Livrable 3.2 - GNSS Quantitative Analysis for ERSAT GGC Project - Projet ERSAT GGC - ERTMS on SATELLITE Galileo Game Changer

In order to apply the Enhanced ERTMS/ETCS Functional Architecture, capable of using GNSS and Public Radio TLC Technologies, the safety aspects of the ERTMS/ETCS system upon the future application of the above mentioned positioning and communication technologies have to be investigated. This document describes the Quantitative Safety and Hazard Analysis carried out in ERSAT GGC WP3 - Task 3.2 and reports the relative results

Joint safety and security analysis for complex systems

The problem of joint safety and security analysis is considered. For complex systems method of fault tree analysis for safety and security is proposed. The effectiveness of new approach of joint safety and security analysis is shown on example of the European Railway Traffic Management System (ERTMS)

Railway Research

This book focuses on selected research problems of contemporary railways. The first chapter is devoted to the prediction of railways development in the nearest future. The second chapter discusses safety and security problems in general, precisely from the system point of view. In the third chapter, both the general approach and a particular case study of a critical incident with regard to railway safety are presented. In the fourth chapter, the question of railway infrastructure studies is presented, which is devoted to track superstructure. In the fifth chapter, the modern system for the technical condition monitoring of railway tracks is discussed. The compact on-board sensing device is presented. The last chapter focuses on modeling railway vehicle dynamics using numerical simulation, where the dynamical models are exploited

Verification Report

The main input for this deliverable was the Moving Block Specification (Deliverable D4.1, X2Rail-5), defining an ETCS L3 trackside system with moving block ("L3 trackside"). This document describes safety requirements for L3 trackside, in terms of a fault tree-based approach applied at the system of systems (SoS) level, evaluation and refinement of safety hazards for L3 trackside, and results from Formal Methods (FMs) application for V&V of requirements.Safety requirements for L3 trackside implementations should, if fulfilled, ensure that all relevant safety hazards are mitigated. In principle, this should be possible to achieve by: 1. Using a systematic approach to determine the safety hazards at the system of systems level, and apportion the relevant hazards to the L3 trackside subsystem, and 2. Defining safety requirements that are configurable for the different types of L3 trackside systems, and other static configuration data

Systems thinking, the Swiss Cheese Model and accident analysis: a comparative systemic analysis of the Grayrigg train derailment using the ATSB, AcciMap and STAMP models

The Swiss Cheese Model (SCM) is the most popular accident causation model and is widely used throughout various industries. A debate exists in the research literature over whether the SCM remains a viable tool for accident analysis. Critics of the model suggest that it provides a sequential, oversimplified view of accidents. Conversely, proponents suggest that it embodies the concepts of systems theory, as per the contemporary systemic analysis techniques. The aim of this paper was to consider whether the SCM can provide a systems thinking approach and remain a viable option for accident analysis. To achieve this, the train derailment at Grayrigg was analysed with an SCM-based model (the ATSB accident investigation model) and two systemic accident analysis methods (AcciMap and STAMP). The analysis outputs and usage of the techniques were compared. The findings of the study showed that each model applied the systems thinking approach. However, the ATSB model and AcciMap graphically presented their findings in a more succinct manner, whereas STAMP more clearly embodied the concepts of systems theory. The study suggests that, whilst the selection of an analysis method is subject to trade-offs that practitioners and researchers must make, the SCM remains a viable model for accident analysis

The restructuring and future of the British Rail system

The paper focuses mainly on reviewing and analysing the restructuring of Britain’s railways, including the re-cently published proposals for its future. The objective is to investigate the current market structure, the market behaviour and the overall performance of the British rail system over time. In order to learn what other people think about the problems of the industry and their solutions, interviews with key people associated with the in-dustry and several submissions of some key interest parties to the 2004 railway structure review are used in this paper. The results are that all major characteristics of the rail reform in Britain are seen as workable and empiri-cal data reveal that they have worked comparatively successfully, before Hatfield. Because of bad implementa-tion some of the features, and in particular the private infrastructure manager, have not worked well. Most of the problems have arisen because of indecision over refranchising and the disruption following Hatfield. Further-more the policy of the Government after Hatfield created an extremely risk averse culture within the industry, at a time when Railtrack had not enough insights about the state of the rail network. Although empirically unjustified, safety improvement became the main issue, costs escalated and reliability and productivity experienced a huge fall. The current White Paper “The Future of Rail” is seen as partially misleading and not at all detailed. At present it is only clear that the proposals will result in further increase of political interference. Much will depend on the precise implementation of the proposed measures and therefore the future of British rail remains unclear

A data-driven conceptual framework for understanding the nature of hazards in railway accidents

Hazards threaten railway safety by their potential to trigger railway accidents. Whilst there are a considerable number of prior works investigating railway hazards, few offer a holistic view of hazards across jurisdictions and time and demonstrate policy implementation due to the inability to analyse a large amount of safety-related textual data. The conceptual framework HazardMap is developed to overcome this gap, employing open-sourced Natural Language Processing topic model BERTopic for the automated analysis of textual data from Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB), Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) railway accident reports. The topic modelling depicts the relationships between hazards, railway accidents and investigator recommendations and is further extended and integrated with the existing risk theory and epidemiological accident models. Results show that each hazard in the railway system has different aspects and could trigger a railway accident when combined with other hazards. Each aspect can be partially or fully addressed by implementing hazard mitigation policies such as introducing new technologies or regulations. A case study of the application to the risk at level crossings is provided to illustrate how HazardMap works with real-world data. This demonstrates a high degree of coverage within the existing risk management system, indicating the capability of helping policymaking for managing risks with adequate accuracy. The primary contributions of the framework proposed are to enable a huge amount of knowledge accumulated for an intuitive policymaking process to be summarised, and to allow other railway investigators to leverage lessons learnt across jurisdictions and time with limited human intervention. Future research could incorporate data from road, aviation or maritime accidents