An Optimal Online Method of Selecting Source Policies for Reinforcement Learning

Transfer learning significantly accelerates the reinforcement learning process by exploiting relevant knowledge from previous experiences. The problem of optimally selecting source policies during the learning process is of great importance yet challenging. There has been little theoretical analysis of this problem. In this paper, we develop an optimal online method to select source policies for reinforcement learning. This method formulates online source policy selection as a multi-armed bandit problem and augments Q-learning with policy reuse. We provide theoretical guarantees of the optimal selection process and convergence to the optimal policy. In addition, we conduct experiments on a grid-based robot navigation domain to demonstrate its efficiency and robustness by comparing to the state-of-the-art transfer learning method

Solving Large Extensive-Form Games with Strategy Constraints

Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many situations, however, we would like to constrain the set of possible strategies. For example, constraints are a natural way to model limited resources, risk mitigation, safety, consistency with past observations of behavior, or other secondary objectives for an agent. In small games, optimal strategies under linear constraints can be found by solving a linear program; however, state-of-the-art algorithms for solving large games cannot handle general constraints. In this work we introduce a generalized form of Counterfactual Regret Minimization that provably finds optimal strategies under any feasible set of convex constraints. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm for finding strategies that mitigate risk in security games, and for opponent modeling in poker games when given only partial observations of private information.Comment: Appeared in AAAI 201