An Interdisciplinary Approach to Coalition Formation

A stable government is by definition not dominated by any other government. However, it may happen that all governments are dominated. In graph-theoretic terms this means that the dominance graph does not possess a source. In this paper we are able to deal with this case by a clever combination of notions from different fields, such as relational algebra, graph theory and social choice theory, and by using the computer support system RelView for computing solutions and visualizing the results. Using relational algorithms, in such a case we break all cycles in each initial strongly connected component by removing the vertices in an appropriate minimum feedback vertex set. In this way we can choose a government that is as close as possible to being un-dominated. To achieve unique solutions, we additionally apply the majority ranking recently introduced by Balinski and Laraki. The main parts of our procedure can be executed using the RelView tool. Its sophisticated implementation of relations allows to deal with graph sizes that are sufficient for practical applications of coalition formation.Graph theory; RelView; relational algebra; dominance; stable government

Negotiating a stable government - an application of bargaining theory to a coalition formation model

In this paper, we apply bargaining theory to a certain model of coalition formation. The notions of a feasible government and a stable government are central in the model considered. By a government, we mean a pair consisting of a majority coalition and a policy supported by this coalition. The aim of this paper is to establish which stable government should be created if more than one stable government exists or, in case there is no stable one, which feasible government should be formed if more than one feasible government exists. Several bargaining procedures leading to the choice of one stable (or feasible) government are proposed. We define bargaining games in which only parties belonging to at least one stable (or feasible) government bargain over the creation of a government. We consider different bargaining costs. We investigate subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining games defined. It turns out that the prospects of a party depend on the procedure applied, and on the bargaining costs assumed. We also apply the coalition formation model to the Polish Parliament after the 2001 elections and apply the different bargaining games for the creation of a government to this example.stable government; bargaining game; subgame perfect equilibrium

Applications of Relations and Graphs to Coalition Formation

A stable government is by definition not dominated by any other government. However, it may happen that all governments are dominated. In graph-theoretic terms this means that the dominance graph does not possess a source. In this paper we are able to deal with this case by a clever combination of notions from different fields, such as relational algebra, graph theory, social choice and bargaining theory, and by using the computer support system RelView for computing solutions and visualizing the results. Using relational algorithms, in such a case we break all cycles in each initial strongly connected component by removing the vertices in an appropriate minimum feedback vertex set. So, we can choose an un-dominated government. To achieve unique solutions, we additionally apply social choice rules. The main parts of our procedure can be executed using the RelView tool. Its sophisticated implementation of relations allows to deal with graph sizes that are sufficient for practical applications of coalition formation.Graph Theory, RELVIEW, Relational Algebra, Dominance, Stable Government

Negotiating a stable government - an application of bargaining theory to a coalition formation model

International audienceIn this paper, we apply bargaining theory to a certain model of coalition formation. The notions of a feasible government and a stable government are central in the model considered. By a government, we mean a pair consisting of a majority coalition and a policy supported by this coalition. The aim of this paper is to establish which stable government should be created if more than one stable government exists or, in case there is no stable one, which feasible government should be formed if more than one feasible government exists. Several bargaining procedures leading to the choice of one stable (or feasible) government are proposed. We define bargaining games in which only parties belonging to at least one stable (or feasible) government bargain over the creation of a government. We consider different bargaining costs. We investigate subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining games defined. It turns out that the prospects of a party depend on the procedure applied, and on the bargaining costs assumed. We also apply the coalition formation model to the Polish Parliament after the 2001 elections and apply the different bargaining games for the creation of a government to this example

The Ubiquity of Large Graphs and Surprising Challenges of Graph Processing: Extended Survey

Graph processing is becoming increasingly prevalent across many application domains. In spite of this prevalence, there is little research about how graphs are actually used in practice. We performed an extensive study that consisted of an online survey of 89 users, a review of the mailing lists, source repositories, and whitepapers of a large suite of graph software products, and in-person interviews with 6 users and 2 developers of these products. Our online survey aimed at understanding: (i) the types of graphs users have; (ii) the graph computations users run; (iii) the types of graph software users use; and (iv) the major challenges users face when processing their graphs. We describe the participants' responses to our questions highlighting common patterns and challenges. Based on our interviews and survey of the rest of our sources, we were able to answer some new questions that were raised by participants' responses to our online survey and understand the specific applications that use graph data and software. Our study revealed surprising facts about graph processing in practice. In particular, real-world graphs represent a very diverse range of entities and are often very large, scalability and visualization are undeniably the most pressing challenges faced by participants, and data integration, recommendations, and fraud detection are very popular applications supported by existing graph software. We hope these findings can guide future research

Generating and Sampling Orbits for Lifted Probabilistic Inference

A key goal in the design of probabilistic inference algorithms is identifying and exploiting properties of the distribution that make inference tractable. Lifted inference algorithms identify symmetry as a property that enables efficient inference and seek to scale with the degree of symmetry of a probability model. A limitation of existing exact lifted inference techniques is that they do not apply to non-relational representations like factor graphs. In this work we provide the first example of an exact lifted inference algorithm for arbitrary discrete factor graphs. In addition we describe a lifted Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo algorithm that provably mixes rapidly in the degree of symmetry of the distribution