Radicalization as a reaction to failure: an economic model of islamic extremism

This paper views Islamist radicals as self-interested political revolutionaries and builds on a general model of political extremism developed in a previous paper (Ferrero, 2002), where extremism is modelled as a production factor whose effect on expected revenue is initially positive and then turns negative, and whose level is optimally chosen by a revolutionary or-ganization. The organization is bound by a free-access constraint and hence uses the degree of extremism as a means of indirectly controlling its level of membership with the aim of maximizing expected per capita income of its members, like a producer co-operative. The gist of the argument is that radicalization may be an optimal reaction to perceived failure (a widespread perception in the Muslim world) when political activists are, at the margin, relatively strongly averse to effort but not so averse to extremism, a configuration that is at odds with secular, Western-style revolutionary politics but seems to capture well the essence of Islamic revolutionary politics, embedded as it is in a doctrinal framework.

Discursive representation

Democracy can entail the representation of discourses as well as persons or groups. We explain and advocate discursive representation; explore its justifications, advantages, and problems; and show how it can be accomplished in practice. This practice can involve the selection of discursive representatives to a formal Chamber of Discourses and more informal processes grounded in the broader public sphere. Discursive representation supports many aspects of deliberative democracy and is especially applicable to settings such as the international system lacking a well-defined demos

Exploring the pathway from radicalisation to disengagement : comparison of dissonances experienced by a Jihadi foreign fighter and a right-wing extremist

The aim of our article is to analyse the disengagement process of a Swiss returnee from Syria and the emergence of dissonances during his involvement with the Islamic State (IS) and to compare this evolution to the pathway of a right-wing extremist willing to leave the violent extremist group Blood & Honour. Although the contexts of these extremist groups are very different, a number of elements – as the ideology based on hate, the groups’ internal pressure and the affinity for violence – are quite similar. The disengagement process of both extremists is analysed by means of reconstructive methods and the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957), as well as by the current state of research on disengagement processes. This serves as a theoretical framework. The findings show that comparing their pathway to defection reveals a number of parallels: the experiences within the extremist groups, especially violent acts against group members, increased their dissonances and provided a trigger to an opening process and ultimately the attempt to opt out of the group

The Reality of the role of Jordanian Universities In Promoting Moderate Ideologies among Students Based on Amman Message

The present study aimed to explore the reality of the role of Jordanian universities in promoting moderate ideologies among students based on Amman Message from the students’ perspective. It aimed to explore whether there is any significant difference between the respondents’ attitudes which can be attributed to gender, faculty, university, academic year, program and GPA. The sample consists from 400 students. Those students were selected from the University of Jordan, Yarmouk University, and Mu’tah University. A questionnaire was developed. It consists from 40 items. It sheds a light on 4 areas. These areas are: (faculty members, students, student union, and university activities). It was found that Jordanian universities play a moderate role in promoting moderate ideologies among students based on Amman Message from the. That’s because the overall mean is 3.41 which is moderate. The mean of the (faculty member) area is 3.48. It’s moderate and ranked first. The mean of the (student) area is 3.45. It’s moderate and ranked second. The mean of the (student union) is 3.39. It’s moderate and ranked third. The mean of the (university activity) area is 3.32. It’s moderate and ranked last. It was found that there is a significant difference between the respondents’ attitude which can be attributed to faculty. The latter difference is for the favour of the ones enrolled in human sciences faculties. It was found that there is a significant difference between the respondents’ attitude which can be attributed to university. The latter difference is for the favour of the ones enrolled in the University of Jordan. It was found that there is a significant difference between the respondents’ attitude which can be attributed to academic year. The latter difference is for the favour of the freshmen. It was found that there is a significant difference between the respondents’ attitude which can be attributed to GPA. The latter difference is for the favour of the ones whose rating is (very good). It was found that there isn’t any significant difference between the respondents’ attitude which can be attributed to gender or program. The researchers recommend promoting moderate ideologies among students. They recommend promoting awareness among students about awareness among students about the significance of moderate ideologies. They recommend fighting against extremist ideologies. They recommend carrying out activities to promote moderate ideologies among students. They recommend moderate ideologies among students through the student union. That shall contribute to the development of balanced personalities DOI: 10.7176/JEP/11-20-09 Publication date:July 31st 202

All-pay aspects of decision making under public scrutiny

We study decision making processes with non-standard all-pay structures. In our first group of applications, individual members of some institution—due to public pressure or expectation—propose reductions of their own income, e.g., corporate board members reducing their bonus payments in an economic downturn, or politicians who reduce their expense allowances after some scandal. In such situations, the most aggressive proposal might carry the day and win public credibility or moral kudos for the proposer. Everyone, however, suffers the cost of that winning proposal. In the second group of applications, all participants bear the total cost of all bids as, e.g., under the filibuster strategy of delaying legislative action. The common features of these situations are a winner-take-all structure, non-standard payment rules, and nonvoluntary participation. We find that, in the equilibria of these games, everybody suffers a loss (with the possible exception of the winner).Auctions, Contests, Truth-telling

Countering violent extremism in Indonesia: need for a rethink

Indonesia is making some progress in countering violent extremism, argues this report, but more through community efforts than through government programs. Overview Indonesia is making some headway in countering violent extremism but not through government programs. Some prisoners have moderated their views through discussions with fellow inmates and their own self-awareness. Communities have taken back radical mosques on their own without help from counter-terrorism agencies. In general, the twin goals of “deradicalisation” (persuading extremists, especially prisoners convicted of terrorism, to move away from violence) and “counter-radicalisation” (immunising communities against extremist ideology and preventing new recruitment) have not been well-served by top-down programs heavy on rhetoric and formal meetings, divorced from detailed knowledge of radical networks. The challenge is to understand when, why and how individuals and communities resist on their own and see if there are any lessons that can be replicated. The National Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional untuk Penanggulangan Terorisme, BNPT) has not been as effective as hoped. Some of its problems on the prevention side are not of its own making. There is still no consensus in the broader Muslim community about what constitutes extremism; radicalism in defence of the faith is considered laudable in many quarters. The BNPT structure effectively puts the police in charge of intelligence and operations and the military in charge of prevention, which does not make for smooth cooperation. All the law enforcement officers with direct field experience went to the first, leaving prevention to newcomers who had no personal knowledge of networks, prisoners or available data. Prevention officials still complain that funds have been slow in coming, hampering their work. Many agencies and ministries that BNPT is supposed to be coordinating have little interest either in the subject of countering extremism or in being coordinated. Questions remain, however, over BNPT’s ability to target programs effectively. In its 2014 “National Program for Preventing Terrorism” for example, BNPT identifies prisons, mosques, schools and media as the key areas for work. These are the right areas, but the activities proposed are mostly meetings and generic training of trainers without honing in on particular institutions and individuals known to be propagating extremism. The design of prevention programs could benefit from more systematic study of the case dossiers of the almost 800 individuals indicted on terrorism charges since 2002. It could also benefit from better analysis of the ideological arguments used against violence within the radical community that some convicted terrorists have found persuasive and more in-depth study of successful cases of community rejection of radical teachings. This report examines the government prevention program to date while also looking at examples of non-government and community-based initiatives to counter violent extremism. When well-planned and implemented, the latter can be very effective, but in some cases, they turn into exercises in vigilantism that are as ugly when mobilised against extremists as when directed against religious minorities. BNPT’s programs to date may be weak but a national agency is still needed to coordinate and share information across agencies; develop policies designed to discourage advocacy of violence; and help community leaders develop strategies. Unless programs in all of these areas are based on detailed knowledge about how and where radicalisation takes place, however, they are not likely to be productive. As a new government takes office later this year, it might consider a restructuring of BNPT to remove the divide between intelligence/operations and prevention

Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from U.S. Cities

We examine whether partisan political differences have important effects on policy outcomes at the local level using a new panel data set of mayoral elections in the United States. Applying a regression discontinuity design to deal with the endogeneity of the mayor's party, we find that party labels do not affect the size of government, the allocation of spending or crime rates, even though there is a large political advantage to incumbency in terms of the probability of winning the next election. The absence of a strong partisan impact on policy in American cities, which is in stark contrast to results at the state and federal levels of government, appears due to certain features of the urban environment associated with Tiebout sorting. In particular, there is a relatively high degree of household homogeneity at the local level that appears to provide the proper incentives for local politicians to be able to credibly commit to moderation and discourages strategic extremism.

Is comment free? Ethical, editorial and political problems of moderating online news

Polis visiting research fellow Sanna Trygg explores why we moderate public comment and the effects of different moderation policies

The delegate paradox: Why polarized politicians can represent citizens best

Many advocate for political reforms intended to resolve apparent disjunctures between politicians’ ideologically polarized policy positions and citizens’ less polarized policy preferences. We show these apparent disjunctures can arise even when politicians represent their constituencies well and that resolving them would likely degrade representation. These counterintuitive results arise from a paradox whereby polarized politicians can best represent constituencies composed of citizens with idiosyncratic preferences. We document this paradox among US House members, often criticized for excessive polarization. We show that if House members represented their constituencies’ preferences as closely as possible, they would still appear polarized. Moreover, current members nearly always represent their constituencies better than counterfactual less polarized members. A series of experiments confirms that even “moderate” citizens usually prefer ostensibly polarized representatives to many less polarized alternatives

PATHWAYS TO AND FROM VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE CASE FOR SCIENCE-BASED FIELD RESEARCH Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats & Capabilities, March 10, 2010

We are fixated on technology and technological success, and we have no sustained or systematic approach to field-based social understanding of our adversaries' motivation, intent, will, and the dreams that drive their strategic vision, however strange those dreams and vision may seem to us