A Machine-Checked Formalization of the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Model

Most approaches to the formal analyses of cryptographic protocols make the perfect cryptography assumption, i.e. the hypothese that there is no way to obtain knowledge about the plaintext pertaining to a ciphertext without knowing the key. Ideally, one would prefer to rely on a weaker hypothesis on the computational cost of gaining information about the plaintext pertaining to a ciphertext without knowing the key. Such a view is permitted by the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Model which provide non-standard computational models in which one may reason about the computational cost of breaking a cryptographic scheme. Using the proof assistant Coq, we provide a machine-checked account of the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Mode

Formal Verification of Security Protocol Implementations: A Survey

Automated formal verification of security protocols has been mostly focused on analyzing high-level abstract models which, however, are significantly different from real protocol implementations written in programming languages. Recently, some researchers have started investigating techniques that bring automated formal proofs closer to real implementations. This paper surveys these attempts, focusing on approaches that target the application code that implements protocol logic, rather than the libraries that implement cryptography. According to these approaches, libraries are assumed to correctly implement some models. The aim is to derive formal proofs that, under this assumption, give assurance about the application code that implements the protocol logic. The two main approaches of model extraction and code generation are presented, along with the main techniques adopted for each approac

Proof Theory, Transformations, and Logic Programming for Debugging Security Protocols

We define a sequent calculus to formally specify, simulate, debug and verify security protocols. In our sequents we distinguish between the current knowledge of principals and the current global state of the session. Hereby, we can describe the operational semantics of principals and of an intruder in a simple and modular way. Furthermore, using proof theoretic tools like the analysis of permutability of rules, we are able to find efficient proof strategies that we prove complete for special classes of security protocols including Needham-Schroeder. Based on the results of this preliminary analysis, we have implemented a Prolog meta-interpreter which allows for rapid prototyping and for checking safety properties of security protocols, and we have applied it for finding error traces and proving correctness of practical examples

Certified Impossibility Results for Byzantine-Tolerant Mobile Robots

We propose a framework to build formal developments for robot networks using the COQ proof assistant, to state and to prove formally various properties. We focus in this paper on impossibility proofs, as it is natural to take advantage of the COQ higher order calculus to reason about algorithms as abstract objects. We present in particular formal proofs of two impossibility results forconvergence of oblivious mobile robots if respectively more than one half and more than one third of the robots exhibit Byzantine failures, starting from the original theorems by Bouzid et al.. Thanks to our formalization, the corresponding COQ developments are quite compact. To our knowledge, these are the first certified (in the sense of formally proved) impossibility results for robot networks

Logic of Non-Monotonic Interactive Proofs (Formal Theory of Temporary Knowledge Transfer)

We propose a monotonic logic of internalised non-monotonic or instant interactive proofs (LiiP) and reconstruct an existing monotonic logic of internalised monotonic or persistent interactive proofs (LiP) as a minimal conservative extension of LiiP. Instant interactive proofs effect a fragile epistemic impact in their intended communities of peer reviewers that consists in the impermanent induction of the knowledge of their proof goal by means of the knowledge of the proof with the interpreting reviewer: If my peer reviewer knew my proof then she would at least then (in that instant) know that its proof goal is true. Their impact is fragile and their induction of knowledge impermanent in the sense of being the case possibly only at the instant of learning the proof. This accounts for the important possibility of internalising proofs of statements whose truth value can vary, which, as opposed to invariant statements, cannot have persistent proofs. So instant interactive proofs effect a temporary transfer of certain propositional knowledge (knowable ephemeral facts) via the transmission of certain individual knowledge (knowable non-monotonic proofs) in distributed systems of multiple interacting agents.Comment: continuation of arXiv:1201.3667 ; published extended abstract: DOI:10.1007/978-3-642-36039-8_16 ; related to arXiv:1208.591

Impossibility of Gathering, a Certification

Recent advances in Distributed Computing highlight models and algorithms for autonomous swarms of mobile robots that self-organise and cooperate to solve global objectives. The overwhelming majority of works so far considers handmade algorithms and proofs of correctness. This paper builds upon a previously proposed formal framework to certify the correctness of impossibility results regarding distributed algorithms that are dedicated to autonomous mobile robots evolving in a continuous space. As a case study, we consider the problem of gathering all robots at a particular location, not known beforehand. A fundamental (but not yet formally certified) result, due to Suzuki and Yamashita, states that this simple task is impossible for two robots executing deterministic code and initially located at distinct positions. Not only do we obtain a certified proof of the original impossibility result, we also get the more general impossibility of gathering with an even number of robots, when any two robots are possibly initially at the same exact location.Comment: 10