Exploiting cloud utility models for profit and ruin

A key characteristic that has led to the early adoption of public cloud computing is the utility pricing model that governs the cost of compute resources consumed. Similar to public utilities like gas and electricity, cloud consumers only pay for the resources they consume and only for the time they are utilized. As a result and pursuant to a Cloud Service Provider\u27s (CSP) Terms of Agreement, cloud consumers are responsible for all computational costs incurred within and in support of their rented computing environments whether these resources were consumed in good faith or not. While initial threat modeling and security research on the public cloud model has primarily focused on the confidentiality and integrity of data transferred, processed, and stored in the cloud, little attention has been paid to the external threat sources that have the capability to affect the financial viability of cloud-hosted services. Bounded by a utility pricing model, Internet-facing web resources hosted in the cloud are vulnerable to Fraudulent Resource Consumption (FRC) attacks. Unlike an application-layer DDoS attack that consumes resources with the goal of disrupting short-term availability, a FRC attack is a considerably more subtle attack that instead targets the utility model over an extended time period. By fraudulently consuming web resources in sufficient volume (i.e. data transferred out of the cloud), an attacker is able to inflict significant fraudulent charges to the victim. This work introduces and thoroughly describes the FRC attack and discusses why current application-layer DDoS mitigation schemes are not applicable to a more subtle attack. The work goes on to propose three detection metrics that together form the criteria for detecting a FRC attack from that of normal web activity and an attribution methodology capable of accurately identifying FRC attack clients. Experimental results based on plausible and challenging attack scenarios show that an attacker, without knowledge of the training web log, has a difficult time mimicking the self-similar and consistent request semantics of normal web activity necessary to carryout a successful FRC attack

A new framework to alleviate DDoS vulnerabilities in cloud computing

In the communication age, the Internet has growing very fast and most industries rely on it. An essential part of Internet, Web applications like online booking, e-banking, online shopping, and e-learning plays a vital role in everyday life. Enhancements have been made in this domain, in which the web servers depend on cloud location for resources. Many organizations around the world change their operations and data storage from local to cloud platforms for many reasons especially the availability factor. Even though cloud computing is considered a renowned technology, it has many challenges, the most important one is security. One of the major issue in the cloud security is Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS), which results in serious loss if the attack is successful and left unnoticed. This paper focuses on preventing and detecting DDoS attacks in distributed and cloud environment. A new framework has been suggested to alleviate the DDoS attack and to provide availability of cloud resources to its users. The framework introduces three screening tests VISUALCOM, IMGCOM, and AD-IMGCOM to prevent the attack and two queues with certain constraints to detect the attack. The result of our framework shows an improvement and better outcomes and provides a recovered from attack detection with high availability rate. Also, the performance of the queuing model has been analysed

Denial of Service in Web-Domains: Building Defenses Against Next-Generation Attack Behavior

The existing state-of-the-art in the field of application layer Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) protection is generally designed, and thus effective, only for static web domains. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first that studies the problem of application layer DDoS defense in web domains of dynamic content and organization, and for next-generation bot behaviour. In the first part of this thesis, we focus on the following research tasks: 1) we identify the main weaknesses of the existing application-layer anti-DDoS solutions as proposed in research literature and in the industry, 2) we obtain a comprehensive picture of the current-day as well as the next-generation application-layer attack behaviour and 3) we propose novel techniques, based on a multidisciplinary approach that combines offline machine learning algorithms and statistical analysis, for detection of suspicious web visitors in static web domains. Then, in the second part of the thesis, we propose and evaluate a novel anti-DDoS system that detects a broad range of application-layer DDoS attacks, both in static and dynamic web domains, through the use of advanced techniques of data mining. The key advantage of our system relative to other systems that resort to the use of challenge-response tests (such as CAPTCHAs) in combating malicious bots is that our system minimizes the number of these tests that are presented to valid human visitors while succeeding in preventing most malicious attackers from accessing the web site. The results of the experimental evaluation of the proposed system demonstrate effective detection of current and future variants of application layer DDoS attacks

Exploiting cloud utility models for profit and ruin

A key characteristic that has led to the early adoption of public cloud computing is the utility pricing model that governs the cost of compute resources consumed. Similar to public utilities like gas and electricity, cloud consumers only pay for the resources they consume and only for the time they are utilized. As a result and pursuant to a Cloud Service Provider's (CSP) Terms of Agreement, cloud consumers are responsible for all computational costs incurred within and in support of their rented computing environments whether these resources were consumed in good faith or not. While initial threat modeling and security research on the public cloud model has primarily focused on the confidentiality and integrity of data transferred, processed, and stored in the cloud, little attention has been paid to the external threat sources that have the capability to affect the financial viability of cloud-hosted services. Bounded by a utility pricing model, Internet-facing web resources hosted in the cloud are vulnerable to Fraudulent Resource Consumption (FRC) attacks. Unlike an application-layer DDoS attack that consumes resources with the goal of disrupting short-term availability, a FRC attack is a considerably more subtle attack that instead targets the utility model over an extended time period. By fraudulently consuming web resources in sufficient volume (i.e. data transferred out of the cloud), an attacker is able to inflict significant fraudulent charges to the victim. This work introduces and thoroughly describes the FRC attack and discusses why current application-layer DDoS mitigation schemes are not applicable to a more subtle attack. The work goes on to propose three detection metrics that together form the criteria for detecting a FRC attack from that of normal web activity and an attribution methodology capable of accurately identifying FRC attack clients. Experimental results based on plausible and challenging attack scenarios show that an attacker, without knowledge of the training web log, has a difficult time mimicking the self-similar and consistent request semantics of normal web activity necessary to carryout a successful FRC attack.</p