Epistemic Logic for Communication Chains

The paper considers epistemic properties of linear communication chains. It describes a sound and complete logical system that, in addition to the standard axioms of S5 in a multi-modal language, contains two non-trivial axioms that capture the linear structure of communication chains.Comment: 7 pages, Contributed talk at TARK 2013 (arXiv:1310.6382) http://www.tark.or

Diversification Preferences in the Theory of Choice

Diversification represents the idea of choosing variety over uniformity. Within the theory of choice, desirability of diversification is axiomatized as preference for a convex combination of choices that are equivalently ranked. This corresponds to the notion of risk aversion when one assumes the von-Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility model, but the equivalence fails to hold in other models. This paper studies axiomatizations of the concept of diversification and their relationship to the related notions of risk aversion and convex preferences within different choice theoretic models. Implications of these notions on portfolio choice are discussed. We cover model-independent diversification preferences, preferences within models of choice under risk, including expected utility theory and the more general rank-dependent expected utility theory, as well as models of choice under uncertainty axiomatized via Choquet expected utility theory. Remarks on interpretations of diversification preferences within models of behavioral choice are given in the conclusion

- SHAPLEY-SHUBIK AND BANZHAF INDICES REVISITED.

We provide a new axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf power indices in thedomain of simple superadditive games by means of transparent axioms. Only anonymity isshared with the former characterizations in the literature. The rest of the axioms are substitutedby more transparent ones in terms of power in collective decision-making procedures. Inparticular, a clear restatement and a compelling alternative for the transfer axiom are proposed.Only one axiom differentiates the characterization of either index, and these differentiatingaxioms provide a new point of comparison. In a first step both indices are characterized up to azero and a unit of scale. Then both indices are singled out by simple normalizing axioms.Power indices, voting power, collective decision-making, simple games

On the Intuition of Rank-Dependent Utility

Among the most popular models for decision under risk and uncertainty are the rank-dependent models, introduced by Quiggin and Schmeidler.Central concepts in these models are rank-dependence and comonotonicity.It has been suggested in the literature that these concepts are technical tools that have no intuitive or empirical content.This paper describes such contents.As a result, rank-dependence and comonotonicity become natural concepts upon which preference conditions, empirical tests, and improvements for utility measurement can be based.Further, a new derivation of the rank-dependent models is obtained.It is not based on observable preference axioms or on empirical data, but naturally follows from the intuitive perspective assumed.We think that the popularity of the rank-dependent theories is mainly due to the natural concepts adopted in these theories.rank-dependence;comonotonicity;Choquet integral;pessimism;uncertainty aversion;prospect theory