9 research outputs found
Four Round Secure Computation without Setup
We construct a 4-round multi-party computation protocol in the plain model for any functionality, secure against a malicious adversary. Our protocol relies on the sub-exponential hardness of the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem with slightly super-polynomial noise ratio, and on the existence of adaptively secure commitments. Lin, Pass and Soni (FOCS \u2717) provide an adaptively secure commitment scheme from Time-Lock Puzzles.
Our round complexity matches a lower bound of Garg et al. (EUROCRYPT \u2716), and outperforms the state of the art of 6 rounds based on similar assumptions to ours, and 5 rounds relying on indistinguishability obfuscation and other strong assumptions.
To do this, we construct an LWE based multi-key FHE scheme with a very simple one-round distributed setup procedure (vs. the trusted setup required in previous LWE based constructions).
This lets us construct the first 3-round semi-malicious MPC protocol without setup from standard LWE using the approach of Mukherjee and Wichs (EUROCRYPT \u2716). Finally, subexponential hardness and adaptive commitments are used to \u27\u27compile\u27\u27 the protocol into the fully malicious setting
Towards Round-Optimal Secure Multiparty Computations: Multikey FHE without a CRS
Multikey fully homomorphic encryption (MFHE) allows homomorphic operations between ciphertexts encrypted under different keys. In applications for secure multiparty computation (MPC)protocols, MFHE can be more advantageous than usual fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) since
users do not need to agree with a common public key before the computation when using MFHE. In EUROCRYPT 2016, Mukherjee and Wichs constructed a secure MPC protocol in only two rounds via MFHE which deals with a common random/reference string (CRS) in key generation. After then, Brakerski et al.. replaced the role of CRS with the distributed setup for CRS calculation to form a four round secure MPC protocol. Thus, recent improvements in round complexity of MPC protocols have
been made using MFHE.
In this paper, we go further to obtain round-efficient and secure MPC protocols. The underlying MFHE schemes in previous works still involve the common value, CRS, it seems to weaken the power of using
MFHE to allow users to independently generate their own keys. Therefore, we resolve the issue by constructing an MFHE scheme without CRS based on LWE assumption, and then we obtain a secure MPC protocol against semi-malicious security in three rounds
Lattice-based, more general anti-leakage model and its application in decentralization
In the case of standard \LWE samples , is typically uniformly over , and under the \LWE assumption, the conditional distribution of given and should be consistent. However, if an adversary chooses adaptively, the gap between the two may be larger. In this work, we are mainly interested in quantifying , while an adversary chooses. Brakerski and D\ {o}ttling answered the question in one case: they proved that when is uniformly chosen from , it holds that . We prove that for any , is uniformly chosen from or is sampled from a discrete Gaussian, the above result still holds.
In addition, as an independent result, we have also proved the regularity of the hash function mapped to the prime-order group and its Cartesian product.
As an application of the above results, we improved the multi-key
fully homomorphic encryption\cite{TCC:BraHalPol17} and answered the question raised at the end of their work positively: we have GSW-type ciphertext rather than Dual-GSW, and the improved scheme has shorter keys and ciphertext
Key lifting : Multi-key Fully Homomorphic Encryption in plain model without noise flooding
Multi-key Fully Homomorphic Encryption (\MK), based on the Learning With Error assumption (\LWE), usually lifts ciphertexts of different users to new ciphertexts under a common public key to enable homomorphic evaluation. The efficiency of the current Multi-key Fully Homomorphic Encryption (\MK) scheme is mainly restricted by two aspects:
Expensive ciphertext expansion operation: In a boolean circuit with input length , multiplication depth , security parameter , the number of additional encryptions introduced to achieve ciphertext expansion is .
Noise flooding technology resulting in a large modulus : In order to prove the security of the scheme, the noise flooding technology introduced in the encryption and distributed decryption stages will lead to a huge modulus , which corrodes the whole scheme and leads to sub-exponential approximation factors .
This paper solves the first problem by presenting a framework called Key-Lifting Multi-key Fully Homomorphic Encryption (\KL). With this \emph{key lifting} procedure, the number of encryptions for a local user is reduced to , similar to single-key fully homomorphic encryption (\FHE). For the second problem, based on R\\u27{e}nyi divergence, we propose an optimized proof method that removes the noise flooding technology in the encryption phase. Additionally, in the distributed decryption phase, we prove that the asymmetric nature of the DGSW ciphertext ensures that the noise after decryption does not leak the noise in the initial ciphertext, as long as the depth of the circuit is sufficient. Thus, our initial ciphertext remains semantically secure even without noise flooding, provided the encryption scheme is leakage-resilient. This approach significantly reduces the size of the modulus (with ) and the computational overhead of the entire scheme
Interaction-Preserving Compilers for Secure Computation
In this work we consider the following question: What is the cost of security for multi-party protocols? Specifically, given an insecure protocol where parties exchange (in the worst case) bits in rounds, is it possible to design a secure protocol with communication complexity close to and rounds? We systematically study this problem in a variety of settings and we propose solutions based on the intractability of different cryptographic problems.
For the case of two parties we design an interaction-preserving compiler where the number of bits exchanged in the secure protocol approaches and the number of rounds is exactly , assuming the hardness of standard problems over lattices. For the more general multi-party case, we obtain the same result assuming either (i) an additional round of interaction or (ii) the existence of extractable witness encryption and succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge. As a contribution of independent interest, we construct the first multi-key fully homomorphic encryption scheme with message-to-ciphertext ratio (i.e., rate) of , assuming the hardness of the learning with errors (LWE) problem.
We view our work as a support for the claim that, as far as interaction and communication are concerned, one does not need to pay a significant price for security in multi-party protocols
Round-Optimal Black-Box Multiparty Computation from Polynomial-Time Assumptions
A central direction of research in secure multiparty computation with dishonest majority
has been to achieve three main goals:
1. reduce the total number of rounds of communication (to four, which is optimal);
2. use only polynomial-time hardness assumptions, and
3. rely solely on cryptographic assumptions in a black-box manner.
This is especially challenging when we do not allow a trusted setup assumption of any kind. While protocols achieving two out of three goals in this setting have been designed in recent literature, achieving all three simultaneously remained an elusive open question. Specifically, it was answered positively only for a restricted class of functionalities. In this paper, we completely resolve this long-standing open question. Specifically, we present a protocol for all polynomial-time computable functions that does not require any trusted setup assumptions and achieves all three of the above goals simultaneously
Delayed-Input and Non-Malleable Cryptographic Protocols
2016 - 2017A major goal in the design of cryptographic protocols is to re-
duce the number of communication rounds. Since a cryptographic
protocol usually consists of a composition and interplay of some
subprotocols and cryptographic primitives, the natural approach
to save rounds consists in playing all subprotocols in parallel. Un-
fortunately this approach often fails since a subprotocol in order
to start could require as input the output of another subprotocol.
In such cases the two subprotocols must be played sequentially
therefore penalizing the overall round complexity.
In this thesis we provide delayed-input cryptographic protocols
that can be played in parallel with other subprotocols even in the
above scenario where the output of a subprotocol is required as
input by the other subprotocol. We show the actual impact of
our delayed-input cryptographic protocols by improving the round
e ciency of various applications... [edited by Author]XXX cicl
List Oblivious Transfer and Applications to Round-Optimal Black-Box Multiparty Coin Tossing
In this work we study the problem of minimizing the round complexity for securely evaluating multiparty functionalities while making black-box use of polynomial time assumptions. In Eurocrypt 2016, Garg et al. showed that, assuming all parties have access to a broadcast channel, then at least four rounds of communication are required to securely realize non-trivial functionalities in the plain model. A sequence of works follow-up the result of Garg et al. matching this lower bound under a variety of assumptions. Unfortunately, none of these works make black-box use of the underlying cryptographic primitives. In Crypto 2021, Ishai, Khurana, Sahai, and Srinivasan came closer to matching the four-round lower bound, obtaining a five-round protocol that makes black-box use of oblivious transfer and PKE with pseudorandom public keys.
In this work, we show how to realize any input-less functionality (e.g., coin-tossing, generation of key-pairs, and so on) in four rounds while making black-box use of two-round oblivious transfer. As an additional result, we construct the first four-round MPC protocol for generic functionalities that makes black-box use of the underlying primitives, achieving security against non-aborting adversaries. Our protocols are based on a new primitive called list two-party computation. This primitive offers relaxed
security compared to the standard notion of secure two-party computation. Despite this relaxation, we argue that this tool suffices for our applications. List two-party computation is of independent interest, as we argue it can also be used for the generation of setups, like oblivious transfer correlated randomness, in three rounds. Prior to our work, generating such a setup required at least four rounds of interactions or a trusted third party