7 research outputs found

    That’s Mine! Employee Side Projects, Intellectual Property Ownership, and Innovation

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    Working on side projects outside their work hours is a growing trend for IT professionals. While employees might believe that everything they create in their spare time belongs to themselves, it is not always the case. In the legal case of Alcatel v. Brown, the court ruled that the employer owned rights to employees’ intellectual property including ideas of their side projects. Relatively little is known about how innovation activities are affected when employees are not allowed to retain the ownership of their intellectual property. We leverage the Alcatel v. Brown case as an exogenous shock and apply a difference-in-difference model to examine how the legal case affects innovation activities in different counties. We find that following Alcatel v. Brown, both patent counts and entrepreneurial activities decrease in counties where employees’ ownership of their intellectual property is not legally protected. We also find that the dampening effect is more pronounced in IT-related industries. Our work contributes to the literature on innovation management while providing practical implications for policy makers on intellectual property law

    Can Starving Start-ups Beat Fat Labs? A Bandit Model of Innovation with Endogenous Financing Constraint

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    Is there any such thing as too much capital when it comes to the financing of innovative projects? We study a principal–agent model in which the principal chooses the scale of the experiment, and the agent privately observes the outcome realizations and can privately choose the novelty of the project. When the agent has private access to a safe but non-innovative project, the principal starves the agent of funds to incentivize risk-taking. The principal quickly scales up after early successes, and can tolerate early failures. If the principal is equally informed about the outcome, then the agent is well-resourced, resembling a large research and development department

    Can starving start-ups beat fat labs? A bandit model of innovation with endogenous financing constraint

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    First published: 03 October 2018This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Is there any such thing as too much capital when it comes to the financing of innovative projects? We study a principal-agent model in which the principal chooses the scale of the experiment, and the agent privately observes the outcome realizations and can privately choose the novelty of the project. When the agent has private access to a safe but non-innovative project, the principal starves the agent of funds to incentivise risk-taking. The principal quickly scales up after early successes, and may tolerate early failures. If the principal is equally informed about the outcome, the agent is well-resourced, resembling a large R&D department

    Teacher Leadership in State Education Policy

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    There is a national call for teacher leadership, which has occurred after many education reforms have struggled due to a perceived lack of teacher involvement. The purpose of this study was to examine whether teachers felt that their involvement in education policy had impact and whether there is ample teacher expertise in education policy. The overarching research question was to appraise educator perceptions of teacher impact on state education policy. The study revealed a perceived lack of teacher impact and education expertise. The conceptual framework was based on theories of adult learning and the development of expertise and supported the necessity of teacher expertise in policy discussions\u27 because teachers are the ones who have developed classroom expertise and the potential impact of policy on classrooms. A case study methodology was applied with 5 state teachers of the year participants. The participants were from 4 states, recognized from 2012-2015, and had local, state, and national policy experience. Interviews were conducted to collect data, with direct interpretation and categorical aggregation through coding applied to analyze data during collection. After identifying a perceived lack of teacher impact, themes were identified that could create more effective impact. Themes were grouped into skills, knowledge, and dispositions that could be taught in a series of learning experiences, serving as curriculum for teachers to build expertise in policy. This project has the potential to assist educators in developing the skills, knowledge, and dispositions needed to become more effectively involved in policy. It also has the potential to create social change in the United States by assisting teachers in getting meaningfully involved in policy, thereby positively impacting public education for their students in their classrooms, schools, districts, and beyond

    Essays on climate change, innovation, and inequality

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    This thesis consists of three essays on the interface of applied microeconomic and macroeconomic theory, with the common theme of studying the role of financing constraints in various economic issues. The first chapter tackles the problem of deriving optimal climate policies in a world characterised by credit constraints. Credible implementation of climate change policy requires a large proportion of current fossil fuel reserves to remain unused. This issue, named the Carbon Bubble, is usually presented as a required asset write-off, with implications for investors. For the first time, we discuss its implications for macroeconomic policy and for climate policy itself. We embed the Carbon Bubble in a macroeconomic model exhibiting a financial accelerator: if investors are leveraged, the Carbon Bubble may precipitate a fire-sale of assets across the economy, and generate a large and persistent fall in output and investment. We find a role for policy in mitigating the Carbon Bubble. In the second chapter, we analyse the role of financing constraints in motivating innovation. Is there a thing as too much capital when it comes to the financing of innovative projects? We study a principal-agent model in which the principal chooses the scale of the experiment, and the agent privately observes the outcome realizations and may privately choose the novelty of the project. When the agent has private access to a safe but non-innovative project, the principal starves the agent of funds to incentivise risk-taking. The principal quickly scales up after early successes, and may tolerate early failures. If the principal is equally informed about the outcome, the agent is well-resourced, resembling a large R&D department. In the third chapter, we investigate if inequality hinders or fosters innovation. We study an occupational choice model in which agents differ in observable wealth and unobservable innovative talent. Investors deposit their wealth in banks, whereas entrepreneurs contract with banks to obtain credit to set up risky firms and can privately choose the novelty of the technology used and the effort exerted. Since financial contracts can be made contingent only on wealth, up to five wealth classes form endogenously and, in general equilibrium, the interest rate adjusts to clear the credit market. In a quantitative illustration, we show that increased inequality can lead to a decrease in both the average quality of the innovators and the number of successful innovations, and to an increase in the number of non-innovative entrepreneurs
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