Explorative R&D collaboration: Searching for effective and efficient governance mechanisms.

Explorative R&D collaboration is an important alternative for the internal development of new technologies. The high failure rate of this type of inter-organizational collaboration, however, indicates that governing explorative R&D collaboration is not a straightforward task. Moreover, we argue that different theoretical perspectives have formulated contradictory advice of how to govern explorative R&D collaboration. Given high risks of opportunistic behavior and high coordination costs within explorative R&D collaboration, Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory emphasize the need for formal governance mechanisms. The innovation literature, however, stresses that formal governance mechanisms prohibit the carrying out of explorative activities which are necessary to develop new technologies. We also suggest two alternatives to address these paradoxical requirements. In specific, we argue that effective and efficient governance of explorative R&D collaboration can be achieved by 1) collecting second-hand information about potential partners, allowing for the substitution of formal governance by relational governance, and 2) combining formal and relational governance mechanisms. Based on these theoretical findings, we emphasize the importance of longitudinal, multi-level research to study the characteristics and dynamics of different governance mechanisms within inter-organizational collaboration.Behavior; Characteristics; Coordination; Cost; Costs; Dynamics; Economics; Governance; Information; Innovation; Organization theory; R&D; Requirements; Research; Risk; Studies; Substitution; Technology; Theory; Transaction cost;

School Formal Governance Structure Template

Formal governance structure chart template for schools.https://digital.sandiego.edu/npi-bpl-governance/1014/thumbnail.jp

Uncertainty, trust and formal governance mechanism in Indonesian family SMEs

This paper discusses the relationship between uncertainty, trust and the application of formal governance mechanism in Indonesian family SMEs. The data were obtained through survey to 360 family firms in indonesia. This study used factor analysis to validate the construct and multiple regression analysis to examine the hypothesis. The moderation testing indicated that trust moderated the relationship between uncertainty and formal governance was negatively significan

An Empirical Study of the Creation of Online Collaborative Capability from Formal Governance Perspective

On the base of e-business process view and transaction cost economics, we propose the formation model of online collaborative capability, explore the creation process of online collaborative capability, and examine the complex role of formal governance. We adopt an empirical research method with structural equation modeling to verify the underlying hypotheses of the research model in a study of 202 manufacturing firms. The findings suggest that the creation process of online collaborative capability is online collaboration needs→online collaborative resources→online collaborative capability, and formal governance not only positively affects online collaborative capability, but also positively moderates the impact of online collaborative resources on online collaborative capability. This study has important theoretical and practical implications for enhancing e-business implementation, and reveals the complex role of formal governance in the creation process of online collaborative capability

Governing knowledge sharing in organisations : levels of analysis, mechanisms, and research directions

We discuss and test recent claims that research on knowledge processes has paid insufficient attention to micro (individual) level constructs and mechanisms and to the role of formal organisation in governing knowledge processes. We review knowledge sharing research published in thirteen (top academic plus top practitioner-oriented) journals in the period 1996-2006 in relation to these two propositions. The review confirms the claim that the knowledge sharing literature is pre-occupied with constructs, processes, and phenomena defined at a macro (collective, organisational) level and pay comparatively little attention to micro level constructs. However, our review provides less support for the proposition that formal governance mechanisms have been under-researched in comparison to formal organisation. Still, the multiple ways in which formal governance mechanisms may interact in influencing knowledge sharing outcomes have been under-researched, as have the interaction between more informal aspects of the firm and formal governance mechanisms. We develop a series of recommendations for future research on knowledge sharing

GOV-AARGH-NANCE – “EVEN CRIMINALS NEED LAW AND ORDER”

We present a theoretical model postulating that the relationship between crime and governance is “hump-shaped”, rather than linearly decreasing, when criminals need access to markets. State collapse, violent conflict and a lack of infrastructure are not conducive for the establishment of any business, legal or illegal. At the bottom end of the spectrum, therefore, criminal gangs benefit from improved governance, especially when this is delivered informally. With significant improvements in formal governance criminal activities decline. We use data from the International Maritime Bureau to create a new dataset on piracy and find strong and consistent support for this non-linear relationship.Governance; Crime; Piracy; Informal governance; Law enforcement

Making Slums Governable: Integration and Resistance in a Nairobi Slum

"This study first reviews existing literature on the impact of mobile phones on governance and participation, highlighting limitations of the current literature. It then details the methodology used in field research. The recent political history of Kenya, and ICT developments, are explored, and the Kibera slum is introduced in greater detail. The study then discusses the dynamics of mobile phone usage in Kibera in relation to policies and projects of the formal governance network and introduces arguments by James Scott concerning state optics and state-society relations, which provide valuable tools in understanding ICT usage in Kibera. Finally, the paper presents implications for the formal governance network resulting from the politics of ICT adoption in marginalized communities."--from page 22

How Formal Governance Affects Multisourcing Success: A Multi-level Perspective

Multisourcing has become a common sourcing model in recent outsourcing practice. Yet, the extant and relevant IS literature has so far offered limited insight into how to stipulate both individual (i.e., individual vendor) and joint (the entire vendor network) performance while ensuring governance efficiency. Our study set about addressing this gap by examining how these three dimensions of multisourcing success can be achieved through formal governance. Specifically, we considered bilateral formal control, collective formal control and conflict arbitration (among vendors) as key formal governance elements. Results from a pan-European survey of client firms pursuing multisourcing projects show that bilateral formal control sets the stage to achieve both individual and joint performance, while conflict arbitration strengthens individual performance, and collective formal control strengthens joint performance. Governance efficiency is improved when both collective formal control and conflict arbitration are high. We also found that conflict arbitration strengthens the positive effect of collective formal control on both individual and joint performance. Our findings highlight the importance of governing inter-vendor relationships in multisourcing arrangements as opposed to relying solely on bilateral governance. Our study extends the limited literature on IS multisourcing, and assists managers in considering the strategies they wish to pursue when choosing appropriate governance mechanisms

Bilateral, Collective, or Both? Formal Governance and Performance in Multisourcing

While multisourcing offers benefits such as access to best-of-breed resources and enhanced competition, it also presents clients with a new governance challenge, namely the need to ensure that vendors not only deliver their individual contributions but also collaborate to produce a coherent joint outcome. Clients can address this challenge by combining bilateral governance focused on each vendor’s individual performance with collective governance aimed at the vendors’ joint performance. However, it is unclear how the simultaneous application of bilateral and collective governance affects multisourcing performance. Indeed, the literature falls short in systematically differentiating these governance mechanisms and empirically examining their interplay. Drawing on existing work on multisourcing and on the outsourcing governance literature, we argue that bilateral and collective governance direct efforts toward different performance dimensions (individual vs. joint), invoke different metaphors (market vs. team), and promote conflicting norms (competitive vs. cooperative), which can result in trade-offs when bilateral and collective governance mechanisms are combined. Results from a survey of 189 multisourcing arrangements support our expectation that bilateral and collective governance promote different performance dimensions. Notably, one collective governance mechanism, conflict management procedures, contributes to both individual and joint performance. We find substitutional effects between bilateral and collective governance in relation to joint performance but not individual performance, indicating that the benefits of collective governance for joint performance are more easily compromised than the benefits of bilateral governance for individual performance. We also observe complementary effects within collective governance mechanisms. Our key contribution lies in theorizing and empirically examining the effects and interplay of bilateral and collective governance in multisourcing