23,709 research outputs found
A Formal Approach to Cyber-Physical Attacks
We apply formal methods to lay and streamline theoretical foundations to
reason about Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) and cyber-physical attacks. We focus
on %a formal treatment of both integrity and DoS attacks to sensors and
actuators of CPSs, and on the timing aspects of these attacks. Our
contributions are threefold: (1) we define a hybrid process calculus to model
both CPSs and cyber-physical attacks; (2) we define a threat model of
cyber-physical attacks and provide the means to assess attack
tolerance/vulnerability with respect to a given attack; (3) we formalise how to
estimate the impact of a successful attack on a CPS and investigate possible
quantifications of the success chances of an attack. We illustrate definitions
and results by means of a non-trivial engineering application
Design-Time Quantification of Integrity in Cyber-Physical-Systems
In a software system it is possible to quantify the amount of information
that is leaked or corrupted by analysing the flows of information present in
the source code. In a cyber-physical system, information flows are not only
present at the digital level, but also at a physical level, and to and fro the
two levels. In this work, we provide a methodology to formally analyse a
Cyber-Physical System composite model (combining physics and control) using an
information flow-theoretic approach. We use this approach to quantify the level
of vulnerability of a system with respect to attackers with different
capabilities. We illustrate our approach by means of a water distribution case
study
A Satisfiability Modulo Theory Approach to Secure State Reconstruction in Differentially Flat Systems Under Sensor Attacks
We address the problem of estimating the state of a differentially flat
system from measurements that may be corrupted by an adversarial attack. In
cyber-physical systems, malicious attacks can directly compromise the system's
sensors or manipulate the communication between sensors and controllers. We
consider attacks that only corrupt a subset of sensor measurements. We show
that the possibility of reconstructing the state under such attacks is
characterized by a suitable generalization of the notion of s-sparse
observability, previously introduced by some of the authors in the linear case.
We also extend our previous work on the use of Satisfiability Modulo Theory
solvers to estimate the state under sensor attacks to the context of
differentially flat systems. The effectiveness of our approach is illustrated
on the problem of controlling a quadrotor under sensor attacks.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1412.432
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