977 research outputs found

    Efficient computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion games

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    Congestion games constitute an important class of games in which computing an exact or even approximate pure Nash equilibrium is in general {\sf PLS}-complete. We present a surprisingly simple polynomial-time algorithm that computes O(1)-approximate Nash equilibria in these games. In particular, for congestion games with linear latency functions, our algorithm computes (2+ϵ)(2+\epsilon)-approximate pure Nash equilibria in time polynomial in the number of players, the number of resources and 1/ϵ1/\epsilon. It also applies to games with polynomial latency functions with constant maximum degree dd; there, the approximation guarantee is dO(d)d^{O(d)}. The algorithm essentially identifies a polynomially long sequence of best-response moves that lead to an approximate equilibrium; the existence of such short sequences is interesting in itself. These are the first positive algorithmic results for approximate equilibria in non-symmetric congestion games. We strengthen them further by proving that, for congestion games that deviate from our mild assumptions, computing ρ\rho-approximate equilibria is {\sf PLS}-complete for any polynomial-time computable ρ\rho

    Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure

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    We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, the existence of (pure Nash) equilibria is guaranteed by potential function arguments. Unfortunately, this proof of existence is inefficient and computing equilibria is such games is a {\sf PLS}-hard problem. The situation gets worse when superlinear latency functions come into play; in this case, the Nash dynamics of the game may contain cycles and equilibria may not even exist. Given these obstacles, we consider approximate equilibria as alternative solution concepts. Do such equilibria exist? And if so, can we compute them efficiently? We provide positive answers to both questions for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions by exploiting an "approximation" of such games by a new class of potential games that we call Ψ\Psi-games. This allows us to show that these games have d!d!-approximate equilibria, where dd is the maximum degree of the latency functions. Our main technical contribution is an efficient algorithm for computing O(1)-approximate equilibria when dd is a constant. For games with linear latency functions, the approximation guarantee is 3+52+O(γ)\frac{3+\sqrt{5}}{2}+O(\gamma) for arbitrarily small γ>0\gamma>0; for latency functions with maximum degree d2d\geq 2, it is d2d+o(d)d^{2d+o(d)}. The running time is polynomial in the number of bits in the representation of the game and 1/γ1/\gamma. As a byproduct of our techniques, we also show the following structural statement for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions of maximum degree d2d\geq 2: polynomially-long sequences of best-response moves from any initial state to a dO(d2)d^{O(d^2)}-approximate equilibrium exist and can be efficiently identified in such games as long as dd is constant.Comment: 31 page

    Computing Approximate Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games via Best-Responses

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    We present a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for computing dd+o(d)d^{d+o(d)}-approximate (pure) Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games with polynomial cost functions of degree at most dd. This is an exponential improvement of the approximation factor with respect to the previously best deterministic algorithm. An appealing additional feature of our algorithm is that it uses only best-improvement steps in the actual game, as opposed to earlier approaches that first had to transform the game itself. Our algorithm is an adaptation of the seminal algorithm by Caragiannis et al. [FOCS'11, TEAC 2015], but we utilize an approximate potential function directly on the original game instead of an exact one on a modified game. A critical component of our analysis, which is of independent interest, is the derivation of a novel bound of [d/W(d/ρ)]d+1[d/\mathcal{W}(d/\rho)]^{d+1} for the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of ρ\rho-approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games, where W\mathcal{W} is the Lambert-W function. More specifically, we show that this PoA is exactly equal to Φd,ρd+1\Phi_{d,\rho}^{d+1}, where Φd,ρ\Phi_{d,\rho} is the unique positive solution of the equation ρ(x+1)d=xd+1\rho (x+1)^d=x^{d+1}. Our upper bound is derived via a smoothness-like argument, and thus holds even for mixed Nash and correlated equilibria, while our lower bound is simple enough to apply even to singleton congestion games

    On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games

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    In \emph{bandwidth allocation games} (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists of various demands on different resources. The player's utility is at most the sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied. Every resource has a limited capacity and if it is exceeded by the total demand, it has to be split between the players. Since these games generally do not have pure Nash equilibria, we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria, in which no player can improve her utility by more than some fixed factor α\alpha through unilateral strategy changes. There is a threshold αδ\alpha_\delta (where δ\delta is a parameter that limits the demand of each player on a specific resource) such that α\alpha-approximate pure Nash equilibria always exist for ααδ\alpha \geq \alpha_\delta, but not for α<αδ\alpha < \alpha_\delta. We give both upper and lower bounds on this threshold αδ\alpha_\delta and show that the corresponding decision problem is NP{\sf NP}-hard. We also show that the α\alpha-approximate price of anarchy for BAGs is α+1\alpha+1. For a restricted version of the game, where demands of players only differ slightly from each other (e.g. symmetric games), we show that approximate Nash equilibria can be reached (and thus also be computed) in polynomial time using the best-response dynamic. Finally, we show that a broader class of utility-maximization games (which includes BAGs) converges quickly towards states whose social welfare is close to the optimum

    Privacy and Truthful Equilibrium Selection for Aggregative Games

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    We study a very general class of games --- multi-dimensional aggregative games --- which in particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted congestion games. For any such game that is also large, we solve the equilibrium selection problem in a strong sense. In particular, we give an efficient weak mediator: a mechanism which has only the power to listen to reported types and provide non-binding suggested actions, such that (a) it is an asymptotic Nash equilibrium for every player to truthfully report their type to the mediator, and then follow its suggested action; and (b) that when players do so, they end up coordinating on a particular asymptotic pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced complete information game. In fact, truthful reporting is an ex-post Nash equilibrium of the mediated game, so our solution applies even in settings of incomplete information, and even when player types are arbitrary or worst-case (i.e. not drawn from a common prior). We achieve this by giving an efficient differentially private algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium in such games. The rates of convergence to equilibrium in all of our results are inverse polynomial in the number of players nn. We also apply our main results to a multi-dimensional market game. Our results can be viewed as giving, for a rich class of games, a more robust version of the Revelation Principle, in that we work with weaker informational assumptions (no common prior), yet provide a stronger solution concept (ex-post Nash versus Bayes Nash equilibrium). In comparison to previous work, our main conceptual contribution is showing that weak mediators are a game theoretic object that exist in a wide variety of games -- previously, they were only known to exist in traffic routing games

    On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Anonymous Games

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    We show that the problem of finding an {\epsilon}-approximate Nash equilibrium in an anonymous game with seven pure strategies is complete in PPAD, when the approximation parameter {\epsilon} is exponentially small in the number of players.Comment: full versio

    On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria of Action-Graph Games

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    We consider the problem of computing Nash Equilibria of action-graph games (AGGs). AGGs, introduced by Bhat and Leyton-Brown, is a succinct representation of games that encapsulates both "local" dependencies as in graphical games, and partial indifference to other agents' identities as in anonymous games, which occur in many natural settings. This is achieved by specifying a graph on the set of actions, so that the payoff of an agent for selecting a strategy depends only on the number of agents playing each of the neighboring strategies in the action graph. We present a Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme for computing mixed Nash equilibria of AGGs with constant treewidth and a constant number of agent types (and an arbitrary number of strategies), together with hardness results for the cases when either the treewidth or the number of agent types is unconstrained. In particular, we show that even if the action graph is a tree, but the number of agent-types is unconstrained, it is NP-complete to decide the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and PPAD-complete to compute a mixed Nash equilibrium (even an approximate one); similarly for symmetric AGGs (all agents belong to a single type), if we allow arbitrary treewidth. These hardness results suggest that, in some sense, our PTAS is as strong of a positive result as one can expect
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