5 research outputs found
Does Fair Value Accounting Reduce Prices and Create Illiquidity?
Concerns about the use of fair value accounting commonly focus on the sensitivity of market prices to exogenous liquidity shocks. In this paper, we show that the use of fair value accounting for assets without an active market endogenously creates illiq- uidity. The underlying mechanism is the discretion in fair value reports when prices are unavailable. Firms use this discretion to report aggressively, leading to two market e ects. On the plus side, by revealing an upper bound on an asset's value, fair value reporting leads to lower prices than would occur in a conservative regime. This is an indication that prices are more e cient than under conservatism, as the reports protect investors from paying information rents. The downside is that fair value reports cannot credibly convey a lower bound on an asset's value, causing illiquidity. We con rm these e ects in a laboratory experiment
Contre le libertarianisme de droite : lâaccĂšs aux ressources pour une justice minimale
Dans ce mĂ©moire, nous aborderons des questions portant sur la lĂ©gitimitĂ© de la propriĂ©tĂ© privĂ©e, Ă quels moments est-ce que la propriĂ©tĂ© privĂ©e cesse dâĂȘtre lĂ©gitime ? Nous dĂ©fendrons que chaque individu dĂ©tient le droit inaliĂ©nable dâaccĂ©der aux ressources, et que cet accĂšs aux ressources doit lui fournir tous les moyens nĂ©cessaires pour quâil puisse se dĂ©velopper jusquâĂ ce quâil soit pleinement autonome. Ainsi, lorsque la propriĂ©tĂ© privĂ©e de certains individus bloque lâaccĂšs aux ressources, il doit y avoir des mĂ©canismes de redistribution permettant de compenser la nuisance produite par la propriĂ©tĂ© privĂ©e. Par ailleurs, lâaccĂšs aux ressources peut ĂȘtre remplacĂ© par une gamme dâopportunitĂ©s de base : les opportunitĂ©s de dĂ©veloppement nĂ©cessaires Ă lâatteinte de lâautonomie en sociĂ©tĂ©. La redistribution nâa donc pas besoin de viser lâaccĂšs aux ressources, elle doit garantir que tous aient accĂšs aux opportunitĂ©s de base.
Nous circonscrirons notre rĂ©flexion Ă un cadre de justice minimale dans le but dâattribuer une nĂ©cessitĂ© morale Ă chacune des conclusions de ce mĂ©moire. Autrement dit, si les paramĂštres de redistribution dĂ©veloppĂ©s au terme de ce mĂ©moire reprĂ©sentent le strict minimum pour quâune sociĂ©tĂ© se soucie de la justice, alors il est nĂ©cessaire que toutes les sociĂ©tĂ©s instituent au moins ces paramĂštres de redistribution. Pour dĂ©montrer le minimalisme de ces paramĂštres de justice, nous les dĂ©duirons Ă partir de la position des libertariens de droite. ConsidĂ©rant que leur position se veut la plus minimale possible, si nos paramĂštres de redistribution sont pleinement consistants avec leur position, alors ces paramĂštres relĂšvent de la justice minimale.This paper is based on a crucial question of social justice: when does the private property stop to be morally legitimate? This paper will defend a universal right to have access to all the resources needed for the acquisition of a personal autonomy. Therefore, when the private properties of some people prevent others to gain a sufficient access to the resources they need, we have to institute a system of wealth redistribution in order to compensate the prejudice of loosing access to the resources. Furthermore, it is possible to substitute the right to resources by a group of basic opportunities, such as an education system accessible without indebtedness. Since the basic opportunities grant an access to personal autonomy, people do not need to have access to resources anymore. Therefore, private properties are legitimate if and only if there is a system of wealth redistribution ensuring that everyone has an access to the basic opportunities.
In this paper, every conclusion concerning the wealth redistribution is bound to minimal justice. In other words, if a society fails to grand access to the basic opportunities, this society is necessarily unjust. To ensure that ours conclusions are bound to minimal justice, we will also demonstrate their consistency with right libertarianism. Although, every conclusion concerning basic opportunities come from the no harm principle and the full self-ownership, the two basis of right libertarianism
Distinguishing indeterminate belief from "risk-averse" preferences
I focus my discussion on the well-known Ellsberg paradox. I find good normative reasons for incorporating non-precise belief, as represented by sets of probabilities, in an Ellsberg decision model. This amounts to forgoing the completeness axiom of expected utility theory. Provided that probability sets are interpreted as genuinely indeterminate belief (as opposed to âimpreciseâ belief), such a model can moreover make the âEllsberg choicesâ rationally permissible. Without some further element to the story, however, the model does not explain how an agent may come to have unique preferences for each of the Ellsberg options. Levi (1986, Hard choices: Decision making under unresolved conflict. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press) holds that the extra element amounts to innocuous secondary âriskâ or security considerations that are used to break ties when more than one option is rationally permissible. While I think a lexical choice rule of this kind is very plausible, I argue that it involves a greater break with xpected utility theory than mere violation of the ordering axiom