26,923 research outputs found
Epistemic Considerations on Extensive-Form Games
In this thesis, we study several topics in extensive-form games. First, we consider perfect information games with belief revision with players who are tolerant of each other’s hypothetical errors. We bound the number of hypothetical non-rational moves of a player that will be tolerated by other players without revising the belief on that player’s rationality on future moves, and investigate which games yield the backward induction solution.
Second, we consider players who have no way of assigning probabilities to various possible outcomes, and define players as conservative, moderate and aggressive depending on the way they choose, and show that all such players could be considered rational.
We then concentrate on games with imperfect and incomplete information and study how conservative, moderate and aggressive players might play such games. We provide models for the behavior of a (truthful) knowledge manipulator whose motives are not known to the active players, and look into how she can bring about a certain knowledge situation about a game, and change the way the game will be played
Uniform Mixed Equilibria in Network Congestion Games with Link Failures
Motivated by possible applications in fault-tolerant routing, we introduce the notion of uniform mixed equilibria in network congestion games with adversarial link failures, where players need to route traffic from a source to a destination node. Given an integer rho >= 1, a rho-uniform mixed strategy is a mixed strategy in which a player plays exactly rho edge disjoint paths with uniform probabilities, so that a rho-uniform mixed equilibrium is a tuple of rho-uniform mixed strategies, one for each player, in which no player can lower her cost by deviating to another rho-uniform mixed strategy. For games with weighted players and affine latency functions, we show existence of rho-uniform mixed equilibria and provide a tight characterization of their price of anarchy. For games with unweighted players, instead, we extend the existential guarantee to any class of latency functions and, restricted to games with affine latencies, we derive a tight characterization of both the prices of anarchy and stability
Similarity based cooperation and spatial segregation
We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the
previous behaviour of the co-player, but on the similarity between the players.
This system has been studied in a mean-field description recently [A. Traulsen
and H. G. Schuster, Phys. Rev. E 68, 046129 (2003)]. Here, the spatial
extension to a two-dimensional lattice is studied, where each player interacts
with eight players in a Moore neighborhood. The system shows a strong
segregation independent on parameters. The introduction of a local conversion
mechanism towards tolerance allows for four-state cycles and the emergence of
spiral waves in the spatial game. In the case of asymmetric costs of
cooperation a rich variety of complex behavior is observed depending on both
cooperation costs. Finally, we study the stabilization of a cooperative fixed
point of a forecast rule in the symmetric game, which corresponds to
cooperation across segregation borders. This fixed point becomes unstable for
high cooperation costs, but can be stabilized by a linear feedback mechanism.Comment: 7 pages, 9 figure
Social Data Offloading in D2D-Enhanced Cellular Networks by Network Formation Games
Recently, cellular networks are severely overloaded by social-based services,
such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, in which thousands of clients subscribe
a common content provider (e.g., a popular singer) and download his/her content
updates all the time. Offloading such traffic through complementary networks,
such as a delay tolerant network formed by device-to-device (D2D)
communications between mobile subscribers, is a promising solution to reduce
the cellular burdens. In the existing solutions, mobile users are assumed to be
volunteers who selfishlessly deliver the content to every other user in
proximity while moving. However, practical users are selfish and they will
evaluate their individual payoffs in the D2D sharing process, which may highly
influence the network performance compared to the case of selfishless users. In
this paper, we take user selfishness into consideration and propose a network
formation game to capture the dynamic characteristics of selfish behaviors. In
the proposed game, we provide the utility function of each user and specify the
conditions under which the subscribers are guaranteed to converge to a stable
network. Then, we propose a practical network formation algorithm in which the
users can decide their D2D sharing strategies based on their historical
records. Simulation results show that user selfishness can highly degrade the
efficiency of data offloading, compared with ideal volunteer users. Also, the
decrease caused by user selfishness can be highly affected by the cost ratio
between the cellular transmission and D2D transmission, the access delays, and
mobility patterns
Benefits of tolerance in public goods games
Leaving the joint enterprise when defection is unveiled is always a viable
option to avoid being exploited. Although loner strategy helps the population
not to be trapped into the tragedy of the commons state, it could offer only a
modest income for non-participants. In this paper we demonstrate that showing
some tolerance toward defectors could not only save cooperation in harsh
environments, but in fact results in a surprisingly high average payoff for
group members in public goods games. Phase diagrams and the underlying spatial
patterns reveal the high complexity of evolving states where cyclic dominant
strategies or two-strategy alliances can characterize the final state of
evolution. We identify microscopic mechanisms which are responsible for the
superiority of global solutions containing tolerant players. This phenomenon is
robust and can be observed both in well-mixed and in structured populations
highlighting the importance of tolerance in our everyday life.Comment: 10 two-column pages, 8 figures; accepted for publication in Physical
Review
An Analysis of Operant Conditioning and its Relationship with Video Game Addiction
A report published by the Entertainment Software Association revealed that in 2015, 155 million Americans play video games with an average of two gamers in each game-playing household (Entertainment Software Association, “Essential Facts about the Computer and Video Game Industry”). With this massive popularity that has sprung alongside video games, the question must be asked: how are video games affecting today\u27s people? With the current way some video games are structured, the video game rewards players for achieving certain accomplishments. For example, competitive video games reward players who achieve victories by giving them a higher ranking or other games display the player\u27s score so that other players can see their score. With this in mind, some video game players may place more emphasis on their gaming achievements rather than their happiness or success in their own real lives. Once this emphasis has been placed, video game players have a chance to become addicted to their respective game; however, a distinction must be set between video game addiction and operant conditioning. Opereant conditioning is a video game design that many of today\u27s video games utilize. The use of operant conditioning towards a gamer can be one of the factors contributing towards video game addiction; operant conditioning is the strategy while video game addiction can be the byproduct of operant conditioning
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