Quantifying the time course of visual object processing using ERPs: it's time to up the game

Hundreds of studies have investigated the early ERPs to faces and objects using scalp and intracranial recordings. The vast majority of these studies have used uncontrolled stimuli, inappropriate designs, peak measurements, poor figures, and poor inferential and descriptive group statistics. These problems, together with a tendency to discuss any effect p < 0.05 rather than to report effect sizes, have led to a research field very much qualitative in nature, despite its quantitative inspirations, and in which predictions do not go beyond condition A > condition B. Here we describe the main limitations of face and object ERP research and suggest alternative strategies to move forward. The problems plague intracranial and surface ERP studies, but also studies using more advanced techniques – e.g., source space analyses and measurements of network dynamics, as well as many behavioral, fMRI, TMS, and LFP studies. In essence, it is time to stop amassing binary results and start using single-trial analyses to build models of visual perception

Experience-driven formation of parts-based representations in a model of layered visual memory

Growing neuropsychological and neurophysiological evidence suggests that the visual cortex uses parts-based representations to encode, store and retrieve relevant objects. In such a scheme, objects are represented as a set of spatially distributed local features, or parts, arranged in stereotypical fashion. To encode the local appearance and to represent the relations between the constituent parts, there has to be an appropriate memory structure formed by previous experience with visual objects. Here, we propose a model how a hierarchical memory structure supporting efficient storage and rapid recall of parts-based representations can be established by an experience-driven process of self-organization. The process is based on the collaboration of slow bidirectional synaptic plasticity and homeostatic unit activity regulation, both running at the top of fast activity dynamics with winner-take-all character modulated by an oscillatory rhythm. These neural mechanisms lay down the basis for cooperation and competition between the distributed units and their synaptic connections. Choosing human face recognition as a test task, we show that, under the condition of open-ended, unsupervised incremental learning, the system is able to form memory traces for individual faces in a parts-based fashion. On a lower memory layer the synaptic structure is developed to represent local facial features and their interrelations, while the identities of different persons are captured explicitly on a higher layer. An additional property of the resulting representations is the sparseness of both the activity during the recall and the synaptic patterns comprising the memory traces.Comment: 34 pages, 12 Figures, 1 Table, published in Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience (Special Issue on Complex Systems Science and Brain Dynamics), http://www.frontiersin.org/neuroscience/computationalneuroscience/paper/10.3389/neuro.10/015.2009

Cortical Learning of Recognition Categories: A Resolution of the Exemplar Vs. Prototype Debate

Do humans and animals learn exemplars or prototypes when they categorize objects and events in the world? How are different degrees of abstraction realized through learning by neurons in inferotemporal and prefrontal cortex? How do top-down expectations influence the course of learning? Thirty related human cognitive experiments (the 5-4 category structure) have been used to test competing views in the prototype-exemplar debate. In these experiments, during the test phase, subjects unlearn in a characteristic way items that they had learned to categorize perfectly in the training phase. Many cognitive models do not describe how an individual learns or forgets such categories through time. Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) neural models provide such a description, and also clarify both psychological and neurobiological data. Matching of bottom-up signals with learned top-down expectations plays a key role in ART model learning. Here, an ART model is used to learn incrementally in response to 5-4 category structure stimuli. Simulation results agree with experimental data, achieving perfect categorization in training and a good match to the pattern of errors exhibited by human subjects in the testing phase. These results show how the model learns both prototypes and certain exemplars in the training phase. ART prototypes are, however, unlike the ones posited in the traditional prototype-exemplar debate. Rather, they are critical patterns of features to which a subject learns to pay attention based on past predictive success and the order in which exemplars are experienced. Perturbations of old memories by newly arriving test items generate a performance curve that closely matches the performance pattern of human subjects. The model also clarifies exemplar-based accounts of data concerning amnesia.Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency SyNaPSE program (Hewlett-Packard Company, DARPA HR0011-09-3-0001; HRL Laboratories LLC #801881-BS under HR0011-09-C-0011); Science of Learning Centers program of the National Science Foundation (NSF SBE-0354378

Representational Kinds

Many debates in philosophy focus on whether folk or scientific psychological notions pick out cognitive natural kinds. Examples include memory, emotions and concepts. A potentially interesting type of kind is: kinds of mental representations (as opposed, for example, to kinds of psychological faculties). In this chapter we outline a proposal for a theory of representational kinds in cognitive science. We argue that the explanatory role of representational kinds in scientific theories, in conjunction with a mainstream approach to explanation in cognitive science, suggest that representational kinds are multi-level. This is to say that representational kinds’ properties cluster at different levels of explanation and allow for intra- and inter-level projections

Semantic memory

The Encyclopedia of Human Behavior, Second Edition is a comprehensive three-volume reference source on human action and reaction, and the thoughts, feelings, and physiological functions behind those actions

Time course and robustness of ERP object and face differences

Conflicting results have been reported about the earliest “true” ERP differences related to face processing, with the bulk of the literature focusing on the signal in the first 200 ms after stimulus onset. Part of the discrepancy might be explained by uncontrolled low-level differences between images used to assess the timing of face processing. In the present experiment, we used a set of faces, houses, and noise textures with identical amplitude spectra to equate energy in each spatial frequency band. The timing of face processing was evaluated using face–house and face–noise contrasts, as well as upright-inverted stimulus contrasts. ERP differences were evaluated systematically at all electrodes, across subjects, and in each subject individually, using trimmed means and bootstrap tests. Different strategies were employed to assess the robustness of ERP differential activities in individual subjects and group comparisons. We report results showing that the most conspicuous and reliable effects were systematically observed in the N170 latency range, starting at about 130–150 ms after stimulus onset

After-effects and the reach of perceptual content

In this paper, I discuss the use of after-effects as a criterion for showing that we can perceive high-level properties. According to this criterion, if a high-level property is susceptible to after-effects, this suggests that the property can be perceived, rather than cognized. The defenders of the criterion claim that, since after-effects are also present for low-level, uncontroversially perceptual properties, we can safely infer that high-level after-effects are perceptual as well. The critics of the criterion, on the other hand, assimilate it to superficially similar effects in cognition and argue that the after-effect criterion is a cognitive phenomenon rather than a perceptual one, and that as a result it is not a reliable guide for exploring the contents of perception. I argue against both of these views and show that high-level after-effects cannot be identified either with low-level after-effects or with cognitive biases. I suggest an intermediate position: high-level after-effects are not cognitive, but they are nonetheless not a good criterion for exploring the contents of perception

Toward a social psychophysics of face communication

As a highly social species, humans are equipped with a powerful tool for social communication—the face, which can elicit multiple social perceptions in others due to the rich and complex variations of its movements, morphology, and complexion. Consequently, identifying precisely what face information elicits different social perceptions is a complex empirical challenge that has largely remained beyond the reach of traditional research methods. More recently, the emerging field of social psychophysics has developed new methods designed to address this challenge. Here, we introduce and review the foundational methodological developments of social psychophysics, present recent work that has advanced our understanding of the face as a tool for social communication, and discuss the main challenges that lie ahead

Platonic model of mind as an approximation to neurodynamics

Hierarchy of approximations involved in simplification of microscopic theories, from sub-cellural to the whole brain level, is presented. A new approximation to neural dynamics is described, leading to a Platonic-like model of mind based on psychological spaces. Objects and events in these spaces correspond to quasi-stable states of brain dynamics and may be interpreted from psychological point of view. Platonic model bridges the gap between neurosciences and psychological sciences. Static and dynamic versions of this model are outlined and Feature Space Mapping, a neurofuzzy realization of the static version of Platonic model, described. Categorization experiments with human subjects are analyzed from the neurodynamical and Platonic model points of view

Acetylcholine neuromodulation in normal and abnormal learning and memory: vigilance control in waking, sleep, autism, amnesia, and Alzheimer's disease

This article provides a unified mechanistic neural explanation of how learning, recognition, and cognition break down during Alzheimer's disease, medial temporal amnesia, and autism. It also clarifies whey there are often sleep disturbances during these disorders. A key mechanism is how acetylcholine modules vigilance control in cortical layer