Lewis meets Brouwer: constructive strict implication

C. I. Lewis invented modern modal logic as a theory of "strict implication". Over the classical propositional calculus one can as well work with the unary box connective. Intuitionistically, however, the strict implication has greater expressive power than the box and allows to make distinctions invisible in the ordinary syntax. In particular, the logic determined by the most popular semantics of intuitionistic K becomes a proper extension of the minimal normal logic of the binary connective. Even an extension of this minimal logic with the "strength" axiom, classically near-trivial, preserves the distinction between the binary and the unary setting. In fact, this distinction and the strong constructive strict implication itself has been also discovered by the functional programming community in their study of "arrows" as contrasted with "idioms". Our particular focus is on arithmetical interpretations of the intuitionistic strict implication in terms of preservativity in extensions of Heyting's Arithmetic.Comment: Our invited contribution to the collection "L.E.J. Brouwer, 50 years later

Bibliography on Realizability

AbstractThis document is a bibliography on realizability and related matters. It has been collected by Lars Birkedal based on submissions from the participants in “A Workshop on Realizability Semantics and Its Applications”, Trento, Italy, June 30–July 1, 1999. It is available in BibTEX format at the following URL: http://www.cs.cmu.edu./~birkedal/realizability-bib.html

Continuation-Passing Style and Strong Normalisation for Intuitionistic Sequent Calculi

The intuitionistic fragment of the call-by-name version of Curien and Herbelin's \lambda\_mu\_{\~mu}-calculus is isolated and proved strongly normalising by means of an embedding into the simply-typed lambda-calculus. Our embedding is a continuation-and-garbage-passing style translation, the inspiring idea coming from Ikeda and Nakazawa's translation of Parigot's \lambda\_mu-calculus. The embedding strictly simulates reductions while usual continuation-passing-style transformations erase permutative reduction steps. For our intuitionistic sequent calculus, we even only need "units of garbage" to be passed. We apply the same method to other calculi, namely successive extensions of the simply-typed λ-calculus leading to our intuitionistic system, and already for the simplest extension we consider (λ-calculus with generalised application), this yields the first proof of strong normalisation through a reduction-preserving embedding. The results obtained extend to second and higher-order calculi

The intuitionistic temporal logic of dynamical systems

A dynamical system is a pair $(X,f)$, where $X$ is a topological space and $f\colon X\to X$ is continuous. Kremer observed that the language of propositional linear temporal logic can be interpreted over the class of dynamical systems, giving rise to a natural intuitionistic temporal logic. We introduce a variant of Kremer's logic, which we denote ${\sf ITL^c}$, and show that it is decidable. We also show that minimality and Poincar\'e recurrence are both expressible in the language of ${\sf ITL^c}$, thus providing a decidable logic expressive enough to reason about non-trivial asymptotic behavior in dynamical systems

Relevant Logics Obeying Component Homogeneity

This paper discusses three relevant logics that obey Component Homogeneity - a principle that Goddard and Routley introduce in their project of a logic of significance. The paper establishes two main results. First, it establishes a general characterization result for two families of logic that obey Component Homogeneity - that is, we provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their consequence relations. From this, we derive characterization results for S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fde. Second, the paper establishes complete sequent calculi for S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fde. Among the other accomplishments of the paper, we generalize the semantics from Bochvar, Hallden, Deutsch and Daniels, we provide a general recipe to define containment logics, we explore the single-premise/single-conclusion fragment of S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fdeand the connections between crossS*fde and the logic Eq of equality by Epstein. Also, we present S*fde as a relevant logic of meaninglessness that follows the main philosophical tenets of Goddard and Routley, and we briefly examine three further systems that are closely related to our main logics. Finally, we discuss Routley's criticism to containment logic in light of our results, and overview some open issues

Proof Theory for Positive Logic with Weak Negation

Proof-theoretic methods are developed for subsystems of Johansson's logic obtained by extending the positive fragment of intuitionistic logic with weak negations. These methods are exploited to establish properties of the logical systems. In particular, cut-free complete sequent calculi are introduced and used to provide a proof of the fact that the systems satisfy the Craig interpolation property. Alternative versions of the calculi are later obtained by means of an appropriate loop-checking history mechanism. Termination of the new calculi is proved, and used to conclude that the considered logical systems are PSPACE-complete

Frontiers of Conditional Logic

Conditional logics were originally developed for the purpose of modeling intuitively correct modes of reasoning involving conditional—especially counterfactual—expressions in natural language. While the debate over the logic of conditionals is as old as propositional logic, it was the development of worlds semantics for modal logic in the past century that catalyzed the rapid maturation of the field. Moreover, like modal logic, conditional logic has subsequently found a wide array of uses, from the traditional (e.g. counterfactuals) to the exotic (e.g. conditional obligation). Despite the close connections between conditional and modal logic, both the technical development and philosophical exploitation of the latter has outstripped that of the former, with the result that noticeable lacunae exist in the literature on conditional logic. My dissertation addresses a number of these underdeveloped frontiers, producing new technical insights and philosophical applications. I contribute to the solution of a problem posed by Priest of finding sound and complete labeled tableaux for systems of conditional logic from Lewis\u27 V-family. To develop these tableaux, I draw on previous work on labeled tableaux for modal and conditional logic; errors and shortcomings in recent work on this problem are identified and corrected. While modal logic has by now been thoroughly studied in non-classical contexts, e.g. intuitionistic and relevant logic, the literature on conditional logic is still overwhelmingly classical. Another contribution of my dissertation is a thorough analysis of intuitionistic conditional logic, in which I utilize both algebraic and worlds semantics, and investigate how several novel embedding results might shed light on the philosophical interpretation of both intuitionistic logic and conditional logic extensions thereof. My dissertation examines deontic and connexive conditional logic as well as the underappreciated history of connexive notions in the analysis of conditional obligation. The possibility of interpreting deontic modal logics in such systems (via embedding results) serves as an important theoretical guide. A philosophically motivated proscription on impossible obligations is shown to correspond to, and justify, certain (weak) connexive theses. Finally, I contribute to the intensifying debate over counterpossibles, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents, and take—in contrast to Lewis and Williamson—a non-vacuous line. Thus, in my view, a counterpossible like If there had been a counterexample to the law of the excluded middle, Brouwer would not have been vindicated is false, not (vacuously) true, although it has an impossible antecedent. I exploit impossible (non-normal) worlds—originally developed to model non-normal modal logics—to provide non-vacuous semantics for counterpossibles. I buttress the case for non-vacuous semantics by making recourse to both novel technical results and theoretical considerations