Környezeti egyezmények betartathatóságának vizsgálata játékelméleti módszerekkel

Rockstörm and his colleges consider global warming as the third most serious ecological problem, meanwhile human population mainly perceives the its effects through climate change. Ensuring the sustainable development, creating long-lasting, viable environmental conditions poses serious challenges to leading world’s decision-makers and requires the adoption and globan acceptance of conservation measures that cannot be imagined without the strategic cooperation of economies. For these reasons, in our paper, we mainly examine the structure, the success and enforceability of international environmental agreements with special attention to treaties related to climate change. Our aim is to determine the principles and conditions which can make international environmental agreements acceptable and enforceable for all the participants. We also show two detailed examples to illustrate the success and failure of environmental agreements (e.g. Montreal Protocol, Kyoto Agreement). After considering the main principles of international environmental agreements, we use different game theoretic models to describe countries strategic behaviour during the climate change negotiations

Környezeti egyezmények betartathatóságának vizsgálata játékelméleti módszerekkel

Rockstörm and his colleges consider global warming as the third most serious ecological problem, meanwhile human population mainly perceives the its effects through climate change. Ensuring the sustainable development, creating long-lasting, viable environmental conditions poses serious challenges to leading world’s decision-makers and requires the adoption and globan acceptance of conservation measures that cannot be imagined without the strategic cooperation of economies. For these reasons, in our paper, we mainly examine the structure, the success and enforceability of international environmental agreements with special attention to treaties related to climate change. Our aim is to determine the principles and conditions which can make international environmental agreements acceptable and enforceable for all the participants. We also show two detailed examples to illustrate the success and failure of environmental agreements (e.g. Montreal Protocol, Kyoto Agreement). After considering the main principles of international environmental agreements, we use different game theoretic models to describe countries strategic behaviour during the climate change negotiations.Rockstörm and his colleges consider global warming as the third most serious ecological problem, meanwhile human population mainly perceives the its effects through climate change. Ensuring the sustainable development, creating long-lasting, viable environmental conditions poses serious challenges to leading world’s decision-makers and requires the adoption and globan acceptance of conservation measures that cannot be imagined without the strategic cooperation of economies. For these reasons, in our paper, we mainly examine the structure, the success and enforceability of international environmental agreements with special attention to treaties related to climate change. Our aim is to determine the principles and conditions which can make international environmental agreements acceptable and enforceable for all the participants. We also show two detailed examples to illustrate the success and failure of environmental agreements (e.g. Montreal Protocol, Kyoto Agreement). After considering the main principles of international environmental agreements, we use different game theoretic models to describe countries strategic behaviour during the climate change negotiations

Climate change in game theory

The study provides an overview of the application possibilities of game theory to climate change. The characteristics of games are adapted to the topics of climate and carbon. The importance of uncertainty, probability, marginal value of adaptation, common pool resources, etc. are tailored to the context of international relations and the challenge of global warming

Climate change in game theory context

The aim of this paper is to survey the game theory modelling of the behaviour of global players in mitigation and adaptation related to climate change. Three main fields are applied for the specific aspects of temperature rise: behaviour games, CPR problem and negotiation games. The game theory instruments are useful in analyzing strategies in uncertain circumstances, such as the occurrence and impacts of climate change. To analyze the international players’ relations, actions, attitude toward carbon emission, negotiation power and motives, several games are applied for the climate change in this paper. The solution is surveyed, too, for externality problem

Descent and penalization techniques for equilibrium problems with nonlinear constraints

This paper deals with equilibrium problems with nonlinear constraints. Exploiting a gap function recently introduced, which rely on a polyhedral approximation of the feasible region, we propose two descent methods. They are both based on the minimization of a suitable exact penalty function, but they use different rules for updating the penalization parameter and they rely on different types of line search. The convergence of both algorithms is proved under standard assumptions

Cost allocation for the problem of pollution reduction: a dynamic cooperative game approach

This paper studies CO2 emissions at a global level. The authors use Dynamic Optimisation to derive the minimum penalty cost on countries every single time. They then use an Imputation Distribution Procedure to allocate the minimum penalty cost among countries. Their work provides the extension of the Shapley value cost allocation as a penalty to reduce CO2 emissions. The paper has implications for how to provide initiatives to improve cooperation on reducing CO2 emissions at an international level. Results show that a reduction in cost of only one country can be harmful for other countries. In this way, some countries can end up or worse off in a case where all countries experience a uniform decrease in their penalty cost. Therefore, the findings of this work suggest a low penalty-cost scenario that helps the countries fight for pollution reduction and provide fruitful links for policy-makers. They show that the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol could be implemented by the Shapley value cost allocation

Modeling endogenous learning and imperfect competition effects in climate change economics

In this two-part paper we evaluate the effect of "endogenizing” technological learning and strategic behavior of agents in economic models used to assess climate change policies. In the first part we show the potential impact of R&D policies or demonstration and deployment (D&D) programs in the context of stringent stabilization scenarios. In the second part we show how game-theoretic methods can be implemented in climate change economic models to take into account three types of strategic interactions: (i) the market power of the countries benefiting from very low abatement costs on international markets for CO2 emissions, (ii) the strategic behavior of governments in the domestic allocation of CO2 emissions quotas, and (iii) the non-cooperative behavior of countries and regions in the burden sharing of CO2 concentration stabilization. The two topics of endogenous learning and game-theoretic approach to economic modeling are two manifestations of the need to take into account the strategic behavior of agents in the evaluation of climate change policies. In the first case an R&D policy or a demonstration and deployment (D&D) program are put in place in order to attain a cost reduction through the learning effect; in the second case the agents (countries) reply optimally to the actions decided by the other agents by exploiting their strategic advantages. Simulations based on integrated assessment models illustrate the approaches. These studies have been conducted under the Swiss NCCR-Climate progra

Existence and solution methods for equilibria

Equilibrium problems provide a mathematical framework which includes optimization, variational inequalities, fixed-point and saddle point problems, and noncooperative games as particular cases. This general format received an increasing interest in the last decade mainly because many theoretical and algorithmic results developed for one of these models can be often extended to the others through the unifying language provided by this common format. This survey paper aims at covering the main results concerning the existence of equilibria and the solution methods for finding them