The Management of the Industrial Maintenance at the International Level (I)

When defining a maintenance policy, it must be held in mind the fact that there isn’t such a thing like “good maintenance policy” in itself; instead, for each industrial equipment should be adapted a particular maintenance method, coming to a technical-economic compromise through its products, through its market, its equipments, its people, the managers’ psychology, the organizational culture and, as a consequence, the industrial maintenance will be different. The present article will pursue to highlight the position of the maintenance activity having in mind the imperatives imposed to this activity, the maintenance methods applied at the international level and the methods that can be applied in our country.maintenance mission; Total Productive Maintenance (TMP); corrective maintenance; systematic preventive maintenance; conditional preventive maintenance.

On the role of Prognostics and Health Management in advanced maintenance systems

The advanced use of the Information and Communication Technologies is evolving the way that systems are managed and maintained. A great number of techniques and methods have emerged in the light of these advances allowing to have an accurate and knowledge about the systems’ condition evolution and remaining useful life. The advances are recognized as outcomes of an innovative discipline, nowadays discussed under the term of Prognostics and Health Management (PHM). In order to analyze how maintenance will change by using PHM, a conceptual model is proposed built upon three views. The model highlights: (i) how PHM may impact the definition of maintenance policies; (ii) how PHM fits within the Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) and (iii) how PHM can be integrated into Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) programs. The conceptual model is the research finding of this review note and helps to discuss the role of PHM in advanced maintenance systems.EU Framework Programme Horizon 2020, 645733 - Sustain-Owner - H2020-MSCA-RISE-201

Bowtie models as preventive models in maritime safety

Aquest treball ha sorgit d’una proposta del Dr. Rodrigo de Larrucea que ha acabat de publicar un llibre ambiciós sobre Seguretat Marítima. Com ell mateix diu, el tema “excedeix amb molt les potencialitats de l’autor”, així que en el meu cas això és més cert. Es pot aspirar, però, a fer una modesta contribució a l’estudi i difusió de la seguretat de la cultura marítima, que només apareix a les notícies quan tenen lloc desastres molt puntuals. En qualsevol cas, el professor em va proposar que em centrés en els Bowtie Models, models en corbatí, que integren l’arbre de causes y el de conseqüències (en anglès el Fault Tree Analysis, FTA, i l’Event Tree Analysis, ETA). Certament, existeixen altres metodologies i aproximacions (i en el seu llibre en presenta vàries, resumides), però per la seva senzillesa conceptual i possibilitat de generalització i integració dels resultats era una bona aposta. Així, després d’una fase de meditació i recopilació de informació, em vaig decidir a presentar un model en corbatí molt general on caben les principals causes d’accidents (factores ambientals, error humà i fallada mecànica), comptant també que pot existir una combinació de causes. De tota manera, a l’hora d’explotar aquest model existeix la gran dificultat de donar una probabilitat de ocurrència, un nombre entre 0 i 1, a cada branca. Normalment les probabilitats d’ocurrència són petites i degut a això difícils d’estimar. Cada accident és diferent, de grans catàstrofes n’hi ha poques, i cada accident ja és estudiat de manera exhaustiva (més exhaustiva quan més greu és). Un altre factor que dificulta l’estima de la probabilitat de fallada és l’evolució constant del món marítim, tant des del punt de vista tècnic, de formació, legal i fins i tot generacional doncs cada generació de marins és diferent. Els esforços estan doncs enfocats a augmentar la seguretat, encara que sempre amb un ull posat sobre els costs. Així, he presentat un model en corbatí pel seu valor didàctic i gràfic però sense entrar en detalls numèrics, que si s’escau ja aniré afinant i interioritzant en l’exercici de la professió. En aquest treball també he intentat no mantenir-me totalment al costat de la teoria (ja se sap que si tot es fa bé, tot surt perfecte, etc…) sinó presentar amb cert detall 2 casos ben coneguts d’accidents marítims: el petroler Exxon Valdez, el 1989 i el ferry Estonia en 1994, entre altres esmentats. Són casos ja una mica vells però que van contribuir a augmentar la cultura de la seguretat, fins a arribar al nivell del que gaudim actualment, al menys als països occidentals. Doncs la seguretat, com esmenta Rodrigo de Larrucea “és una actitud i mai és fortuïta; sempre és el resultat d’una voluntat decidida, un esforç sincer, una direcció intel·ligent i una execució acurada. Sens lloc a dubtes, sempre suposa la millor alternativa”. The work has been inspired in its initial aspects by the book of my tutor Jaime Rodrigo de Larrucea, that presents a state of the art of all the maritime aspects related to safety. Evidently, since it covers all the topics, it cannot deepen on every topic. It was my opportunity to deepen in the Bowtie Model but finally I have also covered a wide variety of topics. Later, when I began to study the topics, I realized that the people in the maritime world usually do not understand to a great extent statistics. Everybody is concerned about safety but few nautical students take a probabilistic approach to the accidents. For this it is extremely important to study the population that is going to be studied: in our case the SOLAS ships Also, during my time at Riga, I have been very concerned with the most diverse accidents, some of them studied during the courses at Barcelona. I have seen that it is difficult to model mathematically the accidents, since each one has different characteristics, angles, and surely there are not 2 equal. Finally, it was accorded that I should concentrate on the Bowtie Model, which is not very complex from a statistical point of view. It is simply a fault tree of events model and a tree of effects. I present some examples in this Chapter 2. The difficulty I point out is to try to estimate the probabilities of occurrence of events that are unusual. We concentrated at major accidents, those that may cause victims or heavy losses. Then, for the sake of generality, at Chapter 4, I have divided the causes in 4 great classes: Natural hazards, human factor, mechanical failure and attacks (piracy and terrorism). The last concern maybe should not be included beside the others since terrorism and piracy acts are not accidents, but since there is an important code dedicated to prevent security threats, ISPS, it is example of design of barriers to prevent an undesired event (although it gives mainly guidelines to follow by the States, Port Terminals and Shipping Companies). I have presented a detailed study of the tragedy of the Estonia, showing how a mechanical failure triggered the failure of the ferry, by its nature a delicate ship, but there were other factors such as poor maintenance and heavy seas. At the next Chapter, certain characteristics of error chains are analyzed. Finally, the conclusions are drawn, offering a pretty optimistic view of the safety (and security) culture at the Western World but that may not easily permeate the entire World, due to the associated costs

Genetic Testing When There is a Mix of Compulsory and Voluntary Health Insurance

Genetic insurance can deal with the negative effects of genetic testing on insurance coverage and income distribution when the insurer has access to information about test status. Hence, efficient testing is promoted. When information about prevention and test status is private, two types of social inefficiencies may occur; genetic testing may not be done when it is socially efficient and genetic testing may be done although it is socially inefficient. The first type of inefficiency is shown to be likely for consumers with compulsory insurance only, while the second type of inefficiency is more likely for those who have supplemented the compulsory insurance with substantial voluntary insurance. This second type of inefficiency is more important the less effective prevention is. It is therefore a puzzle that many countries have imposed strict regulation on the genetic information insurers have access to. A reason may be that genetic insurance is not yet a political issue, and the advantage of shared genetic information is therefore not transparent.Genetic testing insurance, private information, compulsory/voluntary mix

Barnes Hospital Bulletin

https://digitalcommons.wustl.edu/bjc_barnes_bulletin/1038/thumbnail.jp

On Evidence-based Risk Management in Requirements Engineering

Background: The sensitivity of Requirements Engineering (RE) to the context makes it difficult to efficiently control problems therein, thus, hampering an effective risk management devoted to allow for early corrective or even preventive measures. Problem: There is still little empirical knowledge about context-specific RE phenomena which would be necessary for an effective context- sensitive risk management in RE. Goal: We propose and validate an evidence-based approach to assess risks in RE using cross-company data about problems, causes and effects. Research Method: We use survey data from 228 companies and build a probabilistic network that supports the forecast of context-specific RE phenomena. We implement this approach using spreadsheets to support a light-weight risk assessment. Results: Our results from an initial validation in 6 companies strengthen our confidence that the approach increases the awareness for individual risk factors in RE, and the feedback further allows for disseminating our approach into practice.Comment: 20 pages, submitted to 10th Software Quality Days conference, 201

Attitude Determination and Control System (ADCS) and Maintenance and Diagnostic System (MDS): A maintenance and diagnostic system for Space Station Freedom

The Maintenance and Diagnostic System (MDS) that is being developed at Honeywell to enhance the Fault Detection Isolation and Recovery system (FDIR) for the Attitude Determination and Control System on Space Station Freedom is described. The MDS demonstrates ways that AI-based techniques can be used to improve the maintainability and safety of the Station by helping to resolve fault anomalies that cannot be fully determined by built-in-test, by providing predictive maintenance capabilities, and by providing expert maintenance assistance. The MDS will address the problems associated with reasoning about dynamic, continuous information versus only about static data, the concerns of porting software based on AI techniques to embedded targets, and the difficulties associated with real-time response. An initial prototype was built of the MDS. The prototype executes on Sun and IBM PS/2 hardware and is implemented in the Common Lisp; further work will evaluate its functionality and develop mechanisms to port the code to Ada