Advancing Hardware Security Using Polymorphic and Stochastic Spin-Hall Effect Devices

Protecting intellectual property (IP) in electronic circuits has become a serious challenge in recent years. Logic locking/encryption and layout camouflaging are two prominent techniques for IP protection. Most existing approaches, however, particularly those focused on CMOS integration, incur excessive design overheads resulting from their need for additional circuit structures or device-level modifications. This work leverages the innate polymorphism of an emerging spin-based device, called the giant spin-Hall effect (GSHE) switch, to simultaneously enable locking and camouflaging within a single instance. Using the GSHE switch, we propose a powerful primitive that enables cloaking all the 16 Boolean functions possible for two inputs. We conduct a comprehensive study using state-of-the-art Boolean satisfiability (SAT) attacks to demonstrate the superior resilience of the proposed primitive in comparison to several others in the literature. While we tailor the primitive for deterministic computation, it can readily support stochastic computation; we argue that stochastic behavior can break most, if not all, existing SAT attacks. Finally, we discuss the resilience of the primitive against various side-channel attacks as well as invasive monitoring at runtime, which are arguably even more concerning threats than SAT attacks.Comment: Published in Proc. Design, Automation and Test in Europe (DATE) 201

Design and Code Optimization for Systems with Next-generation Racetrack Memories

With the rise of computationally expensive application domains such as machine learning, genomics, and fluids simulation, the quest for performance and energy-efficient computing has gained unprecedented momentum. The significant increase in computing and memory devices in modern systems has resulted in an unsustainable surge in energy consumption, a substantial portion of which is attributed to the memory system. The scaling of conventional memory technologies and their suitability for the next-generation system is also questionable. This has led to the emergence and rise of nonvolatile memory ( NVM ) technologies. Today, in different development stages, several NVM technologies are competing for their rapid access to the market. Racetrack memory ( RTM ) is one such nonvolatile memory technology that promises SRAM -comparable latency, reduced energy consumption, and unprecedented density compared to other technologies. However, racetrack memory ( RTM ) is sequential in nature, i.e., data in an RTM cell needs to be shifted to an access port before it can be accessed. These shift operations incur performance and energy penalties. An ideal RTM , requiring at most one shift per access, can easily outperform SRAM . However, in the worst-cast shifting scenario, RTM can be an order of magnitude slower than SRAM . This thesis presents an overview of the RTM device physics, its evolution, strengths and challenges, and its application in the memory subsystem. We develop tools that allow the programmability and modeling of RTM -based systems. For shifts minimization, we propose a set of techniques including optimal, near-optimal, and evolutionary algorithms for efficient scalar and instruction placement in RTMs . For array accesses, we explore schedule and layout transformations that eliminate the longer overhead shifts in RTMs . We present an automatic compilation framework that analyzes static control flow programs and transforms the loop traversal order and memory layout to maximize accesses to consecutive RTM locations and minimize shifts. We develop a simulation framework called RTSim that models various RTM parameters and enables accurate architectural level simulation. Finally, to demonstrate the RTM potential in non-Von-Neumann in-memory computing paradigms, we exploit its device attributes to implement logic and arithmetic operations. As a concrete use-case, we implement an entire hyperdimensional computing framework in RTM to accelerate the language recognition problem. Our evaluation shows considerable performance and energy improvements compared to conventional Von-Neumann models and state-of-the-art accelerators

Enabling Reliable, Efficient, and Secure Computing for Energy Harvesting Powered IoT Devices

Energy harvesting is one of the most promising techniques to power devices for future generation IoT. While energy harvesting does not have longevity, safety, and recharging concerns like traditional batteries, its instability brings a new challenge to the embedded systems: the energy harvested from environment is usually weak and intermittent. With traditional CMOS based technology, whenever the power is off, the computation has to start from the very beginning. Compared with existing CMOS based memory devices, emerging non-volatile memory devices such as PCM and STT-RAM, have the benefits of sustaining the data even when there is no power. By checkpointing the processor's volatile state to non-volatile memory, a program can resume its execution immediately after power comes back on again instead of restarting from the very beginning with checkpointing techniques. However, checkpointing is not sufficient for energy harvesting systems. First, the program execution resumed from the last checkpoint might not execute correctly and causes inconsistency problem to the system. This problem is due to the inconsistency between volatile system state and non-volatile system state during checkpointing. Second, the process of checkpointing consumes a considerable amount of energy and time due to the slow and energy-consuming write operation of non-volatile memory. Finally, connecting to the internet poses many security issues to energy harvesting IoT devices. Traditional data encryption methods are both energy and time consuming which do not fit the resource constrained IoT devices. Therefore, a light-weight encryption method is in urgent need for securing IoT devices. Targeting those three challenges, this dissertation proposes three techniques to enable reliable, efficient, and secure computing in energy harvesting IoT devices. First, a consistency-aware checkpointing technique is proposed to avoid inconsistency errors generated from the inconsistency between volatile state and non-volatile state. Second, checkpoint aware hybrid cache architecture is proposed to guarantee reliable checkpointing while maintaining a low checkpointing overhead from cache. Finally, to ensure the security of energy harvesting IoT devices, an energy-efficient in-memory encryption implementation for protecting the IoT device is proposed which can quickly encrypts the data in non-volatile memory and protect the embedded system physical and on-line attacks

Gestión de jerarquías de memoria híbridas a nivel de sistema

Tesis inédita de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Informática, Departamento de Arquitectura de Computadoras y Automática y de Ku Leuven, Arenberg Doctoral School, Faculty of Engineering Science, leída el 11/05/2017.In electronics and computer science, the term ‘memory’ generally refers to devices that are used to store information that we use in various appliances ranging from our PCs to all hand-held devices, smart appliances etc. Primary/main memory is used for storage systems that function at a high speed (i.e. RAM). The primary memory is often associated with addressable semiconductor memory, i.e. integrated circuits consisting of silicon-based transistors, used for example as primary memory but also other purposes in computers and other digital electronic devices. The secondary/auxiliary memory, in comparison provides program and data storage that is slower to access but offers larger capacity. Examples include external hard drives, portable flash drives, CDs, and DVDs. These devices and media must be either plugged in or inserted into a computer in order to be accessed by the system. Since secondary storage technology is not always connected to the computer, it is commonly used for backing up data. The term storage is often used to describe secondary memory. Secondary memory stores a large amount of data at lesser cost per byte than primary memory; this makes secondary storage about two orders of magnitude less expensive than primary storage. There are two main types of semiconductor memory: volatile and nonvolatile. Examples of non-volatile memory are ‘Flash’ memory (sometimes used as secondary, sometimes primary computer memory) and ROM/PROM/EPROM/EEPROM memory (used for firmware such as boot programs). Examples of volatile memory are primary memory (typically dynamic RAM, DRAM), and fast CPU cache memory (typically static RAM, SRAM, which is fast but energy-consuming and offer lower memory capacity per are a unit than DRAM). Non-volatile memory technologies in Si-based electronics date back to the 1990s. Flash memory is widely used in consumer electronic products such as cellphones and music players and NAND Flash-based solid-state disks (SSDs) are increasingly displacing hard disk drives as the primary storage device in laptops, desktops, and even data centers. The integration limit of Flash memories is approaching, and many new types of memory to replace conventional Flash memories have been proposed. The rapid increase of leakage currents in Silicon CMOS transistors with scaling poses a big challenge for the integration of SRAM memories. There is also the case of susceptibility to read/write failure with low power schemes. As a result of this, over the past decade, there has been an extensive pooling of time, resources and effort towards developing emerging memory technologies like Resistive RAM (ReRAM/RRAM), STT-MRAM, Domain Wall Memory and Phase Change Memory(PRAM). Emerging non-volatile memory technologies promise new memories to store more data at less cost than the expensive-to build silicon chips used by popular consumer gadgets including digital cameras, cell phones and portable music players. These new memory technologies combine the speed of static random-access memory (SRAM), the density of dynamic random-access memory (DRAM), and the non-volatility of Flash memory and so become very attractive as another possibility for future memory hierarchies. The research and information on these Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) technologies has matured over the last decade. These NVMs are now being explored thoroughly nowadays as viable replacements for conventional SRAM based memories even for the higher levels of the memory hierarchy. Many other new classes of emerging memory technologies such as transparent and plastic, three-dimensional(3-D), and quantum dot memory technologies have also gained tremendous popularity in recent years...En el campo de la informática, el término ‘memoria’ se refiere generalmente a dispositivos que son usados para almacenar información que posteriormente será usada en diversos dispositivos, desde computadoras personales (PC), móviles, dispositivos inteligentes, etc. La memoria principal del sistema se utiliza para almacenar los datos e instrucciones de los procesos que se encuentre en ejecución, por lo que se requiere que funcionen a alta velocidad (por ejemplo, DRAM). La memoria principal está implementada habitualmente mediante memorias semiconductoras direccionables, siendo DRAM y SRAM los principales exponentes. Por otro lado, la memoria auxiliar o secundaria proporciona almacenaje(para ficheros, por ejemplo); es más lenta pero ofrece una mayor capacidad. Ejemplos típicos de memoria secundaria son discos duros, memorias flash portables, CDs y DVDs. Debido a que estos dispositivos no necesitan estar conectados a la computadora de forma permanente, son muy utilizados para almacenar copias de seguridad. La memoria secundaria almacena una gran cantidad de datos aun coste menor por bit que la memoria principal, siendo habitualmente dos órdenes de magnitud más barata que la memoria primaria. Existen dos tipos de memorias de tipo semiconductor: volátiles y no volátiles. Ejemplos de memorias no volátiles son las memorias Flash (algunas veces usadas como memoria secundaria y otras veces como memoria principal) y memorias ROM/PROM/EPROM/EEPROM (usadas para firmware como programas de arranque). Ejemplos de memoria volátil son las memorias DRAM (RAM dinámica), actualmente la opción predominante a la hora de implementar la memoria principal, y las memorias SRAM (RAM estática) más rápida y costosa, utilizada para los diferentes niveles de cache. Las tecnologías de memorias no volátiles basadas en electrónica de silicio se remontan a la década de1990. Una variante de memoria de almacenaje por carga denominada como memoria Flash es mundialmente usada en productos electrónicos de consumo como telefonía móvil y reproductores de música mientras NAND Flash solid state disks(SSDs) están progresivamente desplazando a los dispositivos de disco duro como principal unidad de almacenamiento en computadoras portátiles, de escritorio e incluso en centros de datos. En la actualidad, hay varios factores que amenazan la actual predominancia de memorias semiconductoras basadas en cargas (capacitivas). Por un lado, se está alcanzando el límite de integración de las memorias Flash, lo que compromete su escalado en el medio plazo. Por otra parte, el fuerte incremento de las corrientes de fuga de los transistores de silicio CMOS actuales, supone un enorme desafío para la integración de memorias SRAM. Asimismo, estas memorias son cada vez más susceptibles a fallos de lectura/escritura en diseños de bajo consumo. Como resultado de estos problemas, que se agravan con cada nueva generación tecnológica, en los últimos años se han intensificado los esfuerzos para desarrollar nuevas tecnologías que reemplacen o al menos complementen a las actuales. Los transistores de efecto campo eléctrico ferroso (FeFET en sus siglas en inglés) se consideran una de las alternativas más prometedores para sustituir tanto a Flash (por su mayor densidad) como a DRAM (por su mayor velocidad), pero aún está en una fase muy inicial de su desarrollo. Hay otras tecnologías algo más maduras, en el ámbito de las memorias RAM resistivas, entre las que cabe destacar ReRAM (o RRAM), STT-RAM, Domain Wall Memory y Phase Change Memory (PRAM)...Depto. de Arquitectura de Computadores y AutomáticaFac. de InformáticaTRUEunpu

Provably Trustworthy and Secure Hardware Design with Low Overhead

Due to the globalization of IC design in the semiconductor industry and outsourcing of chip manufacturing, 3PIPs become vulnerable to IP piracy, reverse engineering, counterfeit IC, and hardware Trojans. To thwart such attacks, ICs can be protected using logic encryption techniques. However, strong resilient techniques incur significant overheads. SCAs further complicate matters by introducing potential attacks post-fabrication. One of the most severe SCAs is PA attacks, in which an attacker can observe the power variations of the device and analyze them to extract the secret key. PA attacks can be mitigated via adding large extra hardware; however, the overheads of such solutions can render them impractical, especially when there are power and area constraints. In our first approach, we present two techniques to prevent normal attacks. The first one is based on inserting MUX equal to half/full of the output bit number. In the second technique, we first design PLGs using SiNW FETs and then replace some logic gates in the original design with their SiNW FETs-based PLGs counterparts. In our second approach, we use SiNW FETs to produce obfuscated ICs that are resistant to advanced reverse engineering attacks. Our method is based on designing a small block, whose output is untraceable, namely URSAT. Since URSAT may not offer very strong resilience against the combined AppSAT-removal attack, S-URSAT is achieved using only CMOS-logic gates, and this increases the security level of the design to robustly thwart all existing attacks. In our third topic, we present the usage of ASLD to produce secure and resilient circuits that withstand IC attacks (during the fabrication) and PA attacks (after fabrication). First, we show that ASLD has unique features that can be used to prevent PA and IC attacks. In our three topics, we evaluate each design based on performance overheads and security guarantees