773 research outputs found
Differential Fault Analysis Automation
Characterization of all possible faults in a cryptosystem exploitable for fault attacks is a problem
which is of both theoretical and practical interest for the cryptographic community. The complete
knowledge of exploitable fault space is desirable while designing optimal countermeasures for any
given crypto-implementation. In this paper, we address the exploitable fault characterization problem
in the context of Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) attacks on block ciphers. The formidable size
of the fault spaces demands an automated albeit fast mechanism for verifying each individual fault
instance and neither the traditional, cipher-specific, manual DFA techniques nor the generic and au-
tomated Algebraic Fault Attacks (AFA) [10] fulfill these criteria. Further, the diversified structures
of different block ciphers suggest that such an automation should be equally applicable to any block
cipher. This work presents an automated framework for DFA identification, fulfilling all aforemen-
tioned criteria, which, instead of performing the attack just estimates the attack complexity for each
individual fault instance. A generic and extendable data-mining assisted dynamic analysis frame-
work capable of capturing a large class of DFA distinguishers is devised, along with a graph-based
complexity analysis scheme. The framework significantly outperforms another recently proposed
one [6], in terms of attack class coverage and automation effort. Experimental evaluation on AES and
PRESENT establishes the effectiveness of the proposed framework in detecting most of the known
DFAs, which eventually enables the characterization of the exploitable fault space
Differential Fault Analysis on A.E.S.
We explain how a differential fault analysis (DFA) works on AES 128, 192 or 256 bits
Differential Fault Analysis of NORX
In recent literature, there has been a particular interest in studying nonce based AE schemes in the light of fault based attacks as they seem to present an automatic protection against Differential Fault Attacks (DFA). In this work, we present the first DFA on nonce based CAESAR scheme NORX. We demonstrate a scenario when faults introduced in NORX in parallel mode can be used to collide the internal state to produce an \emph{all-zero} state.
We later show how this can be used to replay NORX despite being instantiated by different nonces, messages. Once replayed, we show how the key of NORX can be recovered using secondary faults and using the faulty tags. We use different fault models to showcase the versatility of the attack strategy. A detailed theoretical analysis of the expected number of faults required under various models is also furnished. Under the random bit flip model, around 1384 faults are to be induced to reduce the key space from to while the random byte flip model requires 136 faults to uniquely identify the key. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first fault attack that uses \emph{both internal} and \emph{classical differentials} to mount a DFA on a nonce based authenticated cipher which is otherwise believed to be immune to DFA
Lightweight protection of cryptographic hardware accelerators against differential fault analysis
© 2020 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes,creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.Hardware acceleration circuits for cryptographic algorithms are largely deployed in a wide range of products. The HW implementations of such algorithms often suffer from a number of vulnerabilities that expose systems to several attacks, e.g., differential fault analysis (DFA). The challenge for designers is to protect cryptographic accelerators in a cost-effective and power-efficient way. In this paper, we propose a lightweight technique for protecting hardware accelerators implementing AES and SHA-2 (which are two widely used NIST standards) against DFA. The proposed technique exploits partial redundancy to first detect the occurrence of a fault and then to react to the attack by obfuscating the output values. An experimental campaign demonstrated that the overhead introduced is 8.32% for AES and 3.88% for SHA-2 in terms of area, 0.81% for AES and 12.31% for SHA-2 in terms of power with no working frequency reduction. Moreover, a comparative analysis showed that our proposal outperforms the most recent related countermeasures.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft
Efficient Differential Fault Analysis for AES
This paper proposes improved post analysis methods for Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) against AES. In detail, we propose three techniques to improve the attack efficiency as 1) combining previous DFA methods, 2) performing a divide-and-conquer attack by considering the AES key-schedule structure, and 3) taking the linearity of the MixColumns operation into account. As a result, the expectation of the analysis time in the previous work can be reduced to about one sixteenth.
Notice that these improvements are based on the detailed analysis of the previous DFA methods and the calculation time and memory cost in practical implementations. Moreover, the proposed techniques can be widely applied to DFA attacks under different assumptions
Differential Fault Analysis of Rectangle-80
We present various differential fault attack schemes for the RECTANGLE-80 and demonstrate how initially we started from a 80-bit fault to a single word fault scheme. This was mainly due to a differential vulnerability in the S-box of RECTANGLE as a result of which the exhaustive search space for the key reduces from to . We have also presented a key schedule attack that is a variant of the single fault scheme, exploiting the same vulnerability and reduces the search space to . The paper concludes with the simulation results for the single word fault scheme followed by countermeasures
Extending Differential Fault Analysis to Dynamic S-Box Advanced Encryption Standard Implementations
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a worldwide cryptographic standard for symmetric key cryptography. Many attacks try to exploit inherent weaknesses in the algorithm or use side channels to reduce entropy. At the same time, researchers strive to enhance AES and mitigate these growing threats. This paper researches the extension of existing Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) attacks, a family of side channel attacks, on standard AES to Dynamic S-box AES research implementations. Theoretical analysis reveals an expected average keyspace reduction of 2-88:9323 after one faulty ciphertext using DFA on the State of Rotational S-box AES-128 implementations. Experimental results revealed an average 2-88:8307 keyspace reduction and confirmed full key recovery is possible
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