowable or not knowable. In addition to showing the limited ability of historical realism to incorporate Holocaust representation in an American literary context, the project highlights the ways in which fantasy genres—long discarded to the bottom of the critical dustbin—mediate history, absence, and loss. To conceptualize this contemporary turn to genre-mixing, I develop a critical schemata entitled enchantment. This framework encapsulates the strange commensurability between the fantasy mode of storytelling and its representation of traumatic history. Reflecting the third generation’s lack of first-hand experience, enchantment defamiliarizes historical narratives, producing a critical apparatus that enables new discussions of how aesthetic play structures the intergenerational transfer of Holocaust memory.Doctor of Philosoph

The Funambulist Papers, Volume 1

This book is a collection of thirty-five texts from the first series of guest writers’ essays, written specifically for The Funambulist weblog from June 2011 to November 2012. The idea of complementing Lambert’s own texts on his blog with those written by others originated from the idea that having friends communicate with each other about their work could help develop mutual interests and provide a platform to address an audience. Thirty-nine authors of twenty-three nationalities were given the opportunity to write essays about a part of their work that might fit with the blog’s editorial line. Overall, two ‘families’ of texts emerged, collected in two distinct parts in this volume. The first part, The Power of the Line, explores the legal, geographical and historical politics of various places of the world. The second part, Architectural Narratives, approaches architecture in a mix of things that were once called philosophy, literature and art. This dichotomy represents the blog’s editorial line and can be reconciled by the obsession of approaching architecture without care for the limits of a given discipline. This method, rather than adopting the contemporary architect’s syndrome that consists in talking about everything but being an expert in nothing, attempts to consider architecture as something embedded within (geo)political, cultural, social, historical, biological, and dromological mechanisms that widely exceed what is traditionally understood as the limits of its expertise