Fast and Deterministic Approximations for k-Cut

In an undirected graph, a k-cut is a set of edges whose removal breaks the graph into at least k connected components. The minimum weight k-cut can be computed in n^O(k) time, but when k is treated as part of the input, computing the minimum weight k-cut is NP-Hard [Goldschmidt and Hochbaum, 1994]. For poly(m,n,k)-time algorithms, the best possible approximation factor is essentially 2 under the small set expansion hypothesis [Manurangsi, 2017]. Saran and Vazirani [1995] showed that a (2 - 2/k)-approximately minimum weight k-cut can be computed via O(k) minimum cuts, which implies a O~(km) randomized running time via the nearly linear time randomized min-cut algorithm of Karger [2000]. Nagamochi and Kamidoi [2007] showed that a (2 - 2/k)-approximately minimum weight k-cut can be computed deterministically in O(mn + n^2 log n) time. These results prompt two basic questions. The first concerns the role of randomization. Is there a deterministic algorithm for 2-approximate k-cuts matching the randomized running time of O~(km)? The second question qualitatively compares minimum cut to 2-approximate minimum k-cut. Can 2-approximate k-cuts be computed as fast as the minimum cut - in O~(m) randomized time? We give a deterministic approximation algorithm that computes (2 + eps)-minimum k-cuts in O(m log^3 n / eps^2) time, via a (1 + eps)-approximation for an LP relaxation of k-cut

Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax-and-Round

Many algorithms that are originally designed without explicitly considering incentive properties are later combined with simple pricing rules and used as mechanisms. The resulting mechanisms are often natural and simple to understand. But how good are these algorithms as mechanisms? Truthful reporting of valuations is typically not a dominant strategy (certainly not with a pay-your-bid, first-price rule, but it is likely not a good strategy even with a critical value, or second-price style rule either). Our goal is to show that a wide class of approximation algorithms yields this way mechanisms with low Price of Anarchy. The seminal result of Lucier and Borodin [SODA 2010] shows that combining a greedy algorithm that is an $\alpha$-approximation algorithm with a pay-your-bid payment rule yields a mechanism whose Price of Anarchy is $O(\alpha)$. In this paper we significantly extend the class of algorithms for which such a result is available by showing that this close connection between approximation ratio on the one hand and Price of Anarchy on the other also holds for the design principle of relaxation and rounding provided that the relaxation is smooth and the rounding is oblivious. We demonstrate the far-reaching consequences of our result by showing its implications for sparse packing integer programs, such as multi-unit auctions and generalized matching, for the maximum traveling salesman problem, for combinatorial auctions, and for single source unsplittable flow problems. In all these problems our approach leads to novel simple, near-optimal mechanisms whose Price of Anarchy either matches or beats the performance guarantees of known mechanisms.Comment: Extended abstract appeared in Proc. of 16th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'15

Lift-and-Round to Improve Weighted Completion Time on Unrelated Machines

We consider the problem of scheduling jobs on unrelated machines so as to minimize the sum of weighted completion times. Our main result is a $(3/2-c)$-approximation algorithm for some fixed $c>0$, improving upon the long-standing bound of 3/2 (independently due to Skutella, Journal of the ACM, 2001, and Sethuraman & Squillante, SODA, 1999). To do this, we first introduce a new lift-and-project based SDP relaxation for the problem. This is necessary as the previous convex programming relaxations have an integrality gap of $3/2$. Second, we give a new general bipartite-rounding procedure that produces an assignment with certain strong negative correlation properties.Comment: 21 pages, 4 figure

Ascending-Price Algorithms for Unknown Markets

We design a simple ascending-price algorithm to compute a $(1+\varepsilon)$-approximate equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu exchange markets with weak gross substitute (WGS) property, which runs in time polynomial in market parameters and $\log 1/\varepsilon$. This is the first polynomial-time algorithm for most of the known tractable classes of Arrow-Debreu markets, which is easy to implement and avoids heavy machinery such as the ellipsoid method. In addition, our algorithm can be applied in unknown market setting without exact knowledge about the number of agents, their individual utilities and endowments. Instead, our algorithm only relies on queries to a global demand oracle by posting prices and receiving aggregate demand for goods as feedback. When demands are real-valued functions of prices, the oracles can only return values of bounded precision based on real utility functions. Due to this more realistic assumption, precision and representation of prices and demands become a major technical challenge, and we develop new tools and insights that may be of independent interest. Furthermore, our approach also gives the first polynomial-time algorithm to compute an exact equilibrium for markets with spending constraint utilities, a piecewise linear concave generalization of linear utilities. This resolves an open problem posed by Duan and Mehlhorn (2015).Comment: 33 page

Structural Rounding: Approximation Algorithms for Graphs Near an Algorithmically Tractable Class

We develop a framework for generalizing approximation algorithms from the structural graph algorithm literature so that they apply to graphs somewhat close to that class (a scenario we expect is common when working with real-world networks) while still guaranteeing approximation ratios. The idea is to edit a given graph via vertex- or edge-deletions to put the graph into an algorithmically tractable class, apply known approximation algorithms for that class, and then lift the solution to apply to the original graph. We give a general characterization of when an optimization problem is amenable to this approach, and show that it includes many well-studied graph problems, such as Independent Set, Vertex Cover, Feedback Vertex Set, Minimum Maximal Matching, Chromatic Number, (l-)Dominating Set, Edge (l-)Dominating Set, and Connected Dominating Set. To enable this framework, we develop new editing algorithms that find the approximately-fewest edits required to bring a given graph into one of a few important graph classes (in some cases these are bicriteria algorithms which simultaneously approximate both the number of editing operations and the target parameter of the family). For bounded degeneracy, we obtain an O(r log{n})-approximation and a bicriteria (4,4)-approximation which also extends to a smoother bicriteria trade-off. For bounded treewidth, we obtain a bicriteria (O(log^{1.5} n), O(sqrt{log w}))-approximation, and for bounded pathwidth, we obtain a bicriteria (O(log^{1.5} n), O(sqrt{log w} * log n))-approximation. For treedepth 2 (related to bounded expansion), we obtain a 4-approximation. We also prove complementary hardness-of-approximation results assuming P != NP: in particular, these problems are all log-factor inapproximable, except the last which is not approximable below some constant factor 2 (assuming UGC)