The First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of \u3ci\u3eHolder v. Humanitarian Law Project\u3c/i\u3e in First Amendment Doctrine

In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court’s first decision pitting First Amendment rights against national security interests since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Court appears to have radically departed from some of the First Amendment’s most basic principles, including the maxims that speech may not be penalized because of its viewpoint, that even speech advocating crime deserves protection until it constitutes incitement, and that political association is constitutionally protected absent specific intent to further a group’s illegal ends. These principles lie at the core of our political and democratic freedoms, yet Humanitarian Law Project seems to contravene all three. This article assesses the place of Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment jurisprudence. It argues that the decision departs so dramatically from precedent that it was wrongly decided. But it also maintains that if the decision is to do least damage to First Amendment freedoms going forward, and if it is to be construed as far as possible in harmony with its precedents, three limiting features of the decision are essential to understanding its rationale. At issue in Humanitarian Law Project was whether the government could make it a crime to engage in speech advocating only lawful, peaceful activity, when done in coordination with or for a foreign organization labeled “terrorist.” In Humanitarian Law Project, the Court properly ruled that the government may prohibit speech advocating lawful, peaceful activity based on its content only where it can satisfy the demanding standard that governs when laws prohibit speech on the basis of its content. But the Court’s application of that scrutiny bore no resemblance to any other speech case in the modern era and employed reasoning and reached results that are sharply inconsistent with substantial precedent. Where it had previously protected even direct advocacy of crime, it now denied protection to advocacy of peace and human rights. Where it had previously held that strict scrutiny placed a heavy burden on the government to demonstrate with concrete evidence that its specific speech prohibitions were necessary to further a compelling end, here it sua sponte advanced arguments that the government never made; said no evidence was necessary to support its speculations; and deferred to a legislative finding and an executive affidavit that did not even address the necessity of prohibiting speech, and were not based on any actual evidence. Where it had previously ruled that a desire to suppress particular viewpoints was enough to render a law presumptively invalid, here it took the government’s viewpoint-based motive in suppressing messages of legitimacy as a reason to uphold, not to strike down, the law. And where it had previously protected the right to associate with groups having both lawful and unlawful ends, and recognized that the right included the freedom to act in concert with one’s associates, in Humanitarian Law Project it reduced the right to an empty formalism. Such dramatic departures from precedent suggest that the decision was wrongly decided. But until it is overturned, we must live with it. And that puts a premium on considering whether its rationale can be limited. The Court itself offered three possible avenues of limitation, but offered no explanation for why those avenues were doctrinally significant. None of the three distinguishing features the Court identified is sufficient to reconcile the result with First Amendment precedent. But if the case is to be harmonized as much as possible with precedent, its application should be limited to situations in which all three of the factors identified by the Court are present—namely, when the government is prohibiting only speech coordinated with or directed to foreign organizations that have been subjected to diplomatic sanctions for compelling national security reasons. Short of outright reversal, such a reading provides the most persuasive ground for restricting the damage Humanitarian Law Project does to First Amendment doctrine

Spatial Practices in Borderlands: Bottom-Up Experiences and Their Influence on Border Communities

Differences and conflicts are most evident at borderlands, which act as balancing tools to organize and filter economic and migratory flows. The increased militarization of these areas, which often requires creating empty spaces next to the fences, fosters deterritorialization processes that not only have profound effects on the territory, but also on the people living in these areas. As space shapes people, this paper analyses the effects of marginalization and violence, as well as hope for a better future for people and migrants living in these places. After evidencing place disattachment and life disruption originated by strong transformations to their environments, a review based on literature of several bottom-up experiences acting in these areas is presented. Based on subversion, contamination, hybridization and transgression, these examples show the interesting ambivalence of borderlands, which provide a provocative and inspiring arena for new local planning and architectural design for recovering place attachment, stronger community identities and the development of new models of coexistence

Morality Without Borders: A Vision of Humanity as Community

Identity politics is on the rise, and not only in America, but throughout the world. It is an inherent nationalism, and when unbridled and unchecked, unleashes an exclusive ethic into society appealing, not to an expansive moral ought, but one that is narrow and provincial, condemning and vilifying. The fact of national diversity and the imprint of dissimilar value orientations often cause fear and insecurity among groups and sub-groups who are apt to condense their value-orientation vis-à-vis their national or cultural identity, promoting ethical relativism and neglecting core human values. With a diminishing of religion’s consecrated and sanctified moral vision, many are falling upon an idealized version of national identity to set the parameters of their moral horizon. This is often expressed as a “moral superiority” implying the dominance of certain traditions and customs over those of others. We must be reminded that autocracy, national or religious, can be a tool of anyone seeking moral supremacy. Looking back, history teaches that putting up constrictive, dogmatic borders is morally destructive, fencing out those with different views and stifling dialogue and civility within and without. Obviously, putting up ideological boundaries is apt to enclose those who profess a restrictive and/or superior ethic to unproductive and morality corrosive values. Being ethnocentric and tribal seems natural as there is a desire to protect our most cherished beliefs claiming moral superiority. Values are what define us; they are the substance of whom we are and reveal our commitments and convictions and their assumed authority. But our values can also limit our moral acuity, narrowing moral focus and diminishing its energy, unseeking of the commonalities that bind humanity to humanity. Clearly, it’s time to change this truncated narrative from an exclusive ethic to a morality without borders, exemplified as humanity as community. Authoritarianism, displaying autocratic and anti-egalitarian values, is repressive and results in a limited and often amoral view of others. This we are witnessing today from all corners of the political spectrum, and not only in America, but elsewhere as well. For advancing a vision of the morally possible, an inclusive and expansive moral “ought” is needed, but terribly difficult to achieve or even articulate given the fact of cultural diversity, but we try. As Thomas Donaldson (1996, p.52) has noted, “We all learn ethics in the context of our particular cultures, and the power in the principles is deeply tied to the way in which they are expressed. Internationally accepted lists of moral principles, such as the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, draw on many cultural and religious traditions. As philosopher Michael Walzer (1983) has noted, ‘There is no 2 Esperanto (an artificial language devised in 1887 as an international medium of communication, based on roots from the chief European languages) of global ethics.’” We simply express our view of a global ethic as a “moral human ecology” supportive of an unrestrained moral vision drawing both humanity and the environment into its definitive natural fiber. How often we write in abstractions and generalities forgetting the people about whom we talk. Their needs and the inhumanity heaped upon them are seldom noticed. There is some distance between us and others, but with empathy and care and an unrestrictive vision of others, this fissure can be closed. Differing customs and traditions require our reconsideration and respect. What we expose is an ethic of diversity-seeking those basic and common values grounded in the idea of “humanity” itself. Given the present-day discombobulation of value, especially moral value, as witnessed in present-day politics, nuclear proliferation, human exploitation and misery in Central America, and continuous war in both Africa and the Middle East, “morality without borders” presents a guiding metaphor beckoning our attention. “Humanity as Community” marks its location for it is a global imperative. Its possibilities are endless as it can become a beacon of hope in a divided world. But don’t expect miracles; this will be a slow and evolutionary process as we naturally hold our values close, seldom unleashing them for public scrutiny. Philosophically, more than words are needed and more than well-crafted arguments are required for human rights, understood as moral rights, to be judiciously spread around the world. Commitment, respect, planning, and action are also required. For those who are leaders in human rights proliferation as well as ordinary people whose voices need to be heard, this is an enabling vision. It acknowledges the essence of humanity as moral and does not contradict what the religiously oriented call the “sacredness of human life.” It also acknowledges the principles foundational to human rights, such as fairness and justice, decency and responsibility, and the importance of human dignity, integrity, nurture, and care. Not mere generalities, these values are drawn from personal and collective experience and an unhampered propensity to care for others. To say they are innate (Haidt, 2012, p. 31) is perhaps an overreach, but to recognize their human importance is not. As ethicist Kurt Baier pointed out in 1971 (p. 810), morality looks at the world from the point of view of everyone, that “…to be moral…is to recognize that others too, have a right to a worthwhile life.

A global battlefield?: Drones and the geographical scope of armed conflict

The ever-increasing use of drones in the pursuit of the 'war on terror' has given rise to concerns over the emergence of a global battlefield whereby the entire planet is subject to the application of the laws of armed conflict. These concerns stem from drone strikes frequently occurring outside the 'active battlefields' of Afghanistan and into the border regions of Pakistan and expanding further afield into Yemen and Somalia. In response to emerging practice, a significant body of academic literature has emerged on the legal classification of transnational armed violence. Less attention however, has been given to the geographical scope of the concept of armed conflict itself. This article provides a detailed analysis of the geographical scope of non-international armed conflict under international humanitarian law, and in the context of drone strikes. In particular, it focuses upon the legal implications of the geographical disjunction between the location of drone strikes and primary battlefields from the point-of-view of the application of international humanitarian law

Key dimensions for the prevention and control of communicable diseases in institutional settings. a scoping review to guide the development of a tool to strengthen preparedness at migrant holding centres in the EU/EEA

Migrant centres, as other institutions hosting closed or semi-open communities, may face specific challenges in preventing and controlling communicable disease transmission, particularly during times of large sudden influx. However, there is dearth of evidence on how to prioritise investments in aspects such as human resources, medicines and vaccines, sanitation and disinfection, and physical infrastructures to prevent/control communicable disease outbreaks. We analysed frequent drivers of communicable disease transmission/issues for outbreak management in institutions hosting closed or semi-open communities, including migrant centres, and reviewed existing assessment tools to guide the development of a European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) checklist tool to strengthen preparedness against communicable disease outbreaks in migrant centres. Among articles/reports focusing specifically on migrant centres, outbreaks through multiple types of disease transmission were described as possible/occurred. Human resources and physical infrastructure were the dimensions most frequently identified as crucial for preventing and mitigating outbreaks. This review also recognised a lack of common agreed standards to guide and assess preparedness activities in migrant centres, thereby underscoring the need for a capacity-oriented ECDC preparedness checklist tool

Guided Proofreading of Automatic Segmentations for Connectomics

Automatic cell image segmentation methods in connectomics produce merge and split errors, which require correction through proofreading. Previous research has identified the visual search for these errors as the bottleneck in interactive proofreading. To aid error correction, we develop two classifiers that automatically recommend candidate merges and splits to the user. These classifiers use a convolutional neural network (CNN) that has been trained with errors in automatic segmentations against expert-labeled ground truth. Our classifiers detect potentially-erroneous regions by considering a large context region around a segmentation boundary. Corrections can then be performed by a user with yes/no decisions, which reduces variation of information 7.5x faster than previous proofreading methods. We also present a fully-automatic mode that uses a probability threshold to make merge/split decisions. Extensive experiments using the automatic approach and comparing performance of novice and expert users demonstrate that our method performs favorably against state-of-the-art proofreading methods on different connectomics datasets.Comment: Supplemental material available at http://rhoana.org/guidedproofreading/supplemental.pd

Mississippi v. Tennessee: Resolving an Interstate Groundwater Dispute

This commentary explores the legal background and potential ramifications of Mississippi v. Tennessee: an original jurisdiction case involving a dispute over aquifer groundwater. Although the Supreme Court has addressed water disputes between states in the past, Mississippi v. Tennessee is the first such case to center exclusively on groundwater. As a result the Court has the opportunity to resolve a question of great relevance in an era where access to water is a recurring news story; is aquifer groundwater an interstate resource subject to equitable apportionment, or an intrastate resource subject to state sovereign ownership