Measuring performance of supply chain by relational network DEA: A game theory approach

An appropriate performance measurement system is an important requirement for the effective management of a supply chain. Because of the existence of the intermediate measures connecting the supply chain members, conventional data envelopment analysis (DEA) cannot be utilized directly to measure the performance of supply chain and its members. This paper evaluated the performance of supply chain under cooperative and non-cooperative games by utilizing relational network DEA. Relational network DEA model considers the interrelationship of the members within the supply chain, to measure the efficiency of the supply chain and those of the members at the same time. The non-cooperative game is based on the Stackelberg strategy solution concept. In non- cooperative game, it is considered that some parts in supply chain have more power in marketing competition (leaders) and the other parts of the supply chain repetition of supply chain are the followers. In the leader-follower structure (Stackelberg model), the leaders efficiency, first evaluated by using the relational network DEA in parallel situation, and then the followers efficiency is evaluated, using information related to the leader’s efficiency. In cooperative game it is assumed that all parts of supply chain cooperate to each other in order to achieve higher efficiency

Measuring performance of supply chain by relational network DEA: A game theory approach

An appropriate performance measurement system is an important requirement for the effective management of a supply chain. Because of the existence of the intermediate measures connecting the supply chain members, conventional data envelopment analysis (DEA) cannot be utilized directly to measure the performance of supply chain and its members. This paper evaluated the performance of supply chain under cooperative and non-cooperative games by utilizing relational network DEA. Relational network DEA model considers the interrelationship of the members within the supply chain, to measure the efficiency of the supply chain and those of the members at the same time. The non-cooperative game is based on the Stackelberg strategy solution concept. In non- cooperative game, it is considered that some parts in supply chain have more power in marketing competition (leaders) and the other parts of the supply chain repetition of supply chain are the followers. In the leader-follower structure (Stackelberg model), the leaders efficiency, first evaluated by using the relational network DEA in parallel situation, and then the followers efficiency is evaluated, using information related to the leader’s efficiency. In cooperative game it is assumed that all parts of supply chain cooperate to each other in order to achieve higher efficiency

공급업체간 경쟁이 수익공유 계약에 미치는 영향

학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 경영학과, 2015. 2. 박상욱.공급사슬의 영역이 넓어지고 세분화 됨에 따라 개별 기업의 성과보다는 공급사슬 전체의 관점에서 최적의 성과를 내는 것이 점점 중요한 문제가 되고 있다. 그에 따라 공급사슬 구성원 간에 적절한 인센티브를 제공하는 계약을 통해 전체 최적의 성과를 낼 수 있도록 의사 결정 조정을 유도하는 방법에 대한 연구가 공급사슬 관리 분야에서 중요한 주제로 자리잡았으며, 수익공유 계약은 그 대표적인 사례이다. 이 연구는 공급자가 주도하는 시장에서 하나의 판매업체와 두 개의 공급업체로 이루어진 공급사슬을 대상으로 하나의 업체가 수익공유 계약을 도입할 때의 공급사슬 성과에 관해 알아보았다. 경쟁 상황과 구성원의 합리적 의사 결정을 반영하기 위해 게임이론을 사용하였으며 구성원 간의 협력 정도에 따라 수익공유 계약을 두 가지로 나누어 도매가 계약과의 성과를 비교하였다. 결과로, 수익공유 계약을 도입하기 위해서는 계약 당사자간의 협력과 의사 소통이 반드시 필요하며 하나의 공급업체만 계약을 사용하여도 모든 업체의 성과가 더 높아질 수 있음을 알 수 있었다. 또한 계약의 효과는 가격 민감성과 제품간 대체성의 정도에 따라 달라지며 상황에 따라 계약을 사용할 수 없는 경우도 존재한다. 이 결과는 기업들이 실제로 수입공유 계약을 도입하려 할 때 어떠한 점을 우선적으로 고려해야 하는지에 대한 시사점을 제공해 준다는 데에서 의미를 가질 수 있을 것이다.1. 서론 1 2. 문헌연구 4 3. 모델 8 3.1. 도매가 계약 모델 10 3.2 수익공유 계약 모델 12 3.2.1. 배타적 의사결정에 의한 수익공유 계약 15 3.2.2. 협력적 의사결정에 의한 수익공유 계약 17 4. 결과 분석 19 4.1 배타적 수익공유 계약의 성과 20 4.2 협력적 수익공유 계약의 성과 22 4.2.1. 수익공유 계약을 사용할 수 있는 조건 23 4.2.2 공급업체 간의 이윤 비교 28 5. 결론 32 참고문헌 35 부록 41 Abstract 43Maste

Parallel importation in a supply Chain:The impact of gray market structure

With the rapid development of global economic integration, the size of gray markets continues to expand. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of different structures of gray markets on supply chain decisions and profits. Using game theory, we comprehensively analyze pricing and quantity decisions under monopoly parallel importation (either third-party parallel importation or retailer parallel importation), and duopoly parallel importation, including three different structures in which the retailer and the third-party parallel importation coexist in gray markets with different power structures. We obtain equilibrium results for each structure, compare the optimal strategies of these structures, and develop valuable insights

Equilibrium analysis of supply chain structures under power imbalance

This paper investigates the implications of channel power on supply chain stability in a setting where multiple suppliers sell substitutable products through a common retailer. Such supply chains have been traditionally analyzed as one- or two-stage Stackelberg non-cooperative games with all suppliers sharing balanced (equal) decision-making power. In this paper, we relax this assumption and formulate game-theoretic models to examine scenarios where one supplier can act as the Stackelberg leader. Consequently, we analyze new supply chain structures and introduce the notion of structure dominance, a novel approach to analyze the performance of supply chains that has practical implications. Thus, a decision maker can employ the concepts of structure dominance to determine whether there exist supply chain scenarios that are more stable than others, i.e., less prone to power reconfigurations, at both agent and group level. We find that power imbalance causes significant declines in supply chain profits, and the more balanced the agents are the higher their profits when demand is linear, regardless of product competition. It develops that neither the Manufacturer Stackelberg nor the Retailer Stackelberg supply chains are stable structures in our generalized setting, but that structures where power is equally split between agents provide for best stability and performance.Power dominance Supply chain stability Game theory