Who is that? Brain networks and mechanisms for identifying individuals

Social animals can identify conspecifics by many forms of sensory input. However, whether the neuronal computations that support this ability to identify individuals rely on modality-independent convergence or involve ongoing synergistic interactions along the multiple sensory streams remains controversial. Direct neuronal measurements at relevant brain sites could address such questions, but this requires better bridging the work in humans and animal models. Here, we overview recent studies in nonhuman primates on voice and face identity-sensitive pathways and evaluate the correspondences to relevant findings in humans. This synthesis provides insights into converging sensory streams in the primate anterior temporal lobe (ATL) for identity processing. Furthermore, we advance a model and suggest how alternative neuronal mechanisms could be tested

Category-Specific Item Recognition and the Medial Temporal Lobe

Much neuropsychological and neuroimaging research has been focused on the contributions of different medial temporal lobe (MTL) structures to recognition memory. The majority of these studies have linked perirhinal cortex (PrC) to item recognition, whereas the hippocampus and parahippocampal cortex (PhC) have primarily been associated with the recollection of contextual detail pertaining to a specific prior stimulus encounter. Here, I report results from three fMRI studies that examined the neural correlates of item recognition with a specific focus on the relationship between such signals and category-specific effects in the MTL. In Chapter 2, I reveal that category-specific representations in both PrC and PhC can be brought to bear on item recognition decisions. In Chapter 3, I examined the specific stimulus properties that determine the relative contributions of PrC and PhC to item recognition, with a focus on landmark suitability. The results from this study revealed item recognition signals for non-landmark objects in PrC and landmarks in PhC. In Chapter 4, I focused specifically on face recognition to characterize the manner in which PrC codes item-recognition signals and to further explore the issue of category-specificity with independent functional localizer data. Results from this study indicate that item recognition signals in PrC can be distributed across voxels with directionally heterogeneous response profiles. Further, these data also revealed that the voxels comprising these patterns respond preferentially to faces under passive viewing conditions. Taken together, these findings suggest that item recognition signals are represented in a distributed, category-specific manner within both PrC and PhC

What does semantic tiling of the cortex tell us about semantics?

Recent use of voxel-wise modeling in cognitive neuroscience suggests that semantic maps tile the cortex. Although this impressive research establishes distributed cortical areas active during the conceptual processing that underlies semantics, it tells us little about the nature of this processing. While mapping concepts between Marr's computational and implementation levels to support neural encoding and decoding, this approach ignores Marr's algorithmic level, central for understanding the mechanisms that implement cognition, in general, and conceptual processing, in particular. Following decades of research in cognitive science and neuroscience, what do we know so far about the representation and processing mechanisms that implement conceptual abilities? Most basically, much is known about the mechanisms associated with: (1) features and frame representations, (2) grounded, abstract, and linguistic representations, (3) knowledge-based inference, (4) concept composition, and (5) conceptual flexibility. Rather than explaining these fundamental representation and processing mechanisms, semantic tiles simply provide a trace of their activity over a relatively short time period within a specific learning context. Establishing the mechanisms that implement conceptual processing in the brain will require more than mapping it to cortical (and sub-cortical) activity, with process models from cognitive science likely to play central roles in specifying the intervening mechanisms. More generally, neuroscience will not achieve its basic goals until it establishes algorithmic-level mechanisms that contribute essential explanations to how the brain works, going beyond simply establishing the brain areas that respond to various task conditions

On staying grounded and avoiding Quixotic dead ends

The 15 articles in this special issue on The Representation of Concepts illustrate the rich variety of theoretical positions and supporting research that characterize the area. Although much agreement exists among contributors, much disagreement exists as well, especially about the roles of grounding and abstraction in conceptual processing. I first review theoretical approaches raised in these articles that I believe are Quixotic dead ends, namely, approaches that are principled and inspired but likely to fail. In the process, I review various theories of amodal symbols, their distortions of grounded theories, and fallacies in the evidence used to support them. Incorporating further contributions across articles, I then sketch a theoretical approach that I believe is likely to be successful, which includes grounding, abstraction, flexibility, explaining classic conceptual phenomena, and making contact with real-world situations. This account further proposes that (1) a key element of grounding is neural reuse, (2) abstraction takes the forms of multimodal compression, distilled abstraction, and distributed linguistic representation (but not amodal symbols), and (3) flexible context-dependent representations are a hallmark of conceptual processing

Object processing in the medial temporal lobe: Influence of object domain

We live in a rich visual world, surrounded by many different kinds of objects. While we may not often reflect on it, our ability to recognize what an object is, detect whether an object is familiar or novel, and bring to mind our general knowledge about an object, are all essential components of adaptive behavior. In this dissertation, I investigate the neural basis of object representations, focusing on medial temporal lobe (MTL) structures, namely, perirhinal cortex, parahippocampal cortex, and hippocampus. I use what type of thing an object is, or more specifically, the broader category (e.g., “face” or “house”) or domain (e.g., “animate or “inanimate”) to which an object belongs to probe MTL structures. In the Chapter 2, I used fMRI to explore whether object representations in MTL structures were organized by animacy, and/or real-world size. I found domain-level organization in all three MTL structures, with a distinct pattern of domain organization in each structure. In Chapter 3, I examined whether recognition-memory signals for objects were organized by category and domain in the same MTL structures. I found no evidence of category or domain specificity in recognition memory-signals, but did reveal a distinction between novel and familiar object representations across all categories. Finally, in Chapter 4, I used a neuropsychological approach to discover a unique contribution of the hippocampus to object concepts. I found that an individual with developmental amnesia had normal intrinsic feature knowledge, but less extrinsic, or associative feature knowledge of concepts This decreased extrinsic feature knowledge led to abnormalities specific to non-living object concepts. These results show that the hippocampus may play an important role in the development of object concepts, potentially through the same relational binding mechanism that links objects and context in episodic memory. Taken together, these findings suggest that using object category or domain to probe the function of MTL structures is a useful approach for gaining a deeper understanding of the similarities and differences between MTL structures, and how they contribute more broadly to our perception and memory of the world

More than skin deep: body representation beyond primary somatosensory cortex

The neural circuits underlying initial sensory processing of somatic information are relatively well understood. In contrast, the processes that go beyond primary somatosensation to create more abstract representations related to the body are less clear. In this review, we focus on two classes of higher-order processing beyond somatosensation. Somatoperception refers to the process of perceiving the body itself, and particularly of ensuring somatic perceptual constancy. We review three key elements of somatoperception: (a) remapping information from the body surface into an egocentric reference frame (b) exteroceptive perception of objects in the external world through their contact with the body and (c) interoceptive percepts about the nature and state of the body itself. Somatorepresentation, in contrast, refers to the essentially cognitive process of constructing semantic knowledge and attitudes about the body, including: (d) lexical-semantic knowledge about bodies generally and one’s own body specifically, (e) configural knowledge about the structure of bodies, (f) emotions and attitudes directed towards one’s own body, and (g) the link between physical body and psychological self. We review a wide range of neuropsychological, neuroimaging and neurophysiological data to explore the dissociation between these different aspects of higher somatosensory function

Understanding What We See: How We Derive Meaning From Vision.

Recognising objects goes beyond vision, and requires models that incorporate different aspects of meaning. Most models focus on superordinate categories (e.g., animals, tools) which do not capture the richness of conceptual knowledge. We argue that object recognition must be seen as a dynamic process of transformation from low-level visual input through categorical organisation to specific conceptual representations. Cognitive models based on large normative datasets are well-suited to capture statistical regularities within and between concepts, providing both category structure and basic-level individuation. We highlight recent research showing how such models capture important properties of the ventral visual pathway. This research demonstrates that significant advances in understanding conceptual representations can be made by shifting the focus from studying superordinate categories to basic-level concepts.We thank William Marslen-Wilson for his helpful comments on this manuscript. The research leading to these results has received funding to LKT from the European Research Council under the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ ERC Grant agreement n° 249640.This is the final version of the article. It first appeared from Elsevier via http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2015.08.00

Social re-orientation and brain development: An expanded and updated view.

Social development has been the focus of a great deal of neuroscience based research over the past decade. In this review, we focus on providing a framework for understanding how changes in facets of social development may correspond with changes in brain function. We argue that (1) distinct phases of social behavior emerge based on whether the organizing social force is the mother, peer play, peer integration, or romantic intimacy; (2) each phase is marked by a high degree of affect-driven motivation that elicits a distinct response in subcortical structures; (3) activity generated by these structures interacts with circuits in prefrontal cortex that guide executive functions, and occipital and temporal lobe circuits, which generate specific sensory and perceptual social representations. We propose that the direction, magnitude and duration of interaction among these affective, executive, and perceptual systems may relate to distinct sensitive periods across development that contribute to establishing long-term patterns of brain function and behavior

Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic experience

Users of psychedelic drugs often report that their sense of being a self or ‘I’ distinct from the rest of the world has diminished or altogether dissolved. Neuroscientific study of such ‘ego dissolution’ experiences offers a window onto the nature of self-awareness. We argue that ego dissolution is best explained by an account that explains self-awareness as resulting from the integrated functioning of hierarchical predictive models which posit the existence of a stable and unchanging entity to which representations are bound. Combining recent work on the ‘integrative self' and the phenomenon of self-binding with predictive processing principles yields an explanation of ego dissolution according to which self-representation is a useful Cartesian fiction: an ultimately false representation of a simple and enduring substance to which attributes are bound which serves to integrate and unify cognitive processing across levels and domains. The self-model is not a mere narrative posit, as some have suggested; it has a more robust and ubiquitous cognitive function than that. But this does not mean, as others have claimed, that the self-model has the right attributes to qualify as a self. It performs some of the right kinds of functions, but it is not the right kind of entity. Ego dissolution experiences reveal that the self-model plays an important binding function in cognitive processing, but the self does not exist

Linking pain and the body: neural correlates of visually induced analgesia

The visual context of seeing the body can reduce the experience of acute pain, producing a multisensory analgesia. Here we investigated the neural correlates of this “visually induced analgesia” using fMRI. We induced acute pain with an infrared laser while human participants looked either at their stimulated right hand or at another object. Behavioral results confirmed the expected analgesic effect of seeing the body, while fMRI results revealed an associated reduction of laser-induced activity in ipsilateral primary somatosensory cortex (SI) and contralateral operculoinsular cortex during the visual context of seeing the body. We further identified two known cortical networks activated by sensory stimulation: (1) a set of brain areas consistently activated by painful stimuli (the so-called “pain matrix”), and (2) an extensive set of posterior brain areas activated by the visual perception of the body (“visual body network”). Connectivity analyses via psychophysiological interactions revealed that the visual context of seeing the body increased effective connectivity (i.e., functional coupling) between posterior parietal nodes of the visual body network and the purported pain matrix. Increased connectivity with these posterior parietal nodes was seen for several pain-related regions, including somatosensory area SII, anterior and posterior insula, and anterior cingulate cortex. These findings suggest that visually induced analgesia does not involve an overall reduction of the cortical response elicited by laser stimulation, but is consequent to the interplay between the brain's pain network and a posterior network for body perception, resulting in modulation of the experience of pain