38,072 research outputs found
Discourse network analysis: policy debates as dynamic networks
Political discourse is the verbal interaction between political actors. Political actors make normative claims about policies conditional on each other. This renders discourse a dynamic network phenomenon. Accordingly, the structure and dynamics of policy debates can be analyzed with a combination of content analysis and dynamic network analysis. After annotating statements of actors in text sources, networks can be created from these structured data, such as congruence or conflict networks at the actor or concept level, affiliation networks of actors and concept stances, and longitudinal versions of these networks. The resulting network data reveal important properties of a debate, such as the structure of advocacy coalitions or discourse coalitions, polarization and consensus formation, and underlying endogenous processes like popularity, reciprocity, or social balance. The added value of discourse network analysis over survey-based policy network research is that policy processes can be analyzed from a longitudinal perspective. Inferential techniques for understanding the micro-level processes governing political discourse are being developed
Dynamics of alliance formation and the egalitarian revolution
Arguably the most influential force in human history is the formation of
social coalitions and alliances (i.e., long-lasting coalitions) and their
impact on individual power. In most great ape species, coalitions occur at
individual and group levels and among both kin and non-kin. Nonetheless, ape
societies remain essentially hierarchical, and coalitions rarely weaken social
inequality. In contrast, human hunter-gatherers show a remarkable tendency to
egalitarianism, and human coalitions and alliances occur not only among
individuals and groups, but also among groups of groups. Here, we develop a
stochastic model describing the emergence of networks of allies resulting from
within-group competition for status or mates between individuals utilizing
dyadic information. The model shows that alliances often emerge in a phase
transition-like fashion if the group size, awareness, aggressiveness, and
persuasiveness of individuals are large and the decay rate of individual
affinities is small. With cultural inheritance of social networks, a single
leveling alliance including all group members can emerge in several
generations. Our results suggest that a rapid transition from a hierarchical
society of great apes to an egalitarian society of hunter-gatherers (often
referred to as "egalitarian revolution") could indeed follow an increase in
human cognitive abilities. The establishment of stable group-wide egalitarian
alliances creates conditions promoting the origin of cultural norms favoring
the group interests over those of individuals.Comment: 37 pages, 15 figure
Polarization of coalitions in an agent-based model of political discourse
Political discourse is the verbal interaction between political actors in a policy domain. This article explains the formation of polarized advocacy or discourse coalitions in this complex phenomenon by presenting a dynamic, stochastic, and discrete agent-based model based on graph theory and local optimization. In a series of thought experiments, actors compute their utility of contributing a specific statement to the discourse by following ideological criteria, preferential attachment, agenda-setting strategies, governmental coherence, or other mechanisms. The evolving macro-level discourse is represented as a dynamic network and evaluated against arguments from the literature on the policy process. A simple combination of four theoretical mechanisms is already able to produce artificial policy debates with theoretically plausible properties. Any sufficiently realistic configuration must entail innovative and path-dependent elements as well as a blend of exogenous preferences and endogenous opinion formation mechanisms
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Diffusion of shared goods in consumer coalitions. An agent-based model
This paper focuses on the process of coalition formation conditioning the common decision to adopt a shared good, which cannot be afforded by an average single consumer and whose use cannot be exhausted by any single consumer. An agent based model is developed to study the interplay between these two processes: coalition formation and diffusion of shared goods. Coalition formation is modelled in an evolutionary game theoretic setting, while adoption uses elements from both the Bass and the threshold models. Coalitions formation sets the conditions for adoption, while diffusion influences the consequent formation of coalitions. Results show that both coalitions and diffusion are subject to network effects and have an impact on the information flow though the population of consumers. Large coalitions are preferred over small ones since individual cost is lower, although it increases if higher quantities are purchased collectively. The paper concludes by connecting the model conceptualisation to the on-going discussion of diffusion of sustainable goods, discussing related policy implications
Social Stability and Extended Social Balance - Quantifying the Role of Inactive Links in Social Networks
Structural balance in social network theory starts from signed networks with
active relationships (friendly or hostile) to establish a hierarchy between
four different types of triadic relationships. The lack of an active link also
provides information about the network. To exploit the information that remains
uncovered by structural balance, we introduce the inactive relationship that
accounts for both neutral and nonexistent ties between two agents. This
addition results in ten types of triads, with the advantage that the network
analysis can be done with complete networks. To each type of triadic
relationship, we assign an energy that is a measure for its average occupation
probability. Finite temperatures account for a persistent form of disorder in
the formation of the triadic relationships. We propose a Hamiltonian with three
interaction terms and a chemical potential (capturing the cost of edge
activation) as an underlying model for the triadic energy levels. Our model is
suitable for empirical analysis of political networks and allows to uncover
generative mechanisms. It is tested on an extended data set for the standings
between two classes of alliances in a massively multi-player on-line game
(MMOG) and on real-world data for the relationships between countries during
the Cold War era. We find emergent properties in the triadic relationships
between the nodes in a political network. For example, we observe a persistent
hierarchy between the ten triadic energy levels across time and networks. In
addition, the analysis reveals consistency in the extracted model parameters
and a universal data collapse of a derived combination of global properties of
the networks. We illustrate that the model has predictive power for the
transition probabilities between the different triadic states.Comment: 21 pages, 10 figure
Reconceptualizing major policy change in the advocacy coalition framework: a discourse network analysis of German pension politics
How does major policy change come about? This article identifies and rectifies weaknesses in the conceptualization of innovative policy change in the Advocacy Coalition Framework. In a case study of policy belief change preceding an innovative reform in the German subsystem of old-age security, important new aspects of major policy change are carved out. In particular, the analysis traces a transition from one single hegemonic advocacy coalition to another stable coalition, with a transition phase between the two equilibria. The transition phase is characterized (i) by a bipolarization of policy beliefs in the subsystem and (ii) by state actors with shifting coalition memberships due to policy learning across coalitions or due to executive turnover. Apparently, there are subsystems with specific characteristics (presumably redistributive rather than regulative subsystems) in which one hegemonic coalition is the default, or the "normal state." In these subsystems, polarization and shifting coalition memberships seem to interact to produce coalition turnover and major policy change. The case study is based on discourse network analysis, a combination of qualitative content analysis and social network analysis, which provides an intertemporal measurement of advocacy coalition realignment at the level of policy beliefs in a subsystem
Endogenous Network Dynamics
In all social and economic interactions, individuals or coalitions choose not only with whom to interact but how to interact, and over time both the structure (the “with whom”) and the strategy (“the how”) of interactions change. Our objectives here are to model the structure and strategy of interactions prevailing at any point in time as a directed network and to address the following open question in the theory of social and economic network formation: given the rules of network and coalition formation, the preferences of individuals over networks, the strategic behavior of coalitions in forming networks, and the trembles of nature, what network and coalitional dynamics are likely to emergence and persist. Our main contributions are (i) to formulate the problem of network and coalition formation as a dynamic, stochastic game, (ii) to show that this game possesses a stationary correlated equilibrium (in network and coalition formation strategies), (iii) to show that, together with the trembles of nature, this stationary correlated equilibrium determines an equilibrium Markov process of network and coalition formation which respects the rules of network and coalition formation and the preferences of individuals, and (iv) to show that, although uncountably many networks may form, this endogenous process of network and coalition formation possesses a nonempty finite set of ergodic measures and generates a finite, disjoint collection of nonempty subsets of networks and coalitions, each constituting a basin of attraction. Moreover, we extend to the setting of endogenous Markov dynamics the notions of pairwise stability (Jackson-Wolinsky, 1996), strong stability (Jackson-van den Nouweland, 2005), and Nash stability (Bala-Goyal, 2000), and we show that in order for any network-coalition pair to be stable (pairwise, strong, or Nash) it is necessary and sufficient that the pair reside in one of finitely many basins of attraction - and hence reside in the support of an ergodic measure. The results we obtain here for endogenous network dynamics and stochastic basins of attraction are the dynamic analogs of our earlier results on endogenous network formation and strategic basins of attraction in static, abstract games of network formation (Page and Wooders, 2008), and build on the seminal contributions of Jackson and Watts (2002), Konishi and Ray (2003), and Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray (2005).
Why are some coalitions more successful than others in setting standards? Empirical evidence from the Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD standard war
Standard-setting coalitions are increasingly composed of rival firms from different sectors and are characterized by simultaneous and/or sequential cooperation and competition among their members. This paper examines why firms choose to belong to two standard-setting coalitions instead of one and what determines the success of a standard coalition. We test empirically for network effect, experience effect, and coopetitive effect in the Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD standard war. We find that the higher the similarity of the members in the coalition, the greater the probability of standard coalition success. Furthermore, relatedness leads to a greater probability of joining both competing coalitions, but at a given degree of knowledge difference, an opposite effect exists.Blu-ray; HD-DVD; coalition; coopetition; standard war
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