186 research outputs found
Differential Power Analysis of a McEliece Cryptosystem
This work presents the first differential power analysis of an implementation of the McEliece cryptosystem. Target of this side-channel attack is a state-of-the-art FPGA implementation of the efficient QC-MDPC McEliece decryption operation as presented at DATE 2014. The presented cryptanalysis succeeds to recover the complete secret key after a few observed decryptions. It consists of a combination of a differential leakage analysis during the syndrome computation followed by an algebraic step that exploits the relation between the public and private key
Masking Large Keys in Hardware: A Masked Implementation of McEliece
Instantiations of the McEliece cryptosystem which are considered computationally secure even in a post-quantum era still require hardening against side channel attacks for practical applications. Recently, the first differential power analysis attack on a McEliece cryptosystem successfully recovered the full secret key of a state-of-the-art FPGA implementation of QC-MDPC McEliece. In this work we show how to apply masking countermeasures to the scheme and present the first masked FPGA implementation that includes these countermeasures. We validate the side channel resistance of our design by practical DPA attacks and statistical tests for leakage detection
Algorithmic Security is Insufficient: A Comprehensive Survey on Implementation Attacks Haunting Post-Quantum Security
This survey is on forward-looking, emerging security concerns in post-quantum
era, i.e., the implementation attacks for 2022 winners of NIST post-quantum
cryptography (PQC) competition and thus the visions, insights, and discussions
can be used as a step forward towards scrutinizing the new standards for
applications ranging from Metaverse, Web 3.0 to deeply-embedded systems. The
rapid advances in quantum computing have brought immense opportunities for
scientific discovery and technological progress; however, it poses a major risk
to today's security since advanced quantum computers are believed to break all
traditional public-key cryptographic algorithms. This has led to active
research on PQC algorithms that are believed to be secure against classical and
powerful quantum computers. However, algorithmic security is unfortunately
insufficient, and many cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to side-channel
attacks (SCA), where an attacker passively or actively gets side-channel data
to compromise the security properties that are assumed to be safe
theoretically. In this survey, we explore such imminent threats and their
countermeasures with respect to PQC. We provide the respective, latest
advancements in PQC research, as well as assessments and providing visions on
the different types of SCAs
Towards the security of McEliece's cryptosystem based on Hermitian subfield subcodes
The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive security analysis for the parameter selection process, which involves the computational cost of the information set decoding algorithm using the parameters of subfield subcodes of 1-point Hermitian codes. The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive security analysis for the parameter selection process, which involves the computational cost of the information set decoding (ISD) algorithm using Hermitian subfield subcode parameters
Countermeasure against the SPA attack on an embedded McEliece cryptosystem
International audience—In this paper, we present a novel countermeasure against a simple power analysis based side channel attack on a software implementation of the McEliece public key cryptosys-tem. First, we attack a straightforward C implementation of the Goppa codes based McEliece decryption running on an ARM Cortex-M3 microprocessor. Next, we demonstrate on a realistic example that using a " chosen ciphertext attack " method, it is possible to recover the complete secret permutation matrix. We show that this matrix can be completely recovered by an analysis of a dynamic power consumption of the microprocessor. Then, we estimate the brute-force attack complexity reduction depending on the knowledge of the permutation matrix. Finally, we propose an efficient software countermeasure having low computational complexity. Of course, we provide all the necessary details regarding the attack implementation and all the consequences of the proposed countermeasure especially in terms of power consumption
Envisioning the Future of Cyber Security in Post-Quantum Era: A Survey on PQ Standardization, Applications, Challenges and Opportunities
The rise of quantum computers exposes vulnerabilities in current public key
cryptographic protocols, necessitating the development of secure post-quantum
(PQ) schemes. Hence, we conduct a comprehensive study on various PQ approaches,
covering the constructional design, structural vulnerabilities, and offer
security assessments, implementation evaluations, and a particular focus on
side-channel attacks. We analyze global standardization processes, evaluate
their metrics in relation to real-world applications, and primarily focus on
standardized PQ schemes, selected additional signature competition candidates,
and PQ-secure cutting-edge schemes beyond standardization. Finally, we present
visions and potential future directions for a seamless transition to the PQ
era
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