Do you trust to get trust? A study of trust reciprocity behaviors and reciprocal trust prediction

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Trust me! Examining how group membership and self-disclosure affects trust perceptions between strangers

M.A.M.A. Thesis. University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa 201

The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories

This paper surveys recent experimental and field evidence on the impact of concerns for fairness, reciprocity and altruism on economic decision making. It also reviews some new theoretical attempts to model the observed behavior.Behavioural Economics; Other-regarding Preferences; Fairness; Reciprocity; Altruism; Experiments; Incentives; Contracts; Competition

The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories

Chapter written for the Handbook of Reciprocity, Gift-Giving and AltruismBehavioural Economics; Other-regarding Preferences; Fairness; Reciprocity; Altruism; Experiments; Incentives; Contracts; Competition

Neural Substrates of Decision-Making in Economic Games

In economic experiments decisions often differ from game-theoretic predictions. Why are people generous in one-shot ultimatum games with strangers? Is there a benefit to generosity toward strangers? Research on the neural substrates of decisions suggests that some choices are hormone-dependent. By artificially stimulating subjects with neuroactive hormones, we can identify which hormones and brain regions participate in decisionmaking, to what degree and in what direction. Can a hormone make a person generous while another stingy? In this paper, two laboratory experiments are described using the hormones oxytocin (OT) and arginine vasopressin (AVP). Concentrations of these hormones in the brain continuously change in response to external stimuli. OT enhances trust (Michael Kosfeld et al. 2005b), reduce fear from strangers (C. Sue Carter 1998), and has anti-anxiety effects (Kerstin Uvnäs-Moberg, Maria Peterson 2005). AVP enhances attachment and bonding with kin in monogamous male mammals (Jennifer N. Ferguson et al. 2002) and increases reactive aggression (C. Sue Carter 2007). Dysfunctions of OT and/or AVP reception have been associated with autism (Miranda M. Lim et al. 2005). In Chapter One I review past experiments with the ultimatum (UG) and dictator (DG) games and visit some of the major results in the literature. In Chapter Two I present the results of my laboratory experiment where I examine why people are generous in one-shot economic games with strangers. I hypothesize that oxytocin would enhance generosity in the UG. Players in the OT group were much more generous than those in the placebo—OT offers in the UG were 80% higher than offers on placebo. Enhanced generosity was not due to altruism as there was no effect on DG offers. This implies that other-regarding preferences are at play in the amount of money sent but only in a reciprocal context. The third chapter presents an experiment on punishment. I hypothesized that AVP would increase rejections and stinginess in the UG and TG. Results show that AVP affects rejections and stinginess in small groups but not in large ones. Chapter Four contains the summary of future research suggestions.Oxytocin; Vasopressin; ultimatum game; dictator game; trust game; generosity; altruism

A VIEW INTO RECIPROCITY: LITERATURE REVIEW, MEASUREMENT DESIGN, AND EXPERIMENT

The purpose of this paper is to discuss reciprocity and the role it plays in helping us understand interactions between parties in accounting settings. The concept of reciprocity states that individuals will reward kind behaviors and punish unkind behaviors. (Fisher et al. 2015; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Fehr and Gächter 1997). When trying to trace the origins of the theory of reciprocity, it is useful to track the initial constructs on which it is built from various literary sources. This process contributes to developing an understanding of how reciprocity is used to explain behaviors in the workplace. The notion of reciprocity has a long history and is defined in many iterations of social literature dating back to ancient philosophers. Roman politician Cicero, for example, stated: “there is no duty more indispensable than that of returning a kindness” and “all men distrust one forgetful of a benefit” (Gouldner 1960). This early philosophical sentiment exemplifies the integral role positive reciprocity plays in society and the potential avarice an individual may encounter when not returning positive actions with displays of positive reciprocity. Through this review, I gather literature that builds on the concept of reciprocity. I organize commonly found themes and organize settings previously used to focus on the multiple constructs to build upon reciprocity

Conversational AI Agents: Investigating AI-Specific Characteristics that Induce Anthropomorphism and Trust in Human-AI Interaction

The investment in AI agents has steadily increased over the past few years, yet the adoption of these agents has been uneven. Industry reports show that the majority of people do not trust AI agents with important tasks. While the existing IS theories explain users’ trust in IT artifacts, several new studies have raised doubts about the applicability of current theories in the context of AI agents. At first glance, an AI agent might seem like any other technological artifact. However, a more in-depth assessment exposes some fundamental characteristics that make AI agents different from previous IT artifacts. The aim of this dissertation, therefore, is to identify the AI-specific characteristics and behaviors that hinder and contribute to trust and distrust, thereby shaping users’ behavior in human-AI interaction. Using a custom-developed conversational AI agent, this dissertation extends the human-AI literature by introducing and empirically testing six new constructs, namely, AI indeterminacy, task fulfillment indeterminacy, verbal indeterminacy, AI inheritability, AI trainability, and AI freewill

Building Social Trust : A Human Capital Approach

Much evidence suggests individuals differ in their predisposition to cooperate, which is essentially a component of human capital. This paper examines the role of individual cooperative tendencies and their interactions with institutions in generating social trust; it also endogenizes cooperative tendencies using a human capital investment model. Multiple equilibria and inefficiencies exist due to positive externalities. An innovative finding is that, when institutions are more effective in punishing defecting behaviors, more people invest in cooperative tendencies and hence the endogenous social trust is higher, though the equilibrium cooperative tendencies are lower. This paper provides a plausible explanation for many empirical and experimental results.Human Capital, human capital investment model, endogenous social trust, cooperative tendencies

Building Social Trust: A Human Capital Approach

Much evidence suggests individuals differ in their predisposition to cooperate, which is essentially a component of human capital. This paper examines the role of individual cooperative tendencies and their interactions with institutions in generating social trust; it also endogenizes cooperative tendencies using a human capital investment model. Multiple equilibria and ineffciencies exist due to positive externalities. An innovative fi?nding is that, when institutions are more e¤ective in punishing defecting behaviors, more people invest in cooperative tendencies and hence the endogenous social trust is higher, though the equilibrium cooperative tendencies are lower. This paper provides a plausible explanation for many empirical and experimental results

Social Preferences and Competition

There is a general presumption that social preferences can be ignored if markets are competitive. Market experiments (Smith 1962) and recent theoretical results (Dufwenberg et al. 2008) suggest that competition forces people to behave as if they were purely self-interested. We qualify this view. Social preferences are irrelevant if and only if two conditions are met: separability of preferences and completeness of contracts. These conditions are often plausible, but they fail to hold when uncertainty is important (financial markets) or when incomplete contracts are traded (labor markets). Social preferences can explain many of the anomalies frequently observed on these markets.Social preferences; competition; separability; incomplete contracts; asset markets; labor markets