On the Borders of Vagueness and the Vagueness of Borders

This article argues that resolutions to the sorites paradox offered by epistemic and supervaluation theories fail to adequately account for vagueness. After explaining the paradox, I examine the epistemic theory defended by Timothy Williamson and discuss objections to his semantic argument for vague terms having precise boundaries. I then consider Rosanna Keefe's supervaluationist approach and explain why it fails to accommodate the problem of higher-order vagueness. I conclude by discussing how fuzzy logic may hold the key to resolving the sorites paradox without positing indefensible borders to the correct application of vague terms

Fuzzy Natural Logic in IFSA-EUSFLAT 2021

The present book contains five papers accepted and published in the Special Issue, “Fuzzy Natural Logic in IFSA-EUSFLAT 2021”, of the journal Mathematics (MDPI). These papers are extended versions of the contributions presented in the conference “The 19th World Congress of the International Fuzzy Systems Association and the 12th Conference of the European Society for Fuzzy Logic and Technology jointly with the AGOP, IJCRS, and FQAS conferences”, which took place in Bratislava (Slovakia) from September 19 to September 24, 2021. Fuzzy Natural Logic (FNL) is a system of mathematical fuzzy logic theories that enables us to model natural language terms and rules while accounting for their inherent vagueness and allows us to reason and argue using the tools developed in them. FNL includes, among others, the theory of evaluative linguistic expressions (e.g., small, very large, etc.), the theory of fuzzy and intermediate quantifiers (e.g., most, few, many, etc.), and the theory of fuzzy/linguistic IF–THEN rules and logical inference. The papers in this Special Issue use the various aspects and concepts of FNL mentioned above and apply them to a wide range of problems both theoretically and practically oriented. This book will be of interest for researchers working in the areas of fuzzy logic, applied linguistics, generalized quantifiers, and their applications

The problem of artificial precision in theories of vagueness: a note on the role of maximal consistency

The problem of artificial precision is a major objection to any theory of vagueness based on real numbers as degrees of truth. Suppose you are willing to admit that, under sufficiently specified circumstances, a predication of "is red" receives a unique, exact number from the real unit interval [0,1]. You should then be committed to explain what is it that determines that value, settling for instance that my coat is red to degree 0.322 rather than 0.321. In this note I revisit the problem in the important case of {\L}ukasiewicz infinite-valued propositional logic that brings to the foreground the role of maximally consistent theories. I argue that the problem of artificial precision, as commonly conceived of in the literature, actually conflates two distinct problems of a very different nature.Comment: 11 pages, 2 table

Vagueness, Logic and Use: Four Experimental Studies on Vagueness

Although arguments for and against competing theories of vagueness often appeal to claims about the use of vague predicates by ordinary speakers, such claims are rarely tested. An exception is Bonini et al. (1999), who report empirical results on the use of vague predicates by Italian speakers, and take the results to count in favor of epistemicism. Yet several methodological difficulties mar their experiments; we outline these problems and devise revised experiments that do not show the same results. We then describe three additional empirical studies that investigate further claims in the literature on vagueness: the hypothesis that speakers confuse ‘P’ with ‘definitely P’, the relative persuasiveness of different formulations of the inductive premise of the Sorites, and the interaction of vague predicates with three different forms of negatio

Being Metaphysically Unsettled: Barnes and Williams on Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vagueness

This chapter discusses the defence of metaphysical indeterminacy by Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams and discusses a classical and bivalent theory of such indeterminacy. Even if metaphysical indeterminacy arguably is intelligible, Barnes and Williams argue in favour of it being so and this faces important problems. As for classical logic and bivalence, the chapter problematizes what exactly is at issue in this debate. Can reality not be adequately described using different languages, some classical and some not? Moreover, it is argued that the classical and bivalent theory of Barnes and Williams does not avoid the problems that arise for rival theories

Typicality, graded membership, and vagueness

This paper addresses theoretical problems arising from the vagueness of language terms, and intuitions of the vagueness of the concepts to which they refer. It is argued that the central intuitions of prototype theory are sufficient to account for both typicality phenomena and psychological intuitions about degrees of membership in vaguely defined classes. The first section explains the importance of the relation between degrees of membership and typicality (or goodness of example) in conceptual categorization. The second and third section address arguments advanced by Osherson and Smith (1997), and Kamp and Partee (1995), that the two notions of degree of membership and typicality must relate to fundamentally different aspects of conceptual representations. A version of prototype theory—the Threshold Model—is proposed to counter these arguments and three possible solutions to the problems of logical selfcontradiction and tautology for vague categorizations are outlined. In the final section graded membership is related to the social construction of conceptual boundaries maintained through language use