A novel incentive-based demand response model for Cournot competition in electricity markets

This paper presents an analysis of competition between generators when incentive-based demand response is employed in an electricity market. Thermal and hydropower generation are considered in the model. A smooth inverse demand function is designed using a sigmoid and two linear functions for modeling the consumer preferences under incentive-based demand response program. Generators compete to sell energy bilaterally to consumers and system operator provides transmission and arbitrage services. The profit of each agent is posed as an optimization problem, then the competition result is found by solving simultaneously Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for all generators. A Nash-Cournot equilibrium is found when the system operates normally and at peak demand times when DR is required. Under this model, results show that DR diminishes the energy consumption at peak periods, shifts the power requirement to off-peak times and improves the net consumer surplus due to incentives received for participating in DR program. However, the generators decrease their profit due to the reduction of traded energy and market prices

Strongly polynomial algorithm for a class of minimum-cost flow problems with separable convex objectives

A well-studied nonlinear extension of the minimum-cost flow problem is to minimize the objective $\sum_{ij\in E} C_{ij}(f_{ij})$ over feasible flows $f$, where on every arc $ij$ of the network, $C_{ij}$ is a convex function. We give a strongly polynomial algorithm for the case when all $C_{ij}$'s are convex quadratic functions, settling an open problem raised e.g. by Hochbaum [1994]. We also give strongly polynomial algorithms for computing market equilibria in Fisher markets with linear utilities and with spending constraint utilities, that can be formulated in this framework (see Shmyrev [2009], Devanur et al. [2011]). For the latter class this resolves an open question raised by Vazirani [2010]. The running time is $O(m^4\log m)$ for quadratic costs, $O(n^4+n^2(m+n\log n)\log n)$ for Fisher's markets with linear utilities and $O(mn^3 +m^2(m+n\log n)\log m)$ for spending constraint utilities. All these algorithms are presented in a common framework that addresses the general problem setting. Whereas it is impossible to give a strongly polynomial algorithm for the general problem even in an approximate sense (see Hochbaum [1994]), we show that assuming the existence of certain black-box oracles, one can give an algorithm using a strongly polynomial number of arithmetic operations and oracle calls only. The particular algorithms can be derived by implementing these oracles in the respective settings

Second best toll and capacity optimisation in network: solution algorithm and policy implications

This paper looks at the first and second-best jointly optimal toll and road capacity investment problems from both policy and technical oriented perspectives. On the technical side, the paper investigates the applicability of the constraint cutting algorithm for solving the second-best problem under elastic demand which is formulated as a bilevel programming problem. The approach is shown to perform well despite several problems encountered by our previous work in Shepherd and Sumalee (2004). The paper then applies the algorithm to a small sized network to investigate the policy implications of the first and second-best cases. This policy analysis demonstrates that the joint first best structure is to invest in the most direct routes while reducing capacities elsewhere. Whilst unrealistic this acts as a useful benchmark. The results also show that certain second best policies can achieve a high proportion of the first best benefits while in general generating a revenue surplus. We also show that unless costs of capacity are known to be low then second best tolls will be affected and so should be analysed in conjunction with investments in the network

Exact Penalization and Necessary Optimality Conditions for Multiobjective Optimization Problems with Equilibrium Constraints

A calmness condition for a general multiobjective optimization problem with equilibrium constraints is proposed. Some exact penalization properties for two classes of multiobjective penalty problems are established and shown to be equivalent to the calmness condition. Subsequently, a Mordukhovich stationary necessary optimality condition based on the exact penalization results is obtained. Moreover, some applications to a multiobjective optimization problem with complementarity constraints and a multiobjective optimization problem with weak vector variational inequality constraints are given

Nonlinear Analysis of Frame Structures based on Augmented Total Potential Energy Minimization

Εθνικό Μετσόβιο Πολυτεχνείο--Μεταπτυχιακή Εργασία. Διεπιστημονικό-Διατμηματικό Πρόγραμμα Μεταπτυχιακών Σπουδών (Δ.Π.Μ.Σ.) "Analysis and Design of Earthquake Resistant Structures

Necessary Conditions in Multiobjective Optimization With Equilibrium Constraints

In this paper we study multiobjective optimization problems with equilibrium constraints (MOECs) described by generalized equations in the form 0 is an element of the set G(x,y) + Q(x,y), where both mappings G and Q are set-valued. Such models particularly arise from certain optimization-related problems governed by variational inequalities and first-order optimality conditions in nondifferentiable programming. We establish verifiable necessary conditions for the general problems under consideration and for their important specifications using modern tools of variational analysis and generalized differentiation. The application of the obtained necessary optimality conditions is illustrated by a numerical example from bilevel programming with convex while nondifferentiable data

A Stackelberg Solution to Joint Optimization Problems: A Case Study of Green Design

AbstractDesign of complex engineered systems often involves optimization of multiple competing problems that are supposed to compromise to arrive at equilibrium optima, entailing a joint optimization problem. This paper reveals the leader-follower decision structure inherent in joint optimization problems. A Stackelberg game solution is formulated to model a leader-follower joint optimization problem as a two-level optimization problem between two decision makers, implicating a mathematical program that contains sub-optimization problems as its constraints. A case study of coffee grinder green design demonstrates the potential of Stackelberg solution to joint optimization of modularity subject with conflicting goals

An algorithm for the global resolution of linear stochastic bilevel programs

The aim of this thesis is to find a technique that allows for the use of decomposition methods known from stochastic programming in the framework of linear stochastic bilevel problems. The uncertainty is modeled as a discrete, finite distribution on some probability space. Two approaches are made, one using the optimal value function of the lower level, whereas the second technique uses the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the lower level. Using the latter approach, an integer-programming based algorithm for the global resolution of these problems is presented and evaluated

Multi-Period Natural Gas Market Modeling - Applications, Stochastic Extensions and Solution Approaches

This dissertation develops deterministic and stochastic multi-period mixed complementarity problems (MCP) for the global natural gas market, as well as solution approaches for large-scale stochastic MCP. The deterministic model is unique in the combination of the level of detail of the actors in the natural gas markets and the transport options, the detailed regional and global coverage, the multi-period approach with endogenous capacity expansions for transportation and storage infrastructure, the seasonal variation in demand and the representation of market power according to Nash-Cournot theory. The model is applied to several scenarios for the natural gas market that cover the formation of a cartel by the members of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, a low availability of unconventional gas in the United States, and cost reductions in long-distance gas transportation. The results provide insights in how different regions are affected by various developments, in terms of production, consumption, traded volumes, prices and profits of market participants. The stochastic MCP is developed and applied to a global natural gas market problem with four scenarios for a time horizon until 2050 with nineteen regions and containing 78,768 variables. The scenarios vary in the possibility of a gas market cartel formation and varying depletion rates of gas reserves in the major gas importing regions. Outcomes for hedging decisions of market participants show some significant shifts in the timing and location of infrastructure investments, thereby affecting local market situations. A first application of Benders decomposition (BD) is presented to solve a large-scale stochastic MCP for the global gas market with many hundreds of first-stage capacity expansion variables and market players exerting various levels of market power. The largest problem solved successfully using BD contained 47,373 variables of which 763 first-stage variables, however using BD did not result in shorter solution times relative to solving the extensive-forms. Larger problems, up to 117,481 variables, were solved in extensive-form, but not when applying BD due to numerical issues. It is discussed how BD could significantly reduce the solution time of large-scale stochastic models, but various challenges remain and more research is needed to assess the potential of Benders decomposition for solving large-scale stochastic MCP