Inconsistency-tolerant business rules in distributed information systems

The final publication is available at Springer via http://10.1007/978-3-642-41033-8_41Business rules enhance the integrity of information systems. However, their maintenance does not scale up easily to distributed systems with concurrent transactions. To a large extent, that is due to two problematic exigencies: the postulates of total and isolated business rule satisfaction. For overcoming these problems, we outline a measure-based inconsistency-tolerant approach to business rules maintenance.Supported by ERDF/FEDER and MEC grants TIN2009-14460-C03, TIN2010-17139, TIN2012-37719-C03-01.Decker, H.; Muñoz Escoí, FD. (2013). Inconsistency-tolerant business rules in distributed information systems. En On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems: OTM 2013 Workshops. Springer Verlag (Germany). 8186:322-331. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41033-8_41S3223318186Abiteboul, S., Hull, R., Vianu, V.: Foundations of Databases. 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Integrity Constraint Checking in Federated Databases

A federated database is comprised of multiple interconnected databases that cooperate in an autonomous fashion. Global integrity constraints are very useful in federated databases, but the lack of global queries, global transaction mechanisms, and global concurrency control renders traditional constraint management techniques inapplicable. The paper presents a threefold contribution to integrity constraint checking in federated databases: (1) the problem of constraint checking in a federated database environment is clearly formulated; (2) a family of cooperative protocols for constraint checking is presented; (3) the differences across protocols in the family are analyzed with respect to system requirements, properties guaranteed, and costs involved. Thus, we provide a suite of options with protocols for various environments with specific system capabilities and integrity requirement

Protocols for Integrity Constraint Checking in Federated Databases

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A database management capability for Ada

The data requirements of mission critical defense systems have been increasing dramatically. Command and control, intelligence, logistics, and even weapons systems are being required to integrate, process, and share ever increasing volumes of information. To meet this need, systems are now being specified that incorporate data base management subsystems for handling storage and retrieval of information. It is expected that a large number of the next generation of mission critical systems will contain embedded data base management systems. Since the use of Ada has been mandated for most of these systems, it is important to address the issues of providing data base management capabilities that can be closely coupled with Ada. A comprehensive distributed data base management project has been investigated. The key deliverables of this project are three closely related prototype systems implemented in Ada. These three systems are discussed

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Secure data storage is a serious problem for computer users today, particularly in enterprise environments. As data requirements grow, traditional approaches of secured silos are showing their limitations. They represent a single – or at least, limited – point of failure, and require significant, and increasing, maintenance and overhead. Such solutions are totally unsuitable for consumers, who want a ‘plug and play’ secure solution for their increasing datasets – something with the ubiquity of access of Facebook or webmail. Network providers can provide centralised solutions, but that returns us to the first problem. Sigmoid(x) takes a completely different approach – a scalable, distributed, secure storage mechanism which shares data storage between the users themselves