34 research outputs found
KeyForge: Mitigating Email Breaches with Forward-Forgeable Signatures
Email breaches are commonplace, and they expose a wealth of personal,
business, and political data that may have devastating consequences. The
current email system allows any attacker who gains access to your email to
prove the authenticity of the stolen messages to third parties -- a property
arising from a necessary anti-spam / anti-spoofing protocol called DKIM. This
exacerbates the problem of email breaches by greatly increasing the potential
for attackers to damage the users' reputation, blackmail them, or sell the
stolen information to third parties.
In this paper, we introduce "non-attributable email", which guarantees that a
wide class of adversaries are unable to convince any third party of the
authenticity of stolen emails. We formally define non-attributability, and
present two practical system proposals -- KeyForge and TimeForge -- that
provably achieve non-attributability while maintaining the important protection
against spam and spoofing that is currently provided by DKIM. Moreover, we
implement KeyForge and demonstrate that that scheme is practical, achieving
competitive verification and signing speed while also requiring 42% less
bandwidth per email than RSA2048
Short Paper: On Deployment of DNS-based Security Enhancements
Although the Domain Name System (DNS) was designed as a naming system, its
features have made it appealing to repurpose it for the deployment of novel
systems. One important class of such systems are security enhancements, and
this work sheds light on their deployment. We show the characteristics of these
solutions and measure reliability of DNS in these applications. We investigate
the compatibility of these solutions with the Tor network, signal necessary
changes, and report on surprising drawbacks in Tor's DNS resolution.Comment: Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC) 201
Towards sender accountability on email infrastructure using sender identity and reputation management
Email Infrastructure has grown exponentially, since the early days of ARPANET, to support millions of users. However, the extensive adoption of the original open design has led to security implications. As claimed in recent statistics, about 95% of the emails are unsolicited and place phishing losses at $500 million.
Even though, current email-filtering technologies weed out most of the incoming spam, there is a need to hold senders accountable for their email behavior. Without sender accountability, there is no way to hold senders responsible for their online email behavior. Holding senders accountable helps identify senders who propagate spam, and possibly reduce the spam transmitted.
Holding a sender accountable for the senderâs online activity requires: first, the senderâs identification; and second, maintenance of its historical email activity. Today, widely deployed sender identity techniques counteract email spoofing by authenticating the sender's email server to the receiver organizations. Unfortunately, these techniques are not as effective as originally intended as: a) the senders create their own identity; b) spam-propagating senders have adopted these technologies.
Knowledge of the sender's identity alone does not guarantee its adherence to email best practices. Towards establishing sender accountability, this dissertation proposes RepuScore, a collaborative reputation framework that allows participating receiver organizations to share sender's behavioral patterns. In addition, this dissertation also explores Privilege Messaging (P-Messaging) framework, a fine-granular sender- authorization framework where each sender holds a set of credentials (privileges) to send an email; the receivers verify the attached credentials before accepting the emails. P- Messaging attempts to maintain trust among organizations with the help of a central authority, which periodically verifies the participating organization's adherence to good email practices.
To create a long-standing history, participating organizations locally collect information about the senders - from users or existing spam classification mechanisms that are submitted to a central RepuScore authority - to compute a global reputation summary. This dissertation discusses the distributed architecture and the algorithms designed to compute reputation based on the sender's a) spam rate (RepuScore) or b) spam rate and email volume (Volume-Enhanced RepuScore).
Additionally, the dissertation shares findings from experiments based on a RepuScore prototype using a) simulation logs; and b) deployed SpamAssassin plug-in since 10/9/2007 at three organizations. Based on the deployment, reputation for about 90,000 sender identities and about 12 million IP addresses as of Feb 2009 have been computed. We note that email classification using RepuScore is 97.8% accurate.
Finally, this dissertation discusses future directions for Distributed RepuScore that allows organizations to maintain their personal reputation view to be shared among trusted peers. Distributed RepuScore enables a global reputation view while holding senders accountable at each organization instead of deploying it at a central authority
Forward Pass: On the Security Implications of Email Forwarding Mechanism and Policy
The critical role played by email has led to a range of extension protocols
(e.g., SPF, DKIM, DMARC) designed to protect against the spoofing of email
sender domains. These protocols are complex as is, but are further complicated
by automated email forwarding -- used by individual users to manage multiple
accounts and by mailing lists to redistribute messages. In this paper, we
explore how such email forwarding and its implementations can break the
implicit assumptions in widely deployed anti-spoofing protocols. Using
large-scale empirical measurements of 20 email forwarding services (16 leading
email providers and four popular mailing list services), we identify a range of
security issues rooted in forwarding behavior and show how they can be combined
to reliably evade existing anti-spoofing controls. We show how this allows
attackers to not only deliver spoofed email messages to prominent email
providers (e.g., Gmail, Microsoft Outlook, and Zoho), but also reliably spoof
email on behalf of tens of thousands of popular domains including sensitive
domains used by organizations in government (e.g., state.gov), finance (e.g.,
transunion.com), law (e.g., perkinscoie.com) and news (e.g.,
washingtonpost.com) among others
Forward Pass: On the Security Implications of Email Forwarding Mechanism and Policy
The critical role played by email has led to a range of extension protocols (e.g., SPF, DKIM, DMARC) designed to protect against the spoofing of email sender domains. These protocols are complex as is, but are further complicated by automated email forwarding â used by individual users to manage multiple accounts and by mailing lists to redistribute messages. In this paper, we explore how such email forwarding and its implementations can break the implicit assumptions in widely deployed anti-spoofing protocols. Using large-scale empirical measurements of 20 email forwarding services (16 leading email providers and four popular mailing list services), we identify a range of security issues rooted in forwarding behavior and show how they can be combined to reliably evade existing anti-spoofing controls. We further show how these issues allow attackers to not only deliver spoofed email messages to prominent email providers (e.g., Gmail, Microsoft Outlook, and Zoho), but also reliably spoof email on behalf of tens of thousands of popular domains including sensitive domains used by organizations in government (e.g., state.gov), finance (e.g., transunion.com), law (e.g., perkinscoie.com)and news (e.g., washingtonpost.com) among others
DANE Trusted Email for Supply Chain Management
Supply chain management is critically dependent on trusted email mechanisms that address forgery, confidentiality, and sender authenticity. The IETF protocol âDomain Authentication of Named Entitiesâ (DANE) described in this paper has been extended from its initial goal of providing TLS web site validation to also offer a foundation for globally scalable and interoperable email security. Widespread deployment of DANE will require more than raw technology standards, however. Workflow automation mechanisms will need to emerge in order to simplify the publishing and retrieval of cryptographic credentials that are applicable for general audiences. Security policy enforcement will also need to be addressed. This paper gives a descriptive tutorial of trusted email technologies, shows how DANE solves key distribution logistics, and then suggests desirable automation components that could accelerate deployment of DANE-based trusted email. Pilot deployments are briefly described