5 research outputs found

    Online pricing for multi-type of Items

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    LNCS v. 7285 entitled: Frontiers in algorithmics and algorithmic aspects in information and management: joint international conference, FAW-AAIM 2012 ... proceedingsIn this paper, we study the problem of online pricing for bundles of items. Given a seller with k types of items, m of each, a sequence of users {u 1, u 2, ...} arrives one by one. Each user is single-minded, i.e., each user is interested only in a particular bundle of items. The seller must set the price and assign some amount of bundles to each user upon his/her arrival. Bundles can be sold fractionally. Each u i has his/her value function v i (·) such that v i (x) is the highest unit price u i is willing to pay for x bundles. The objective is to maximize the revenue of the seller by setting the price and amount of bundles for each user. In this paper, we first show that the lower bound of the competitive ratio for this problem is Ω(logh + logk), where h is the highest unit price to be paid among all users. We then give a deterministic online algorithm, Pricing, whose competitive ratio is O (√k·log h log k). When k = 1 the lower and upper bounds asymptotically match the optimal result O(logh). © 2012 Springer-Verlag.postprin

    On Revenue Maximization with Sharp Multi-Unit Demands

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    We consider markets consisting of a set of indivisible items, and buyers that have {\em sharp} multi-unit demand. This means that each buyer ii wants a specific number did_i of items; a bundle of size less than did_i has no value, while a bundle of size greater than did_i is worth no more than the most valued did_i items (valuations being additive). We consider the objective of setting prices and allocations in order to maximize the total revenue of the market maker. The pricing problem with sharp multi-unit demand buyers has a number of properties that the unit-demand model does not possess, and is an important question in algorithmic pricing. We consider the problem of computing a revenue maximizing solution for two solution concepts: competitive equilibrium and envy-free pricing. For unrestricted valuations, these problems are NP-complete; we focus on a realistic special case of "correlated values" where each buyer ii has a valuation v_i\qual_j for item jj, where viv_i and \qual_j are positive quantities associated with buyer ii and item jj respectively. We present a polynomial time algorithm to solve the revenue-maximizing competitive equilibrium problem. For envy-free pricing, if the demand of each buyer is bounded by a constant, a revenue maximizing solution can be found efficiently; the general demand case is shown to be NP-hard.Comment: page2

    Models and Algorithms for the Product Pricing with Single-Minded Customers Requesting Bundles

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    International audienceWe analyze a product pricing problem with single-minded customers, each interested in buying a bundle of products. The objective is to maximize the total revenue and we assume that supply is unlimited for all products. We contribute to a missing piece of literature by giving some mathematical formulations for this single-minded bundle pricing problem. We first present a mixed-integer nonlinear program with bilinear terms in the objective function and the constraints. By applying classical linearization techniques, we obtain two different mixed-integer linear programs. We then study the polyhedral structure of the linear formulations and obtain valid inequalities based on an RLT-like framework. We develop a Benders decomposition to project strong cuts from the tightest model onto the lighter models. We conclude this work with extensive numerical experiments to assess the quality of the mixed-integer linear formulations, as well as the performance of the cutting plane algorithms and the impact of the preprocessing on computation times

    On the theory of truthful and fair pricing for banner advertisements

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    We consider revenue maximization problem in banner advertisements under two fundamental concepts: Envy-freeness and truthfulness. Envy-freeness captures fairness requirement among buyers while truthfulness gives buyers the incentive to announce truthful private bids. A extension of envy-freeness named competitive equilibrium, which requires both envy-freeness and market clearance conditions, is also investigated. For truthfulness also called incentive compatible, we adapt Bayesian settings, where each buyer's private value is drawn independently from publicly known distributions. Therefore, the truthfulness we adopt is Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms. Most of our results are positive. We study various settings of revenue maximizing problem e.g. competitive equilibrium and envy-free solution in relaxed demand, sharp demand and consecutive demand case; Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism in relaxed demand, sharp demand, budget constraints and consecutive demand cases. Our approach allows us to argue that these simple mechanisms give optimal or approximate-optimal revenue guarantee in a very robust manner
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