On Theses Without Iterated Modalities of Modal Logics Between C1 and S5. Part 1

This is the first, out of two papers, in which we identify all logics between C1 and S5 having the same theses without iterated modalities. All these logics canbe divided into certain groups. Each such group depends only on which of thefollowing formulas are theses of all logics from this group: (N), (T), (D), ⌜(T)∨ ☐q⌝,and for any n 0 a formula ⌜(T) ∨ (altn)⌝, where (T) has not the atom ‘q’, and(T) and (altn) have no common atom. We generalize Pollack’s result from [12],where he proved that all modal logics between S1 and S5 have the same theseswhich does not involve iterated modalities (i.e., the same first-degree theses).Zadanie „ Wdrożenie platformy Open Journal System dla czasopisma „ Bulletin of the Section of Logic” finansowane w ramach umowy 948/P-DUN/2016 ze środków Ministra Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego przeznaczonych na działalność upowszechniającą naukę

A New Arithmetically Incomplete First- Order Extension of Gl All Theorems of Which Have Cut Free Proofs

Reference [12] introduced a novel formula to formula translation tool (“formulators”) that enables syntactic metatheoretical investigations of first-order modal logics, bypassing a need to convert them first into Gentzen style logics in order to rely on cut elimination and the subformula property. In fact, the formulator tool, as was already demonstrated in loc. cit., is applicable even to the metatheoretical study of logics such as QGL, where cut elimination is (provably, [2]) unavailable. This paper applies the formulator approach to show the independence of the axiom schema _A ! _8xA of the logics M3 and ML3 of [17, 18, 11, 13]. This leads to the conclusion that the two logics obtained by removing this axiom are incomplete, both with respect to their natural Kripke structures and to arithmetical interpretations. In particular, the so modified ML3 is, similarly to QGL, an arithmetically incomplete first-order extension of GL, but, unlike QGL, all its theorems have cut free proofs. We also establish here, via formulators, a stronger version of the disjunction property for GL and QGL without going through Gentzen versions of these logics (compare with the more complex proofs in [2, 8]).This research was partially supported by NSERC grant No. 8250

Neutrality and Many-Valued Logics

In this book, we consider various many-valued logics: standard, linear, hyperbolic, parabolic, non-Archimedean, p-adic, interval, neutrosophic, etc. We survey also results which show the tree different proof-theoretic frameworks for many-valued logics, e.g. frameworks of the following deductive calculi: Hilbert's style, sequent, and hypersequent. We present a general way that allows to construct systematically analytic calculi for a large family of non-Archimedean many-valued logics: hyperrational-valued, hyperreal-valued, and p-adic valued logics characterized by a special format of semantics with an appropriate rejection of Archimedes' axiom. These logics are built as different extensions of standard many-valued logics (namely, Lukasiewicz's, Goedel's, Product, and Post's logics). The informal sense of Archimedes' axiom is that anything can be measured by a ruler. Also logical multiple-validity without Archimedes' axiom consists in that the set of truth values is infinite and it is not well-founded and well-ordered. On the base of non-Archimedean valued logics, we construct non-Archimedean valued interval neutrosophic logic INL by which we can describe neutrality phenomena.Comment: 119 page

Epistemic logic without closure

All standard epistemic logics legitimate something akin to the principle of closure, according to which knowledge is closed under competent deductive inference. And yet the principle of closure, particularly in its multiple premise guise, has a somewhat ambivalent status within epistemology. One might think that serious concerns about closure point us away from epistemic logic altogether—away from the very idea that the knowledge relation could be fruitfully treated as a kind of modal operator. This, however, need not be so. The abandonment of closure may yet leave in place plenty of formal structure amenable to systematic logical treatment. In this paper we describe a family of weak epistemic logics in which closure fails, and describe two alternative semantic frameworks in which these logics can be modelled. One of these—which we term plurality semantics—is relatively unfamiliar. We explore under what conditions plurality frames validate certain much-discussed principles of epistemic logic. It turns out that plurality frames can be interpreted in a very natural way in light of one motivation for rejecting closure, adding to the significance of our technical work. The second framework that we employ—neighbourhood semantics—is much better known. But we show that it too can be interpreted in a way that comports with a certain motivation for rejecting closure

A partial squeezing theorem for a particular class of many-valued logics

The problem to be studied for this thesis was that of whether the usual statement calculus is a suitable formal system for every many-valued logic in a particular collection of logics. The logics in question are those that fall between the usual two-valued logic and a modified form of the Lukasiewicz-Tarski three-valued logic. Since this betweenness relationship was an original concept and appeared nowhere in the literature, the first goal in the research plan was to define this relationship precisely. Preliminary concepts included truth value mapping and forgivingness of logics, concepts that, like betweenness, are original to this paper and that facilitate the comparison of many-valued logics. After betweenness was defined, the next stage of the research would be to investigate the logics between the classical logic and the modified Lg and to see for which of these logics the statement calculus is suitable. This would involve direct calculations with truth tables as well as the use of any published results on the axiomatization and also the comparison of many-valued logics. Because of the scarcity of work or literature on the problem of comparing many-valued logics, direct calculation turned out to be the most effective method of research. The introduction of a device called a truth class table proved to be invaluable. Such a table allows the logician to work with sets of truth values instead of with individual truth values themselves. Truth class tables were calculated that are characteristic of the logics under consideration. It was discovered that the usual statement calculus is not suitable for every logic between the two-valued logic and the modified L3. The main result of the thesis is a theorem relating sufficient conditions under which a many-valued logic will have the usual statement calculus for a suitable formal system. It is not yet known whether these conditions are necessary as well as sufficient. Concluding remarks demonstrate, as a corollary to the main result, that for any integer n there exist n-valued logics for which the usual statement calculus is suitable