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Lightweight protection of cryptographic hardware accelerators against differential fault analysis
Authors
Ramon Canal Corretger
Luca Cassano
Ana Lasheras Mas
Eva Rodríguez Luna
Publication date
1 January 2020
Publisher
'Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)'
Doi
Abstract
© 2020 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes,creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.Hardware acceleration circuits for cryptographic algorithms are largely deployed in a wide range of products. The HW implementations of such algorithms often suffer from a number of vulnerabilities that expose systems to several attacks, e.g., differential fault analysis (DFA). The challenge for designers is to protect cryptographic accelerators in a cost-effective and power-efficient way. In this paper, we propose a lightweight technique for protecting hardware accelerators implementing AES and SHA-2 (which are two widely used NIST standards) against DFA. The proposed technique exploits partial redundancy to first detect the occurrence of a fault and then to react to the attack by obfuscating the output values. An experimental campaign demonstrated that the overhead introduced is 8.32% for AES and 3.88% for SHA-2 in terms of area, 0.81% for AES and 12.31% for SHA-2 in terms of power with no working frequency reduction. Moreover, a comparative analysis showed that our proposal outperforms the most recent related countermeasures.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft
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Last time updated on 19/11/2020
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