Air Traffic Management Safety Challenges

The primary goal of the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is to control accident risk. ATM safety has improved over the decades for many reasons, from better equipment to additional safety defences. But ATM safety targets, improving on current performance, are now extremely demanding. Safety analysts and aviation decision-makers have to make safety assessments based on statistically incomplete evidence. If future risks cannot be estimated with precision, then how is safety to be assured with traffic growth and operational/technical changes? What are the design implications for the USA’s ‘Next Generation Air Transportation System’ (NextGen) and Europe’s Single European Sky ATM Research Programme (SESAR)? ATM accident precursors arise from (eg) pilot/controller workload, miscommunication, and lack of upto- date information. Can these accident precursors confidently be ‘designed out’ by (eg) better system knowledge across ATM participants, automatic safety checks, and machine rather than voice communication? Future potentially hazardous situations could be as ‘messy’ in system terms as the Überlingen mid-air collision. Are ATM safety regulation policies fit for purpose: is it more and more difficult to innovate, to introduce new technologies and novel operational concepts? Must regulators be more active, eg more inspections and monitoring of real operational and organisational practices

Air Traffic Safety: continued evolution or a new Paradigm.

The context here is Transport Risk Management. Is the philosophy of Air Traffic Safety different from other modes of transport? – yes, in many ways, it is. The focus is on Air Traffic Management (ATM), covering (eg) air traffic control and airspace structures, which is the part of the aviation system that is most likely to be developed through new paradigms. The primary goal of the ATM system is to control accident risk. ATM safety has improved over the decades for many reasons, from better equipment to additional safety defences. But ATM safety targets, improving on current performance, are now extremely demanding. What are the past and current methodologies for ATM risk assessment; and will they work effectively for the kinds of future systems that people are now imagining and planning? The title contrasts ‘Continued Evolution’ and a ‘New Paradigm’. How will system designers/operators assure safety with traffic growth and operational/technical changes that are more than continued evolution from the current system? What are the design implications for ‘new paradigms’, such as the USA’s ‘Next Generation Air Transportation System’ (NextGen) and Europe’s Single European Sky ATM Research Programme (SESAR)? Achieving and proving safety for NextGen and SESAR is an enormously tough challenge. For example, it will need to cover system resilience, human/automation issues, software/hardware performance/ground/air protection systems. There will be a need for confidence building programmes regarding system design/resilience, eg Human-in-the-Loop simulations with ‘seeded errors’

Baseline Assumptions and Future Research Areas for Urban Air Mobility Vehicles

NASA is developing Urban Air Mobility (UAM) concepts to (1) create first-generation reference vehicles that can be used for technology, system, and market studies, and (2) hypothesize second-generation UAM aircraft to determine high-payoff technology targets and future research areas that reach far beyond initial UAM vehicle capabilities. This report discusses the vehicle-level technology assumptions for NASAs UAM reference vehicles, and highlights future research areas for second-generation UAM aircraft that includes deflected slipstream concepts, low-noise rotors for edgewise flight, stacked rotors/propellers, ducted propellers, solid oxide fuel cells with liquefied natural gas, and improved turbo shaft and reciprocating engine technology. The report also highlights a transportation network-scale model that is being developed to understand the impact of these and other technologies on future UAM solutions

Civil tiltrotor missions and applications. Phase 2: The commercial passenger market

The commercial passenger market for the civil tiltrotor was examined in phase 2. A market responsive commercial tiltrotor was found to be technically feasible, and a significant worldwide market potential was found to exist for such an aircraft, especially for relieving congestion in urban area-to-urban area service and for providing cost effective hub airport feeder service. Potential technical obstacles of community noise, vertiport area navigation, surveillance, and control, and the pilot/aircraft interface were determined to be surmountable. Nontechnical obstacles relating to national commitment and leadership and development of ground and air infrastructure were determined to be more difficult to resolve; an innovative public/private partnership is suggested to allow coordinated development of an initial commercial tiltrotor network to relieve congestion in the crowded US Northeast corridor by the year 2000

Bibliography of Supersonic Cruise Research (SCR) program from 1980 to 1983

A bibliography for the Supersonic Cruise Research (SCR) and Variable Cycle Engine (VCE) Programs is presented. An annotated bibliography for the last 123 formal reports and a listing of titles for 44 articles and presentations is included. The studies identifies technologies for producing efficient supersonic commercial jet transports for cruise Mach numbers from 2.0 to 2.7

MONALISA 2.0 and the sea traffic management - a concept creating the need for new maritime information standards and software solutions

Postprint (published version

Cargo Logistics Airlift Systems Study (CLASS). Volume 5: Summary

Findings and conclusions derived during the study of freighter aircraft requirements to the year 2008 are summarized. These results represent the stepping off point for the much needed coordinated planning efforts by government agencies, the airlines, the users, and the aircraft manufacturers. The methodology utilized in the investigations is shown. The analysis of the current system encompassed evaluations of the past and current cargo markets and on sight surveys of airport and cargo terminals. The findings that resulted provided the basis for formulating the case study procedures, developing the future scenario, and developing the future cargo market demand

Urban Air Mobility Market Study

The Booz Allen Team explored market size and potential barriers to Urban Air Mobility (UAM) by focusing on three potential markets – Airport Shuttle, Air Taxi, and Air Ambulance. We found that the Airport Shuttle and Air Taxi markets are viable, with a significant total available market value in the U.S. of $500 billion, for a fully unconstrained scenario. In this unconstrained best-case scenario, passengers would have the ability to access and fly a UAM at any time, from any location to any destination, without being hindered by constraints such as weather, infrastructure, or traffic volume. Significant legal and regulatory, weather, certification, public perception, and infrastructure constraints exist, which reduce the market potential for these applications to only about 0.5$2.5 billion, in the near term. However, we determined that these constraints can be addressed through ongoing intra-governmental partnerships, government and industry collaboration, strong industry commitment, and existing legal and regulatory enablers. We found that the Air Ambulance market is not a viable market if served by electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) vehicles due to technology constraints but may potentially be viable if a hybrid VTOL aircraft are utilized

Human Performance Contributions to Safety in Commercial Aviation

In the commercial aviation domain, large volumes of data are collected and analyzed on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on behaviors that contribute to routine successful outcomes, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of non- representative safety data. Analysis of aviation accident data suggests that human error is implicated in up to 80% of accidents, which has been used to justify future visions for aviation in which the roles of human operators are greatly diminished or eliminated in the interest of creating a safer aviation system. However, failure to fully consider the human contributions to successful system performance in civil aviation represents a significant and largely unrecognized risk when making policy decisions about human roles and responsibilities. Opportunities exist to leverage the vast amount of data that has already been collected, or could be easily obtained, to increase our understanding of human contributions to things going right in commercial aviation. The principal focus of this assessment was to identify current gaps and explore methods for identifying human success data generated by the aviation system, from personnel and within the supporting infrastructure

Report by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

The process of preparation for the first two shuttle flights was observed and information from both flights was gathered in order to confirm the concept and performance of the major elements of the space transportation system. To achieve truly operational operating safety, regularity, and minimum practical cost, the organization of efforts between the R&D community and any transportation service organization should be clearly separated with the latter organization assuming responsibilities for marketing its services; planning and acquiring prime hardware and spares; maintainance; certification of procedures; training; and creation of requirements for future development. A technical audit of the application of redundancy concepts to shuttle systems is suggested. The state of the art of space transportation hardware suggests that a number of concept changes may improve reliability, costs, and operational safety. For the remaining R&D flights, it is suggested that a redline audit be made of limits that should not be exceeded for ready to launch