1,093 research outputs found
Belief revision and computational argumentation: a critical comparison
This paper aims at comparing and relating belief revision and argumentation as
approaches to model reasoning processes. Referring to some prominent literature
references in both fields, we will discuss their (implicit or explicit) assumptions on the
modeled processes and hence commonalities and differences in the forms of reason ing they are suitable to deal with. The intended contribution is on one hand assessing
the (not fully explored yet) relationships between two lively research fields in the
broad area of defeasible reasoning and on the other hand pointing out open issues and
potential directions for future research.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio
Warranting evidence in diverse evidentiary settings
Informal logic, is faced with the problematic of persuasive arguments in contexts where evidence is rich, diverse and preferentially selected on the basis of pre-established attitudes. This requires that the standard view of challenge by presenting inconsistent evidence be rethought. In this paper, I will argue that the solution is to focus less on evidence that contradicts claims and to confront the network of warrants that support the selecting and evaluating of evidentiary moves
On Philosophical Intuitions
I will argue that the scientific investigation of philosophical intuition (\u27experimental philosophy\u27) is of philosophical interest. I will defend the significance of experimental philosophy against two important types of objection. I will term the first objection \u27eliminativism\u27 about intuitions: roughly, it is the claim that philosophical methodology does not in fact rely on intuition, and thus experimental philosophy\u27s investigation is ill-conceived—in the words of one such opponent, \u27a big mistake.\u27 I will then consider a second objection, the \u27expertise\u27 defence. The expertise defence argues that the expert intuitions of professional philosophers are distinct, and to be preferred to those of the \u27folk.\u27 Against the eliminativists, I will argue that an ineliminable mental component remains that can be subject of fruitful empirical investigation. Against the expertise defence I will argue that, at least in the context of philosophy of language, expertise is itself a potential source of bias. Since expertise is domain-specific, however, a general rebuttal will not be given. I will conclude that experimental philosophy has much to contribute
Evidence and Formal Models in the Linguistic Sciences
This dissertation contains a collection of essays centered on the relationship between theoretical model-building and empirical evidence-gathering in linguistics and related language sciences. The first chapter sets the stage by demonstrating that the subject matter of linguistics is manifold, and contending that discussion of relationships between linguistic models, evidence, and language itself depends on the subject matter at hand. The second chapter defends a restrictive account of scientific evidence. I make use of this account in the third chapter, in which I argue that if my account of scientific evidence is correct, then linguistic intuitions do not generally qualify as scientific evidence. Drawing on both extant and original empirical work on linguistic intuitions, I explore the consequences of this conclusion for scientific practice. In the fourth and fifth chapters I examine two distinct ways in which theoretical models relate to the evidence. Chapter four looks at the way in which empirical evidence can support computer simulations in evolutionary linguistics by informing and constraining them. Chapter five, on the other hand, probes the limits of how models are constrained by the data, taking as a case study empirically-suspect but theoretically-useful intentionalist models of meaning
Islands in the grammar? Standards of evidence
When considering how a complex system operates, the observable behavior depends upon both architectural properties of the system and the principles governing its operation. As a simple example, the behavior of computer chess programs depends upon both the processing speed and resources of the computer and the programmed rules that determine how the computer selects its next move. Despite having very similar search techniques, a computer from the 1990s might make a move that its 1970s forerunner would overlook simply because it had more raw computational power. From the naïve observer’s perspective, however, it is not superficially evident if a particular move is dispreferred or overlooked because of computational limitations or the search strategy and decision algorithm. In the case of computers, evidence for the source of any particular behavior can ultimately be found by inspecting the code and tracking the decision process of the computer. But with the human mind, such options are not yet available. The preference for certain behaviors and the dispreference for others may theoretically follow from cognitive limitations or from task-related principles that preclude certain kinds of cognitive operations, or from some combination of the two. This uncertainty gives rise to the fundamental problem of finding evidence for one explanation over the other. Such a problem arises in the analysis of syntactic island effects – the focu
Trusting our own minds
When it comes to the metaethical task of explaining and making sense of what it is that we are doing while doing ethics, the subject of moral objectivity occupies an important and special place within that task. Thus, it is often agreed that being able to explain and justify the objective features of common moral practice is one of if not the most important task for any metaethical theory to undertake.
In this dissertation, I tackle the issue of ethical objectivity on behalf of metaethical constructivism. To be more precise, my aim is to make plausible, strengthen, and defend the constructivist original contribution to contemporary metaethics by developing a novel constructivist account on the objectivity of ethics.
While the account that I develop herein presents a novel and independent approach to the subject of moral objectivity on behalf of constructivism, it also places itself between the two other positions within the constructivist camp that openly strive to secure ethical objectivity – namely Kantianism on the one hand, and the more recently developed Humean objectivist view on the other. It is for the latter reason that I call my own view the hybrid view
Informal Logic: A 'Canadian' Approach to Argument
The informal logic movement began as an attempt to develop – and teach – an alternative logic which can account for the real life arguing that surrounds us in our daily lives – in newspapers and the popular media, political and social commentary, advertising, and interpersonal exchange. The movement was rooted in research and discussion in Canada and especially at the University of Windsor, and has become a branch of argumentation theory which intersects with related traditions and approaches (notably formal logic, rhetoric and dialectics in the form of pragma-dialectics). In this volume, some of the best known contributors to the movement discuss their views and the reasoning and argument which is informal logic’s subject matter. Many themes and issues are explored in a way that will fuel the continued evolution of the field. Federico Puppo adds an insightful essay which considers the origins and development of informal logic and whether informal logicians are properly described as a “school” of thought. In considering that proposition, Puppo introduces readers to a diverse range of essays, some of them previously published, others written specifically for this volume
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